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ABSTRACT

THE ETHICAL OBLIGATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF MEDICAL ERROR IN THE
INTENSIVE CARE UNIT

By
Saleh A. Alnahdi
May 2017

Dissertation supervised by Professor Gerard Magill
The very facts that humans are fallible and that they are integrally involved in the
delivery of healthcare and medical treatment guarantee that medical errors will occur
despite the best of training, skills and vigilance, precautions, or preventive procedures.
While medical errors occur across the spectrum of care and treatment, the propensity for
their occurrence and the severity of the damage they are likely to inflict are undeniably
greatest in the hospital intensive care unit (ICU).
The fundamentals of biomedical ethics require nothing less than a thorough
systematic analysis of the sources of error in the ICU, along with a comprehensive,
coordinated approach to preventing error to the extent humanly possible and to handling
and mitigating the effects of error whenever they do occur. Through the chapters of this
dissertation, the research and analysis has provided the following: 1) a detailed account,
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to the extent that it has been documented, of the high frequency of errors occurring in the
U.S. in general and specifically in hospital intensive care units, as well as the range and
extent of the harm done to patients and family members, both physically and financially;
2) a classification and analysis of the proximate, intermediate and ultimate causes of and
contributing factors to medical errors, which in addition to identifying causation has
formed the basis for this dissertation’s recommendations aimed at developing procedures
and protocols to effectively reduce errors to the greatest degree possible while
minimizing their harmful impact; 3) an in-depth analysis of expectations, grounded in
biomedical ethics, for dealing with the consequences of medical errors including
disclosure and communication, the expectations of patients and family members, the
attitudes and concerns of medical professionals, the disconnect between these two
groups, and recommendations for procedures and protocols to ensure prompt, complete,
and just handling of all consequences of the error; 4) an in-depth framework, based on
Western religious and cultural foundations, for both those responsible for and those
injured by medical errors to interact in handling the consequences of the error, as well as
all of the communication which it engenders; and 5) proposals for numerous procedures
and protocols, both for lessening the vulnerability of hospital ICU patients to suffering
the effects of an error and for addressing and counteracting the variety of systemic
problems which create or heighten the propensity for the occurrence of medical errors.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Standard hospital procedures and law in the United States require medical staff to
disclose information to patients concerning their treatment and outcomes, as well as
information not protected by patient confidentiality to relevant agencies. However, the
increasing threat of lawsuits, the desire to hide negative treatment statistics, higher
insurance premiums, and the threat of loss of employment all contribute to the incentive
for staff to underreport medical errors. As a consequence of this gap in information, not
only do hospital staff risk failing to learn from these errors, but patients also lose a
measure of their autonomy. Depending on when and how these unreported medical errors
occurred, patients may unwittingly be unable to prevent or plan for worst-case scenarios,
provide information to their doctors that is necessary for their treatment, write their last
or living wills, choose the location of their passing, and prepare for other key issues
related either to their health or to their demise. The ethical issues associated with
disclosure of patient information involve patient rights to obtain their medical records,
choose between treatment options, refuse treatment, and make decisions about end-of-life
care. These issues become more nuanced when examined in the context of the scope and
timing of the disclosure of such information, as well as the circumstances that create the
system of incentives and disincentives in which medical staffs operate with regard to
disclosing or withholding information.
There has been significant analysis in the literature of biomedical ethics regarding
medical errors and their causes. This focus has led to significant discussion of the need
for appropriate discourse following the occurrence of medical errors in the field as a
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whole. In terms of healthcare settings, it is widely acknowledged in the literature that the
hospital intensive care unit (ICU) constitutes an area where the need for highest quality
care is acute and the potential for severe harm is great. However, a thorough search
through the literature in the field has failed to identify any research, analysis, or
discussion specifically focusing on the crucial connection between these three topics (i.e.,
disclosure, medical error, and the intensive care unit).
This dissertation seeks to address this substantive gap in the literature. Because
these distinct topics are intricately connected, the dissertation deals with them in an
integrated manner. The analysis explains that disclosure of medical error in the intensive
care unit is so important to efforts to improve patient safety that protocols must be in
place to prevent these errors and to handle their consequences in a manner consistent with
the highest standards of biomedical ethics when they do occur. The various reasons that
disclosure of medical errors in the intensive care unit is so important include:
A. The ICU is a constantly changing environment, which is the confluence of patients at
high risk with critical, often life-threatening and immediate treatment needs and
multiple care providers, who routinely manage complex interventions and intensive
monitoring under stressful conditions.
B. There exists a clearly definable correlation between certain groups of patients and the
likelihood of experiencing positive health outcomes, based on patient demographics
and illness or injury, with ICU patients, by definition, falling into one of the least
promising of categories. For example, during 2005 among hospital ICUs throughout
the U.S., 20% experienced an event with negative consequences. Among such events,
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45% of which were later found to have been preventable while 13% of the latter group
proved life threatening or even fatal. The rate of medical errors in ICUs is estimated
to stand at 15 serious errors/100 patient-days, of which 11% are potentially life
threatening; moreover, 78% of such errors occurred during treatment involving the
administration of medication. The most prevalent type of errors consist of slips and
lapses. First, given that patients who are in critical condition tend to be receiving on
average twice the number of medications as their counterparts who are in the rest of
the hospital, the severity of a patient’s condition constitutes the strongest predictor of
an adverse drug event (ADE). Second, given that they are in critical condition, ICU
patients have fewer natural defense systems, and those that they have are severely
weakened and far less able to cope with the physiological burden of ADEs. Third,
even when their condition improves and ICU patients transition toward recuperation
and/or less intensive levels of care, they face a significant lack of coordination and
continuity in the lack of continuity of care beyond the point of discharge from the ICU.
This extensively documented flaw in the medical care system creates an additional
vulnerability, for the patient, to medical errors during the transition phase. In light of
this weakness and its accompanying danger, coordination and communication between
ICU staff and the patient’s subsequent caregivers constitutes an essential, albeit
neglected aspect of care.
C. The rapid advance of technology within healthcare in general and in the ICU in
particular, has fostered a growing dependence on equipment and systems which are
sophisticated, yet not thoroughly understood by those medical professionals who must
employ them in administering essential care within the ICU. Moreover, medical
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equipment failure and its associated safety risks and consequences is poorly
understood at all levels. This complex clinical scenario presents the context for the
bioethical analysis of the dissertation.
Two realities of the healthcare system in the United States are beyond dispute.
First, as a group, patients being treated in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) of any given
hospital are the most vulnerable in terms of the seriousness and volatility of their
conditions, as well as their need for extensive medical care to be delivered without delay.
Second, throughout the hospital errors in the provision of medical treatment constitute a
significant, even at times life-threatening danger to patients’ health and well-being.
Therefore, it follows that medical errors occurring in the ICU can be expected to have
grave consequences and that eliminating or minimizing such errors should receive the
highest priority. However, as this dissertation explores, medical errors in this part of the
hospital are alarming both in respect to their frequency and to the severity of their
ramifications.
The thesis of this dissertation is that there is an ethical obligation for disclosure of
medical error in the ICU. Biomedical ethics facilitates a systematic analysis of the
sources of error in the ICU to suggest a coordinated approach to preventing errors and to
mitigating the effects of errors whenever they occur.
The analysis begins with a survey of medical errors in the ICU. This chapter is
followed by a discussing of the ethical problems concerning medical error in the ICU.
The subsequent chapter considers the ethical obligations of the medical staff and
administration of the institution in terms of honesty to patients. Within this context of the
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problem and obligations regarding medical error in the ICU, the following chapter
examines protocols for disclosure and addressing the consequences of medical errors.
The final analytical chapter suggests how to establish a systemic endeavor to diminish
medical error in the ICU.
The following is a summary of the analysis that is described in the remaining
chapters. This includes the extent of medical errors in the ICU, ethical problems that
result, ethical obligations to patients, disclosure protocols in the ICU, systematic
endeavors to mitigate these errors, and conclusions.
Two realities of the healthcare system in the United States are beyond dispute:
first, that the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) of the hospital cares for and treats the most
vulnerable patients in need of medical care; and second, that errors in the provision of
medical treatment constitutes a significant threat to patients’ health, up to the point of
threatening their very lives. It is to be anticipated, therefore, that medical errors occurring
in the ICU are of grave consequence. Indeed, as dissertation documents through an
extensive survey of research to date, medical errors in this part of the hospital are
alarming in their frequency and in the severity of their ramifications. As applied to this
increasing problem, the fundamental principles of biomedical ethics require nothing less
than: 1) a thorough, systematic analysis of the sources of error within the ICU, 2)
handling the consequences of medical error with full disclosure and sensitivity to the
religious and culturally expectations of patients, 3) to the greatest extent possible,
reversing, mitigating, or otherwise dealing with any negative effects of errors whenever
they do occur, 4) establishing protocols for handling all aspects of dealing with medical
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errors, mindful of the need to counteract disincentives to full disclosure, as well as the
patient’s condition, needs, and concerns and 5) taking a comprehensive, coordinated
approach to preventing error to the extent humanly possible.
The dissertation surveys the potential causes of error in the ICU from the smallest
causes that may or may not lead to injury and loss to the largest potential causes that can
lead to death. In addition, it describes in detail the extent of medical errors in the ICU,
including those within the broadest scope, namely all occurrences which consist of
unintended failures of one kind or another that are not caused by the disease, injury or the
condition being treated. Moreover, the types of these errors will include both errors of
commission (execution, planning, diagnosis, delays, medication, complex equipment
failure, communication error) and omission (lack of prophylactic treatment, and missing
or poor medical management). From a larger perspective, the dissertation provides
overall statistics regarding the human impact and cost of medical errors.
Following this analysis of the errors themselves, the discussion focuses on the
biomedical ethical challenges that medical errors pose for healthcare providers and the
ethical obligations that the medical staff and institutional administration have in
responding to these errors. Next the dissertation elaborates on those ethical principles,
overtly expressed by the American Medical Association and the American College of
Physicians, which call upon medical providers to fully disclose all relevant details of
medical errors to all patients, holding themselves (the medical professionals) accountable
for their actions. The dominant ethical theories that stand behind these recommendations
and guidelines will be analyzed including the consequentialist theory, which focuses on
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medical outcomes rather than the process; utilitarianism, which focuses upon the use of
resources, delivering the greatest good to the greatest number of people; and deontology,
specifically its variant – principlism – the polar opposites of consequentialist theory, in
which moral process principles dominate, namely the principles of autonomy, justice,
beneficence and non-maleficence. The dissertation demonstrates that while these varying
approaches to ethics may disagree, and even lead to ethical dilemmas in the practice of
healthcare, they are unanimous in their position on how to treat the patient who has
suffered the consequences of a medical error.
In addition to these broad principles, there are also western cultural and religious
ethical expectations and attitudes that specifically apply to what to do following the
occurrence of a medical error. Specifically, certain principles and societal expectations
hold individuals and institutions accountable for the harm they create which results in
losses and costs to others. Applying these principles to medical errors in the ICU, all
involved parties connected with the institution, the hospital itself and medical
professionals working in that setting, are ethically responsible to disclose, fully confess,
apologize with contrition, compensate victims and ask for forgiveness. Not fulfilling
these expectations may further traumatize the victim psychologically and physically, in
this case the ICU patient, and furthermore, may initiate legal action. Statistics attest to a
significant deviation in practice from these expectations, indicating a major weakness in
current medical institutional behavior; it has been estimated that there may only be 30%
compliance with these expectations in the wake of medical errors in U.S. hospitals.
Potential reform here would first include the proper notification and documentation of the
medical errors that occur – critical procedures that are rarely followed at present.
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With this foundation, the dissertation will then elaborate on protocols for
disclosure and handling of the consequences of medical errors addressing scope and scale
of errors, acceptance of responsibility, considerations involving risk of patient outcome
and loss, management of the risk to the medical institution, anticipating consequences,
disclosure timing, apologies and losses, and compensation.
Finally, the dissertation focuses on establishing the systemic, preventative
approach that will be necessary in order to bring the problem of medical errors in the ICU
under control. Protocols will be called for to reduce the amount and severity of medical
errors including prevention planning, better communication, better medication execution,
and planning to prevent, or if not possible, deal with equipment failure. The elimination
or reduction of system failure and tort reform will be recommended although these two
goals are beyond that which can be addressed through the establishment of protocols.
Chapter 2 provides, in broad scope, a picture of the prevalence and frequency at
which medical errors of various types, causes, and characteristics occur in the intensive
care units of hospitals throughout the United States. In order to proceed, it will be
necessary to understand how medical errors have been defined and understood in general
within the field. Further subsections will classify the types of medical errors that may
occur, survey the statistics which document the frequency and severity of the problem,
and analyze the principal risk factors that increase the likelihood of errors occurring.
The sub-section of the chapter defines medical errors, analyze the potential for
their occurrence in general, and enumerate various types or categories into which they
fall. In particular, the discussion will lay the foundation for the position that the
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propensity for a type of error to occur is related to the medical setting, such as the
hospital ICU and that this relationship will be important in proposing measures to combat
medical error in general.
In the abstract, medical errors may be defined to include all those occurrences,
actions, and their results, which are neither intended as part of the course of prescribed
treatment nor directly attributable to the disease, injury, or condition being treated.1 Thus,
in the hospital Intensive Care Unit (ICU), a wide range of occurrences can be classified
as medical errors, including the administration of incorrect medications or dosages, the
improper administration of infusions, errors in the use of medical equipment, deviations
from standard protocol, as well as any other unintended variation in the course of patient
care that could compromise proper medical treatment.2 The Institute of Medicine
characterizes medical errors more broadly, thereby including any failure in following
through to completion on a prescribed plan for treatment, as well as the intentional
implementation of any inappropriate plan or steps in such a plan.3
Frequently, these errors inherently cause some form of harm or setback to the
patient and his or her recuperation process; furthermore, they may vary widely in the
severity of their consequences.4 As Angus and Carlet note, the effects of medical errors
may be so slight as to cause no physiological or biochemical difference in the patient,
thus requiring no rectifying action. On the other hand, over much of the continuum of
severity the error adversely affects the patient, necessitating treatment specifically for the
purpose of correcting or mitigating the damage and restoring the patient’s health.5
Complicating the issue, these adverse consequences can be temporary or permanent, even
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to the point of causing death. In order to provide more precision, the Ohio State
University Severity Scale was created to serve as a seven level basis for assessing the
severity of effect of the medical error on the patient, as follows: a) Level 0 for errors that
are caught and dealt with promptly enough that the patient does not experience any
effects from them; b) Level 1 for errors that cause no change in the patient’s clinical
outcome; c) Level 2 for errors that necessitate increased monitoring but possibly no
action; d) Level 3 for errors that require additional laboratory tests, or produce any
alteration in vital signs; e) Level 4 for errors the require either additional treatment or
procedures, a prolonged stay in the hospital or (re)admission to it; f) Level 5 for errors
that either result in admission to the ICU or necessitate invasive procedure, or otherwise
cause irreversible harm; and g) Level 6 for errors that are ultimately fatal.6
Bauman and Hyzy have asserted that in spite of the intensive training which the
large majority of health care professionals assigned to ICUs are required to go through,
the fact that these individuals are human beings inherently means that they will from time
to time, commit errors.7 Furthermore, the ICU, along with other hospital units, is an
environment of medical care that is especially vulnerable to the occurrence of errors.8
Bohomol et al, credit the Institute of Medicine’s 1999 report, which bears the clichéd title
To Err is Human, with focusing the attention of the community of medical professionals
on the extent and seriousness of medical errors and their adverse consequences.9 The very
nature of the life threatening severity of illnesses and injuries that lead to admission to the
ICU presupposes a significantly elevated potential for errors in treatment, along with an
elevated level of seriousness in their repercussions. Fundamental to this need for constant
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monitoring, intensive and complex treatment interventions, and urgent response to critical
situations is the greatly increased risk of medical error.10
The potential for medical errors to occur is inextricably linked to the
fragmentation of healthcare services, as opposed to their being integrated into a
functioning network system.11 McGowan and Healey, noted that this fragmentation
forces the patient into interactions with numerous providers in various environments.
These researchers contend that the resulting lack of access to complete information,
coupled with the disincentive to take on expanded responsibility or admit responsibility
for mistakes, creates an environment that actually fosters medical errors, increasing their
likelihood and frequency.12
In pursuit of the goal of dealing with medical errors, various researchers have
categorized potential errors according to how they occur. Among the most frequently
occurring types of errors is that of execution, which involves a presumably efficacious
plan for treatment that is not implemented as prescribed and thereby yields negative
consequences.13 Distinct from errors of execution are those that result from failures of
health care providers in creating a plan for treatment, either by neglecting needed steps or
procedures or by calling for those that have unjustifiable risks in relation to anticipated
benefits. Detailed contrastive analysis of these two types of errors leads to the conclusion
that in addition to the errors themselves, errors of execution and errors of planning differ
in the settings in which they most often occur, which individuals in the system most often
commit such errors, and how the errors are to be remedied.14
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A third distinct category of medical errors are known as diagnostic errors consist
of the failure to accurately diagnose either an initial condition which the patient has or a
subsequent development in the course of treatment; such errors are relatively common in
the ICU.15 Obviously, safe and effective medication and treatment cannot be
implemented in the absence of proper diagnosis; moreover, the consequences of such
inaccuracy are far more serious and potentially life-threatening in the ICU.16 At the same
time, however, delays in diagnosis prompted by an effort to be certain of accuracy have
an equal potential for serious or even fatal consequences. Thus, if not thoroughly
justifiable, such delays also constitute medical errors.17
Given the conditions of those patients who populate the ICU, the most rigorous
measures to prevent the introduction or spread of diseases must be adhered to.
Consequently, any lapse in preventative procedures or failure to provide prophylactic
treatment to patients in need of it constitutes a serious medical error. Another set of
medical errors closely related in terms of how they transpire arises out of the inability of
ICU staff, for whatever reason, to follow through with the administration of all treatment
protocols, the implementation of which necessitate continuous monitoring.18
Medication errors, by contrast, represent the commission of an inappropriate act
rather than a failure to take proper action.19 This category of errors includes not only
administering the wrong medicine or dosage, but also any deviation from prescribed
procedures in administering the medication which would compromise the efficacy of the
treatment. In the ICU, the most prevalent occurrence of this type of error stems from one
of two mistakes; either a health care provider prescribes the wrong dosage or even the
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wrong medicine itself, or else the healthcare worker misinterprets written instructions.
Either of these errors can easily lead to critical consequences for a patient in the ICU. 20
Beyond the obvious, direct medical errors of omission and commission described
above are failures of those activities, entities, and technologies that need to function
reliably in support of the delivery of care. One of these categories of medical errors can
be characterized as failures at communicating effectively. Given the added urgency of the
circumstances surrounding a patient’s being in the ICU and the greater numbers of
physicians, healthcare workers, and support staff involved, the need for timely and
accurate communication cannot be overstated.21 ICU facilities depend upon equipment
functioning properly, in some cases to provide automatic delivery of supportive care,
while in other cases to monitor and deliver accurate, up-to-the-second information about
the patient’s status. Any technical failure of this equipment constitutes a medical error.22
Complicating the issue, the source of this failure may be either a defect in manufacture or
either improper use or simply overuse of the equipment. The error may also occur due to
the institution’s neglecting to inspect and ensure that the equipment is functioning
properly; on the other hand, the malfunction may be undetectable despite rigorous
monitoring until the moment it occurs. As a defined and integrated health system, the
ICU must have all support systems, whether human or mechanical, functioning
dependably; otherwise, medical errors are all but inevitable.23
Given that the organizational structure of hospitals is extremely complex,
effective management at all levels is essential for the coordination of interacting systems,
which in turn is necessary for the prevention of medical errors.24 In spite of these
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seemingly obvious considerations, the extent to which many institutions fail to address
this need for effective management in the ICU is remarkable and contributes significantly
to the occurrence of medical errors. Poor medical management has been documented in
numerous cases as an underlying cause medical errors and their negative consequences.
Conscientious management needs to be a high priority for health care institutions for a
multitude of reasons, not merely for the prevention of medical errors. Given the
seriousness of the conditions that place patients in the ICU, hospitals need to place the
proper management of this area of the institution at the top of their priority list.25
Human error can be defined broadly and typically plays a role in the aggregate,
whether it is due to negligence, substandard performance of duties, or failure to be
vigilant in monitoring; as a result, human error is often viewed as the primary cause of a
majority if not all errors in the hospital setting overall and especially in the ICU.26
Consequently, much of the research to date into medical errors in the ICU has
concentrated on human error as the principal source. Even recently, some theorists have
conceived of critical medical errors as solely the result of an anomaly within the
performance of the healthcare staff, based upon the assumption that all systems of
procedure and technology in the ICU would otherwise function perfectly.27
The next sub-section begins with an overview of facts and figures documenting
the frequency of medical errors and their associated costs, comparing in-patient versus
out-patient errors rates and explaining how despite the high level and complexity of risk
for medical errors in the ICU, such factors may still be isolated and analyzed as a
prerequisite to being eliminated or at least minimized.
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Although precise calculation may be impossible, a recent study estimates that as
many as 20% of Americans pass away after a final hospital stay involving time in the
ICU. Whether or not these patients survive, they often endure prolonged pain and
suffering while being obligated to pay for their treatment and care.28 Quantifying the cost,
Multz has estimated that expenditures on ICU care reached approximately $62 billion in
United States in 1998, constituting 34% of hospital budgets and about 1% of U.S. gross
domestic product. Both the potential benefits and the costs in the ICU are enormous,
making the problem of medical errors in that part of the hospital of vital significance.
Notably there are at least twice as many medical errors in the ICU as occur in any other
hospital unit.29 One major study claims that for every critically ill patient spending time
in the ICU, approximately 1.7 medical errors of some level of seriousness occur each
day; furthermore, it is quite common for a patient to have at least one life-threatening
error occur during the course of his or her treatment in the ICU.30 If anything, such
statistics grossly underestimate the frequency of medical errors since their documentation
depends on self-reporting – a method that has been demonstrated to be flawed in favor of
underreporting. Even in teaching hospitals, where monitoring is more intensive and
reporting is a high priority, a tremendous gap has existed between the intention to report
and the actual act of doing so.31
While the determination as to whether an individual patient has died directly
because of a medical error is complicated and in the end often a matter of judgment and
dispute, generally accepted estimates have concluded that somewhere between 44,000 to
98,000 people die annually because of preventable medical errors.32 McGowan and
Healey cited the Institute of Medicine’s report from 1999, which claimed that 98,000
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deaths per year were attributable to preventable medical errors.33 Summarizing the scope
of the problem and the inadequacy of the response, Sultz and Young contend that the
medical error problem in hospitals is quite well-known in the healthcare community, but
largely ignored by those with the power and authority to effect change.34
The same 1999 report from the Institute estimates the annual U.S. economic
losses from medical error at $17 to 29 billion dollars. While more recent 2008 data place
losses closer to the lower end of that range, the $19.5 billion dollar figure from the
Millennium Research Group is still quite high, especially in light of an estimated
additional 17 billion loss each year due to prescription errors.35 In comparative terms,
more individuals are believed to have died from consequences of medical errors that have
perished in motor vehicle accidents or succumbed to either breast cancer or HIV. This
highlights the seriousness of the issue and reveals the need for initiatives to ensure that
medical errors are reduced. One contributing factor to the costs is that in the ICU in
particular, patients run up huge additional expenses any time that a medical error must be
treated, causing extensions of stay in the ICU, along with the added costs of new,
corrective, or prolonged original treatment.36
While research has been undertaken to compare inpatient with outpatient care, in
terms of the cost of medical error, it is primarily the cost of errors in the context of
inpatient care that is the subject of the dissertation’s focus.37 Unfortunately, research into
the specific costs of medical errors within the ICU has not been addressed to any
significant extent, making accurate extrapolation to the U.S. population as a whole
impossible.38 What is understood is that patients admitted to the hospital have a greater
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risk of suffering the consequences of a medical error than do outpatients; moreover,
among inpatients, those in ICUs are at greater risk that those in the general hospital
inpatient population. The overall price tag for inpatient medical errors today (including
those occurring in the ICU) stands at approximately $2.7 billion annually.39
Numerous studies have established that the frequency at which different types of
medical errors occur varies, depending on the origin and type of error, as well as other
related factors.40 For instance, in considering errors that are attributable to human
mistakes, certain factors such as overburdening responsibility or understaffing will tend
to increase the error rate and frequency while equipment failure will not be subject to the
same forces.41 Despite the apparent complexity in the interaction of influential factors,
research exists documenting common trends which explain the frequency of the various
types of errors.42 Furthermore, one overarching factor in determining the types and
frequency of errors in the ICU is the healthcare system that is in place in the specific
institution. Procedures for drug storage at one facility may promote the likelihood of
medication errors, while another hospital might be prone to errors that stem from poor
communication systems.43
The desire to better understand the sources and likelihood of medical errors has
led to a notable amount of research into identifying risk factors.44 This sub-section of the
chapter provides an in-depth analysis of these risk factors such as patients, medications
and ICU equipment, and the mechanism by which they trigger medical errors.

17

A variety of factors, together with characteristics of the patient constitute risk
factors for medical errors, all of which have heightened significance in the environment
of the ICU. These factors include:
1) Severity of the primary illness or injury.
All those admitted to the ICU by definition already have life threatening
conditions. However, medical experts are quick to note that the severity of these
conditions can vary widely. The more severe the case is, the greater complexity exists
along with greater propensity that any need for urgent action will confuse or hamper the
ICU staff.45
2) Age related need for special care.
While most ICU patients have seriously weakened bodily systems, patients at the
extremes of youth and advanced age are at greater vulnerability to injury cause by
medical error. Young children, for example, have immature physiological system with
less tolerance for any variation their level of treatment as the result of a medical error,
especially when in the ICU.46
3) Extended stays in the hospital or ICU.
More lengthy stays in the ICU correlate with more complicated conditions, which
in turn require adaptive treatment strategies, and consequently a greater potential for
error.47
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4) Patients under sedation.
Church and MacKinnon note that many of those in the ICU are under sedation as
a necessary component of their treatment. Unfortunately, sedation dulls the senses which
renders patients more susceptible to the effects of medical error.48
Medication errors form a category comprising a variety of things that can occur
stemming from different risk factors for medical errors in general.49 This variety of
factors and their potential causes presents challenges for the anticipation and prevention
of errors, given the multiplicity of possible triggers.50 The three primary factors include:
1) Special types of medication.
As Bucknall notes, certain medications require highly precise and inflexible
protocols of administration.51 Adding to this problem is the risk of confusion, given the
plethora of combinations of active ingredients, with similar sounding names.
2) The number of medications.
It is a given that patients in the ICU normally need a combination of medications,
which require carefully planning and administering protocols.
3) The number of interventions.
Sometime patients in the ICU present life-threatening conditions that may require
a number of different interventions to save their lives. When such an intervention
becomes necessary, the interactive effects of all medications currently or soon to be in the
patient’s system must be anticipated and allowances for these interactions must be
made.52
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According to Moyen and his colleagues, the potential for malfunctioning or
failure of equipment constitutes another class of risk factors for medical errors in the
ICU.53 These factors include:
1) The complexity of the environment.
The equipment and facilities that provide life support to patients in the ICU are
quite sophisticated, yet must function with near-perfect reliability. Moreover, the ICU
staff must be fully competent in their use.54
2) The need to handle emergency admissions.
A characteristic that sets the ICU apart from other hospital units is that those
staffing the unit do not have the luxury of running checks on the equipment before use.
Emergency admissions to the ICU may occur in rapid succession, challenging ICU staff
to heightened competency and responsiveness at the same time.55
3) The multiplicity of care providers
The round-the-clock need for intensive care and monitoring in the ICU requires
staffing, which consists of rotating shifts of numerous health care providers who possess
varying levels of experience and understanding of the appropriate treatment and
diagnostic procedures in relation to the equipment and to the patient.56
This chapter of the dissertation focuses on errors in the ICU and consists of a
broad category of occurrences, which are unintended failures of one kind or another and
which are not caused by disease, injury, or the condition being treated. There are many
potential causes of error in the ICU, the results of which can range from little to no effect
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all the way up to serious injury and death. These errors include errors of commission
(execution, planning, diagnosis, delay, medication, complex equipment failure,
communication error) and omission (lack of prophylactic treatment, and absent or poor
medical management). Most errors by far are medication errors. It has been roughly
estimated that annually somewhere between 44,000 and 98,000 people die of preventable
medical errors in the ICU, tallying economic losses between $17-29 billion. Furthermore,
twice as many errors occur in the ICU as in the rest of the hospital. More than a third of
most hospitals annual budgets is spent on the ICU. Most patients admitted to the ICU
have life threatening conditions, are weak, physically vulnerable, and under sedation, as
well as in need of complex drug regimens.
Chapter 3 discusses medical errors in the ICU in the context of biomedical ethics,
beginning with an analysis of the major principles of ethics which apply, including:
autonomy, distributed justice, beneficence, and non-maleficence. Beyond this discussion,
the section focuses on the process of preserving patient autonomy and informed consent
in the context of the potential for medical errors interfering with the prescribed course of
patient treatment.
In the broader context of medicine, as well as in the hospital environment, ethical
conflicts arise from factors as diverse as the preferences and opinions of patients or their
surrogates; the duties and professional judgments of physicians, specialists, and other
medical staff; the administrative concerns of hospital management and legal counsel; and
social concerns over equitable allocation of medical resources. It is incumbent upon all
medical professionals to be conversant with the basic fundamentals of biomedical ethics
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as applicable to hospitals and other institutional healthcare settings. These functions serve
as guidelines for professional ethics.57 An understanding of ethical principles by all those
involved facilitates accomplishing the mission of the ICU, especially when urgent action
is called for. Principles of ethics, such as respect for the patient’s autonomy, justice
(particularly with regard to resource allocation), beneficence, and non-maleficence are
cornerstone values in bioethics, which play an enhanced role in the ICU.58
Recognition of the prevalence of and need to prevent, or at least minimize, the
effects of medical errors has already come to family practice and post hospital-discharge
medical settings.59 Ethics guidelines for doctors, nurses, medical researchers, and others
in the healthcare field are already being implemented in various global settings,
monitored by established ethics committees.60 The attention to ethics in the broader
context of healthcare is not merely a response to trends in litigation, but rather is part of
the growing recognition of the burden placed on society as a whole when medical errors
proliferate. By comparison, recognition of the need to address the problem of medical
errors from the perspective of biomedical ethics has been slow to gain attention in
institutional healthcare settings, such as in hospitals and their ICUs.61
As Youngberg and Hatlie, note the code of ethics adopted by the American
Medical Association (AMA) obligates physicians to inform the patient of any mistakes
they (the medical professionals) have made any time the error causes complications for
the patient’s health or medical treatment.62 This ethical disclosure responsibility extends
to all pertinent facts concerning the occurrence. The only significant exception to this rule
is in the case of an error that results in no material consequences to the patient’s health or
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prognosis. Despite years of rigorous medical training and this very concrete obligation, it
appears that a significant number of medical practitioners are not cognizant of the ethical
responsibility that is inherent in every piece of medical advice, directive, medication,
prescription, or course of treatment they choose to give. Ethical practice requires that for
every case in which the disclosure would lead to improvement of the patient’s health,
medical ethics demands full and honest disclosure.63 The American College of
Physicians, concurs on these demands, to which the ethical treatment of the patient
obligates the doctor, calling on the physician to fully disclose all relevant details
concerning errors in both procedure and professional judgment committed in the course
of care. The condition is that this information should be material to the patient’s wellbeing. It is understood that while any particular unintentional medical error may not
qualify as improper, negligent, or unethical, the failure to disclose the error to the patient
qualifies as all of these things.64
One of the most applicable theories of ethics, consequentialism, or teleological
theory focuses on the outcome of an action as distinguished from evaluating the action
itself.65 Under this approach, the goal is to identify and pursue the optimal outcome under
any given set of circumstances, such as a medical error, and subsequently to follow the
best course of action in order to achieve those optimal results. Utilitarianism follows from
this theory, advocating for the course of action that will bring the greatest good to the
greatest number of people. Understandably, in the context of the ICU, this would hold
accountable those people who are directly or indirectly involved in the effects of the
error.66 Going back many centuries, consequentialists have called for the application of
this theory on the basis of a belief in the fundamental benevolence of human nature.67
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This utilitarian perspective clearly takes a position with regard to the allocation of
healthcare resources, and in particular what happens in the context of the ICU.68 A
consequentialist might label as immoral, or at least unethical, the heavy expenditure of
funds and resources on surgery to benefit a single patient if it means that other patients
cannot be helped. In sharp contrast to this position stands non-consequentialist theory.
The tension in balancing these conflicting theoretical approaches as well as considering
other approaches, such as the practice of triage, is what informs the ethical practice of
medicine and its consequences for treatment in the ICU.69
In contrast to both consequentialism and utilitarianism, deontology, as espoused
by Kant and Rawls, posits fundamental principles of ethics that individuals, in this case
medical professional in the ICU, should always endeavor to follow without exception on
the basis of duty as the foundation of all moral action.70 Deontology asserts that moral
rules are the fundamental criterion for judging whether an action can be considered
ethical, making the consequences of actions whether harmful or beneficial largely
secondary to the action’s ethical basis. Following this approach could place the quality of
a decision, for example by a medical provider, a priority ahead of the patient’s outcome.71
A variant of deontology in the area of applied ethics – principlism - is founded on the
concept of core principles – autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice - which
control and determine ethical behavior, while allowing for their being superseded in
exceptional cases by compelling reasons.72
The ICU has functioned as an essential component in the U.S. hospital system for
more than half a century.73 From its beginning, the ICU and its specialized treatment,
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care, and interventions, which include increased monitoring and special equipment such
as mechanical ventilators, have often though not uniformly extended and improved the
quality of life for patients with severe and urgent medical problems. By the late 1970s,
the necessity of possessing a distinct skill set in order to care for ICU patients within
ethical guidelines had become apparent to members of the nursing profession who
focused on matters of ethics.74
Conflicts among the four basic principles of biomedical ethics constitute the
source of most of the ethical dilemmas that arise in the ICU, those principles being: 1)
autonomy, 2) distributed justice, 3) beneficence, and 4) non-maleficence. Ethical
dilemmas today constitute an almost routine concern in the ICU, one of the most
fundamental examples being whether to administer potentially lifesaving medicine to a
patient who vehemently opposes doing so. Efforts to appeal to the judgments of experts
in the field serve merely to create yet another dimension to the controversy.75
By virtue of their need to be there, patients in the ICU are more likely to be
suffering impaired decision-making capability, sometimes even in the extreme. The
patient’s judgment is likely to be impeded, not only by the organic disease, condition, or
injury which sent the individual to the ICU, but also by the symptoms and side effects of
the condition and its treatment. Such hindrances to sound decision-making could
conceivably include metabolic disturbances, pain, sleep deprivation, or sedatives.76
Therefore, the responsibility of medical professionals in the ICU is to ascertain the
patient’s ability to competently give informed consent prior to taking any action with
potentially life-changing consequences.77 The situation is complex considering the
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heightened mortality rate in the ICU, coupled with the fact that each patient’s condition is
unique and may involve decision-making competence in some matters, but not in others.
This problem necessitates a decision based on evidence from the patient’s medical history
and a mental status assessment, along with input from other healthcare professionals and
family members. Any suspicion or disagreement may constitute sufficient cause for
gathering additional information, and possibly even a formal psychiatric consultation at
the patient’s request.78
As these considerations apply to medical errors, respect for the ethical principles
that are overtly expressed by the American Medical Association and the American
College of Physicians calls upon all providers of medical care to fully disclose all
relevant details of medical errors to all patients (patients, surrogate family members,
hospital, regulators, insurers) in such manner that these medical professionals hold
themselves accountable for their actions. Several major theories of ethics stand behind
these guidelines. In particular, consequentialist or teleological theory does so by focusing
on the medical outcome rather than the process. Utilitarianism supports such
accountability by focusing on the use of resources, delivering the greatest good to the
greatest number. Deontology or its variation, principlism, although the polar opposite of
consequentialist theory dictates that moral process principles should dominate, namely
autonomy, justice, beneficence and non-maleficence. These ethical principles stand in
contrast to one another, prompting biomedical ethical dilemmas almost daily in the ICU.
An example of one persistent dilemma is the extent to which patients are competent to
provide informed consent for various medical interventions necessary or desirable to
resolve their medical needs.
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Chapter 4 begins with an analysis of Western cultural and religious attitudes that
shape expectations of how those involved should respond to the discovery of a medical
error. The discussion leads into the more focused consideration of what patients
specifically are likely to expect in such cases. Next, the section considers the process of
disclosure of and apology for medical errors, including barriers to full disclosure, ethical
perspectives, and the importance of having a specific, detailed, and predetermined
disclosure process, as well as an examination of key features of that process.
Given the state of science and information technology, along with an increased
understanding of ethical considerations, patients in western, developed nations are in a
position to become aware of mistakes and errors made by medical professionals and
institutions in the course of their treatment. Moreover, patients in these countries are
empowered to assert their rights and take appropriate action in response to medical errors
(MEs).79 Interacting with this likelihood that MEs will be detected and trigger action are
certain underlying moral tenets of the Judeo-Christian tradition, which call for responses
to MEs in terms of confession, repentance and forgiveness.80 Berlinger and Wu describe
the impact that these traditions have on expectations of ethical conduct in relation to
errors in terms of a set of functionally specified actions with expectations for both the
party causing the harm and the party that has been injured. The offending individual is
fully expected to disclose the error to all affected parties and apologize for it, an action
often referred to as confessing.81 This action may include an explanation of the reasons
for the error, but must be accompanied by an expression of contrition for the harm caused
and a good faith effort to provide compensation and restitution to the extent possible. The
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injured party is then expected, at the point when it becomes appropriate, to respond with
some form of absolution or forgiveness.82
Based on an extensive evaluation of multiple research studies, Robbenolt
concluded that the primary motivation behind lawsuits triggered by the occurrence of
medical errors is the goal of establishing the ultimate causes of the error and ensuring that
such errors are not allowed to recur.83 A significant additional or alternate motivation is
monetary compensation, which those experiencing harm from the medical error believe is
justified to alleviate the physical and emotional trauma and any monetary loss resulting
from the medical error. Institutions such as hospitals typically have established policies
and procedures designed to minimize medical errors and the resulting law suits in order
to preserve their public reputation, goodwill, and prospects for continuing the provision
of health services. However, these institutions have been less likely to have in place fully
transparent internal and external policies and procedures for the disclosure of medical
errors and acknowledgement of responsibility, largely due to the potential uncertainty and
adverse consequences brought on by the involvement of courts, regulators, and insurers.84
Beyond monetary compensation, patients and families injured through medical
errors seek to secure a commitment to and plan for correcting the physical and
psychological results of the error, as well as to insure the medical and healthcare support
needed to cope with the effects of the error.85 From the standpoint of ethics, disclosure of
information relating to minor, less impacting medical errors is no less the duty of
physicians and hospitals in cases for which it will not affect subsequent treatment.86 In
addition to helping provide continuity of medical treatment, the disclosure of errors forms
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an essential part of the foundation of any relationship of trust between medical
professionals and their patients - a fundamental purpose behind the comprehensive codes
of ethical conduct formulated by medical bodies such the American Medical
Association.87 Wolf and Hughes have analyzed various ethical considerations implicit in
the reporting and disclosure of medical errors, along with any negative consequences to
patients and other related parties. By respecting the autonomy of the patient, the medical
professional is able ascertain whether the patient has been harmed in the first place.
These authors conclude that adherence to the ethical principles of fidelity, beneficence,
and non-maleficence ensures that the effects of any medical errors will be minimized.88
The sub-section of the chapter focuses narrowly on contrasting the negative
consequences of withholding information or avoiding disclosure in the wake of a medical
error and the duty, along with the positive effects of full disclosure.
One situation which could foreseeably prompt hospitals and medical professionals
to withhold information about medical errors would be a scenario in which the motive for
withholding was to avoid causing any more distress than was necessary to patients,
thereby avoiding further physically or psychologically incapacitating or traumatizing the
patient.89 Edwin provides a strong counter to this argument, by asserting the importance
of physicians’ and hospitals’ acknowledging and disclosing errors rather than having the
patients or family members learn of the errors from another source, thereby jeopardizing
the trust relationship. Supportive of this argument, honest and timely disclosure has been
linked to lower level of distress in patients.90 Hammami, Attalah and Al-Qadire have
found corroborating evidence in studying the direct relationship between patients’
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reactions to and the source from which they learned of medical errors, with the patients
showing a clear preference for being informed by the at-fault physician in the case.91
Aside from the cogency of various studies which demonstrate that the nondisclosure of medical errors on the part of staff who are at-fault can stimulate negative
reactions potentially leading to legal action, physicians and other medical professionals
are obligated to disclose any and all errors at the earliest time, according to codes of
ethical conduct, as well as their fiduciary duties.92 Edwin asserts that the relationship
between doctors and those in their care constitutes a fiduciary rather than a transactional
relationship, necessitating good faith trust, confidence, and candor. Such a relationship
enables the achievement of the ethical principles of autonomy, non-maleficence,
beneficence, and justice for both parties at all times.93 Beyond adherence to these
principles, Finkelstein et al. highlight the mandatory nature of complying with ethical, as
well as fiduciary requirements, which would require physicians and institutions to both
apologize for medical errors and provide monetary compensation. The foundations of
medical ethics guarantee patients access to all forms of information that they might need
in order to make informed decisions regarding their treatment, thus necessitating
disclosure of medical errors.94
A fundamental discrepancy exists between the expectations of medical
professional and those receiving treatment as to the circumstances under which disclosure
of medical errors is warranted.95 Physicians and colleagues tend to see the issue as a
balancing of risks against benefits both for and against disclosure, presuming
circumstances in which they would appropriately decide to conceal an error. Patients in
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contrast, when asked hypothetically, would say they expect complete disclosure with all
relevant information regardless of the circumstances.96 The result of this discrepancy of
expectation has been analyzed statistically, showing that medical errors are followed by
full disclosure and apology in no more than 30 percent of the cases where they have been
documented to have occurred, often in spite of the patient’s need or expressed request for
full information.97
It is imperative that both physicians and hospitals have an established, detailed
process in place, along with a commitment to disclose medical errors that have threatened
patient’s wellbeing, following it systematically in preparation for whenever there are
medical errors to be disclosed. This process begins by ensuring the discovery and
documentation of all relevant information, along with its corroboration by medical
specialists wherever needed.98
As part of the process of preparation for disclosure, both institutions and the
procedures they implement need to anticipate, acknowledge, and prepare to deal with
emotional responses from those on both sides of the occurrence. On the part of
physicians and medical staff, who are or may be perceived to be at fault, there are likely
to be feelings of failure, incompetence, and self-deprecation, as well as fears of legal
liability.99 These feelings may be expressed in efforts to gloss over or withhold relevant
information or to deflect blame and must be countered with institutional support for full
disclosure as the ethical course of action. On the part of patients and family members,
there are likely to be feelings of betrayal, anger, fear of unidentified negative
consequences of the error, and a tendency to suspect a cover-up by responsible
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authorities, all of which can easily lead to mistrust.100 Risk management personnel are
critical actors in the disclosure process, in particular if there is any likelihood that the
error could lead to additional injury or trauma to the patient beyond the condition which
is already being treated. At the same time, the disclosure process should include only the
minimum of those directly involved, including risk management and medical staff
directly, so as to avoid the patient feeling confronted by an overwhelming adversary, as
well as to ethically preserve the patient’s confidentiality.101
Proper notification and documentation, both of the standard implementation of
procedures in treatment and of any non-routine or unanticipated results, is critical to
effectiveness in disclosing MEs.102 While the institution’s policies and procedures play
the dominant role in how effectively the disclosure of any given error is, thoroughness in
reporting and documentation encourages, as well as signals, the preparedness and
willingness of the at-fault medical staff to admit and fully disclose all errors. When the
mechanisms for reporting and documenting errors involve only the physicians and other
staff at-fault, complete and accurate descriptions, necessary for full disclosure, as well as
subsequent prevention of reoccurrence, tend to suffer. Therefore hospitals need to make
sure that general physicians, risk managers, heads of relevant agencies, and specialists in
patient safety play a crucial role in the process of investigating and documenting any and
all errors.103 Beyond the documentation of occurrences of medical errors, hospitals
should have procedures in place to document near-miss events since information about
them can be invaluable in establishing patterns of heightened risk and in enabling
preventative measures to be taken, or in countering allegations of a pattern of
negligence.104 According to Fein et al. issues surrounding disclosure arise from several
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sources. For one, healthcare professionals and institutions have issues stemming from
fears of potential outcomes, as well as concerns about their training in dealing with errors
and their overall professional responsibility. Issues involving patients relate to their desire
for information, their sophistication in following the course of their healthcare, and the
quality of their relationships with their physicians. Patients are also concerned about
issues related to the extent and level of the harm caused by the error and who is aware of
its occurrence. The degree to which the institution accepts the inevitability of error and
maintains a supportive infrastructure has the greatest influence on the likelihood of full
and accurate disclosure. An understanding and prior consideration of all the above factors
enables the development of a system which can promptly detect, document, and mitigate
the adverse effects of errors in the maximum number of occurrences.105
Fundamentally, western cultural and religious attitudes form the basis of the
medical disclosure process in that all individuals and groups are held accountable for any
harm they create that results in losses and costs to others. As this applies to medical
errors in the ICU, all parties connected with the ICU – the hospital, as well as medical
professionals and staff are ethically responsible to disclose, fully confess, apologize with
contrition, compensate victims and ask for forgiveness. This is a societal expectation.
Not doing so may further psychologically and physically traumatize the victim, in this
case the ICU patient. Such failure may also initiate legal action. Despite the
pervasiveness of these dictates of society, there is a clear gap between the cultural and
religious expectations and the behavior of medical care providers, which has been
estimated to leave expectations unfulfilled in nearly 70 percent of cases, calling for major
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a change in institutions’ procedural behavior. Proper notification and documentation of
medical errors is a critical first step in closing this gap.
Chapter 5 describes the issues involved in establishing and implementing
protocols for disclosing medical errors whenever they occur. Issues which must be
addressed through protocols include: ethical acceptance of responsibility, anticipation in
terms of risk management, determination of known and foreseeable consequences,
identification of patients in the process, and timing of disclosure. Specifically, individual
protocols which need to be adopted will be discussed in relation to acknowledgement of
responsibility, and compensation.
The scope and scale of medical errors in the ICU span a spectrum that begins on
the low end with no error and ranges through errors termed unnoticed, inconsequential,
minimally unsettling, to those deemed discomforting, all of which may be labeled as
minor errors.106 At the other end of the spectrum are those errors classified as major,
which include those labeled as troublesome, disabling, or life threatening, all the way up
to those which prove fatal. From one perspective, every medical error creates a
disruption, in turn necessitating corrective action due to undue effects or at minimum a
modification of prevention procedures; nevertheless, all errors do not merit the same
degree of response or action.107
While minor errors cause minimal injury, disruption, or damage, it is clear that the
public expects full disclosure of even these types of error. One of a number of groups
with similar research findings, a New England health maintenance organization (HMO)
recently found that 92% of respondents in a hypothetical survey thought that every
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medical error ought to be disclosed, regardless of whether it led to any injury or harm. In
another study, only 12% of those surveyed felt it was acceptable not to inform an affected
patient if the error had not affected his or her health. Similar attitudinal results have been
obtained using focus groups.108 Biomedical ethics, professional codes of conduct, and
public perception are in unanimous agreement on the necessity of full disclosure of major
errors, given that they endanger patients, potentially leading to death or serious physical
or psychological injury, and as such demand immediate responsive action. Errors
involving medication constitute the most frequent of any type in the ICU, likely because
of the complexity of administering such a variety of medications, accounting for
approximately 78% of all serious medical errors.109
The standard protocol for the delivery of each individual medication to each ICU
patient involves five steps: prescription, transcription, preparation, dispensation, and
administration; these steps in turn subdivide into as many as several hundred subprocedures with the potential for error at each step in the process. Thus, the risk of error
for any given patient is high, and it is remarkable and to the credit of ICU staff that, as
frequently as errors do occur, there are not many more of them.110 A study which ranked
the frequency of medication errors in terms of the five steps in the process, found the
majority to have occurred during the last step - administration (53%) - followed by
prescription (17%), preparation (14%), and transcription (11%) in that order.111
Rooted in Judeo-Christian ethics and its traditions of confession, repentance, and
forgiveness, the generic protocol presented here emphasizes accepting ethical
responsibility for the medical error, fully disclosing the circumstances and consequences
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of the error, and apologizing and being accountable for the error, as well as mitigating,
correcting effects of and preventing future occurrences of the error.112 These principles
form the foundation for professional medical standards in organizations, such as the
AMA, ANA, ACP, and ACEP. From another perspective, this process is a necessity for
the medical professionals involved, so that they experience the absolution that leads to
the self-forgiveness, which in turn allows them to continue providing medical care to
others in need.113
Protocols involving disclosure need to be focused primarily on patient outcome
rather than on the complex details of procedures and their implementation.114 Three
principles ought to guide such disclosure: 1) the use of language should be easily
comprehensible to the layperson, both in terms of vocabulary and grammar, in all
communications between medical professionals and patients; 2) an explanation of
medical error protocols should be provided in terms of risk or injury, rather than simply a
description of the error and its antecedents; and 3) a clear explanation of corrective
options for dealing with any eventualities should be included.115
Consistent with principles of ethics as applied to healthcare on a broader scale, the
use of informed consent is particularly appropriate when those medical interventions such
as are common in the ICU involve foreseeable, elevated risks of error, injury, or even
death. As part of the protocol, the written permission should be supported by a verbal
discussion of risks and benefits, conducted so as to insure that the patient or surrogate
fully understands what is being prescribed as treatment.116
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The format of the informed consent document should conform to principles of
communication already discussed, should be integrated with any future communication in
the event of medical error, and can even incorporate information on anticipated remedial
procedures for foreseeable errors and unanticipated occurrences.117
When there is any potential for danger or harm, humans have a seemingly innate
dislike of uncertainty; unfortunately, medical treatment typically involves both of these
components.118 Therefore, any protocol for advance communication of the timing of and
of what to expect during the course of treatment provides relief from concern or worry,
circumstances which create a clear path for avoiding errors, and a means for
understanding errors in context, should they occur.119 Although not always possible in the
ICU, wherever it is feasible, such pretreatment disclosure incorporates the patient into the
process of medical decision-making and implementation, setting the foundation for
understanding the potential for medical error.120
For any case of treatment in the ICU, patients include not only the patient and his
or her immediate family, but also the hospital, all members of the medical team providing
direct or supportive care, the patient’s insurance provider, and government regulators (as
representatives of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services). Proactive disclosure
to patients, possibly as part of informed consent documentation, would go a long way
toward minimizing unnecessary uncertainty. Such disclosure would need to cover any
risks involved with anticipated interventions and outcomes, along with contingency
procedures for the mitigation of harm in case of a major medical error and advance
provisions for disclosure to all relevant parties.121
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Medical errors that are minor in their consequences may be addressed through
protocols for informal apology and would typically involve the patient and immediate
family, friends or other acquaintances as the situation dictates, the medical caregiver team
and colleagues.122 In contrast, formal apology protocols need to be established
beforehand in anticipation of the consequences of major errors, as well as of the need to
involve a broader range of parties, including those more indirectly connected to the event.
Drafting a thorough outline for formal apologies to be given in the case of such events
with provision for adding the specifics would be perspicacious, as it would reduce the
potential for compounding problems through errors in communication.123
On one hand, adequate and fair compensation is demanded by the principles of
biomedical ethics and potentially requires adjudication and enforcement.124 On the other
hand, when compensation can be agreed to without having to resort to formal legal
procedures and the creation of an adversarial relationship, the cost in terms of time and
resources consumed, distraction from regular responsibilities, and emotional stress is
greatly reduced. In order to achieve both of these goals simultaneously, specific protocols
in terms of detailed compensation criteria, procedures for validation and payment,
prescribed forms of and limits to compensation, need to be developed and made publicly
available before the occurrence of any error to which they might apply.125
In the final analysis, a critical step in improving ethical behavior involves
establishing and implementing protocols for disclosing medical errors when they occur in
the ICU. Protocols need to be commensurate with the scope and scale of errors and
proactively address the acceptance of responsibility, considerations involving risk to

38

patient outcomes and loss, management of the risk to the medical institution, anticipation
of consequences, identification and involvement of patients, and disclosure timing,
apologies, and compensation.
Beyond the protocols relating to disclosure, as described in the previous section,
the chapter 6 of the dissertation is devoted to protocols required as part of the large effort
to institute systems which will function to prevent or reduce the severity of medical
errors. These protocols include prevention planning, communication, administering
medication, as well as preventing and managing equipment failure and system failure.
Subsequently, the discussion will center on the role of and prospects for tort reform, as a
means of dealing with the legal issues surrounding medical errors.
The principle goal in planning is to avoid the occurrence of medical errors when
and wherever possible, which involves anticipation of the risks, along with understanding
their characteristics and probability of occurring, whether in the ICU or the hospital in
general.126 Prevention planning needs to address three facets simultaneously: 1)
prophylaxis, i.e, concrete preventative actions in diagnosing and administering treatment;
2) monitoring; and 3) taking steps to avoid adverse events such as near misses, slips,
lapses, mistakes, omissions, and commissions.127 Steps as simple as providing checklists
for procedures have successfully and significantly reduced the rate of errors in some
hospital ICUs, diminishing the severity of the consequences of those errors.128 In other
institutions, situational risk factors such as sterilization procedures have been directly
targeted, decreasing the life-threatening impact of staph infections.129 Some hospitals
have made significant improvements in cutting down on medical errors by adopting
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investigative and evaluative procedures comparable with those used by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA).130 Alternatively, a number of hospitals have taken the
approach of fundamentally reorganizing their medical team operations in the ICU,
adopting innovative models of staffing focused on promoting increased teamwork with
diminished reliance on a single specialist in any given situation.131
Accurate, effective, and timely communication is essential, not only in preventing
but also in dealing with medical errors.132 While the education of doctors is rigorous,
broad in scope and in depth, and continuous, it is remarkably deficient in building
communications skills.133 At the same time, the need for these skills in interactions with
patients and their relatives, colleagues, hospital staff and administrators, as well as with
representatives of insurance companies and government agencies is critical, all the more
so when dealing with the effects of a medical error.134 Anywhere in the hospital, but
especially in the ICU, communication mistakes may well damage or end careers, in
addition to compounding the costs of a medical error exponentially.135 While most
physicians understand these dangers cognitively, many are nonetheless unprepared for
the situation or unwilling to remedy this deficiency of skills.136
Hospital administrations need to make fundamental revisions to two forms of
protocols, namely in external communications, something far more extensive than merely
expanding the use of informed consent paperwork or increasing internal communications
between the care-giving staff, administrators, and support personnel.137
Within the environment of the ICU, medication errors predominate, most
frequently at the point of final administration of the medication.138 Furthermore, it is a
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significant cause for concern that such errors point to systemic deficiencies in training,
communications, monitoring, or carrying out of protocols.139 This fact implies that such
systemic errors may be the cumulative result of numerous sequential errors, each with its
own source.140 This multiplicity of causes in turn, requires a systematic in-depth response
in order to determine causes, which in turn involves time consuming investigation
leading possibly all the way back to the earliest diagnosis, possibly through various
settings outside the ICU.141
Equipment failure is perhaps the most frustrating and potentially difficult to
handle among medical errors in the ICU, given that medical professionals and hospital
administrations alike lack the expertise to diagnose machine weakness or malfunction;
moreover, while control and prevention is at least initially in the hands of the equipment
manufacturer, the healthcare provider is proximately responsible for preventing harm.142
Adding to the complexity of these circumstances is the fact that the varieties and uses of
ever more technologically sophisticated equipment are increasing rapidly. Ironically,
while hospitals and their personnel are increasingly less able to handle the maintenance
of the equipment, they are becoming increasingly more dependent on its flawless
operation.143 Although both involve significant additional cost, the two most promising
means of forestalling equipment failure errors would be having access to a sufficient
quantity of backup equipment and involving manufacturing personnel more integrally in
all phases of medical planning.144
Undoubtedly the most difficult of any type of medical error to find and fix is
system failure occurring at the junctures where systems interface or overlap, making it a

41

challenge just to identify the source or sources of the failure.145 The complexity of such
failures makes each occurrence relatively unique, rendering any standardized set of
protocols ineffective.146 Given that the ICU is the area of the hospital that is the nexus of
the greatest number of interacting systems, it should not be surprising that medication
failure, possibly the quintessential example of a system failure, is so prevalent in that part
of the institution.147
From a legal perspective, the process by which a patient or relatives obtain
redress, including compensation, for physical and emotional damage and economic losses
suffered is part of tort law, which deals explicitly with medical errors as part of civil
jurisprudence. While justice for victims of medical error is the purpose of legal recourse,
there is a growing consensus that the goals of providing correction of injustice and
compensation, along with deterrence of future injustices, are poorly achieved at best
through the current legal system.148 The tort systems currently in effect actually
discourages patients who have been legitimately injured by physicians and hospitals from
seeking redress in civil court, makes their chances of prevailing slim, and allows
attorneys and others entities not directly involved with the original error and its
consequences to take an inordinate share of any compensation. Faced with the rise in the
incidence of medical errors, reforms have been proposed, and some enacted, aiming to
deter negligence on the part of physicians and other medical professionals, albeit
instituted typically in order decrease liability premiums rather than increase the safety of
patients.149 Gilmour notes that such tort reform commonly includes capping damage
awards, offsetting payments from collateral sources, limiting the fees lawyers can charge,
instituting discretionary or mandatory periodic payments of damages, restricting the
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labeling of damages in terms of joint and several liability, raising the standards for
designating of a potential witness as an expert, along with various other measures. All
these efforts at tort reform have primarily functioned to bring down the expense of
malpractice litigation and the size of awards; however, at the same time they have made it
much harder for injured persons to establish the liability of any negligent party and their
own right compensation.150
The status quo is unacceptable; thus, educational, institutional-administrative, and
legislative reforms are all mandated. Accomplishing educational reform begins in the
curricula of medicine and nursing schools, where prevention and correction of the effects
of medical errors needs to become an integral part of the curriculum, along with
inculcating a respect for the fundamentals of medical ethics connected to errors of all
types.151
Legislative reform must shift the focus away from suppressing medical liability
toward patient safety. Previously adopted measures such as capping non-economic
damages or attorney fees, setting statutes of limitation, and revising joint and several
liability statutes are all actions that need to be reassessed in light of placing first priority
on patient safety. Two other specific areas that will make tort reform more responsive to
the need for ethics and justice in the face of medical errors are establishing or raising
minimal standards for ‘expert’ witnesses and monitoring trends in the insurance industry
with an eye to ensuring justice and ethical treatment for all parties.152 Continuing
modification of pay-for-performance incentives can, in the long run, support litigationbased reform, while reforms to make Medicare more efficient and effective will further
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help to prevent medical errors and provide rapid, comprehensive, and compassionate
response on occasions when preventable medical errors add to the patient’s medical
problems.153
The aggregate effect of recent legal reforms has been to foster a ‘conspiracy of
silence’ among medical professionals, from hospital administrators and physicians on
down the ranks of the institutional hierarchy; in contrast, these individuals and the
institutions for which they work need to take on the challenge of fostering ethical
behavior towards combating and handling medical errors, which begins with developing
and implementing appropriate error-reduction protocols, beginning with the ICU.154
These measures must be directed at creating a non-punitive atmosphere based on honest,
thorough mechanisms that will encourage the prompt and full reporting of and learning
from errors, while at the same time ensuring organizational accountability and just
compensation for patients who have been harmed.155
On a scope far broader than just disclosure and apology, protocols are called for
to reduce the frequency and severity of medical errors, which include prevention
planning (prophylaxis, monitoring, avoidance of adverse events, organization of team
operations), better communication (doctors to patients, relatives, hospital staff,
administrators, insurers, and regulators), improved administration of medication (training,
communications, monitoring, and protocol execution), and prevention of equipment
failure (access to backup equipment and involvement of manufacturing personnel).
Preventing system failures and tort reform would significantly help in reducing medical
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errors, yet while they are conceivable they are beyond being effectively brought about
through protocols.
Chapter 7 provides a brief conclusion to the dissertation. The inevitability of
medical errors is beyond dispute as long as humans involved in providing medical care
and treatment for illness and injury. The discussion presented here demonstrates that this
reality hold true despite any level of skill or rigor of training; moreover, the propensity
for medical errors is compounded, not alleviated by the increasing integration of
technology and equipment into care and treatment. The setting in which the likelihood of
medical errors is greatest and their consequences potentially the most severe and
irreversible, with the highest probability of fatality is that of the hospital intensive care
unit (ICU). This dissertation seeks: 1) to assemble and provide documentation of the
alarming frequency and level of harm caused by medical errors in the ICU, 2) to
categorize and analyze their causes and contributing factors with the goal of identifying
measures to prevent and minimize the effects of as many errors as possible, 3) to present
a framework for handling incidents of medical errors, which is based on the convergence
of a variety of approaches to biomedical ethics, 4) to outline religious and cultural
expectations of how those on both the causing and receiving sides should respond when
errors occur, and 5) to propose a variety of protocols, which target specific aspects of
vulnerability to the occurrence of medical errors in the ICU, along with proposals to
address the broader scope of systemic problems which tend to promote medical errors.
This dissertation makes the case that, regardless of philosophical position within
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the field, the biomedical profession must accept as ethically justifiable nothing short of a
constant, vigilant effort to do everything possible to prevent medical errors. When errors
occur in the ICU, standards of biomedical ethics and the profession demands a response
that is full and honest in disclosing errors and their potential consequences to the patient
and other patients; this disclosure must include the circumstances and effects of the error,
an acceptance of responsibility for its occurrence, the proposed action to mitigate or
correct any negative effects or repercussions from the error both direct and indirect, and
proposed arrangements to compensate the patient for all negative impacts of the error.
Given the high risk of medical error in the ICU, protocols must be in place to prevent
these errors to the greatest extent possible; furthermore, the highest standards of
biomedical ethics must form the foundation for procedures and actions taken when
medical errors inevitable occur. The final two sections of the dissertation present
specifics for establishing these protocols and proposals for dealing with system-wide
barriers to combating medical errors in the ICU and elsewhere in healthcare.
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Chapter 2: Extent of Medical Errors in the ICU
Introduction
Of all the departments in the hospital, the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) is the one in
which the consequences of medical errors are potentially the most serious. This
conclusion stems from the fact that patients in this section of the facility are the most
vulnerable in terms of their weakened physical condition and inability to cope with
stresses of any kind to their body systems. This susceptibility applies regardless of what
is the source of the error or whether it is classified as one of commission or omission.
Rates of medical errors in the ICU, along with those for the emergency and operating
rooms, in particular have risen alarmingly, with reported estimates of error-induced
fatalities as high as 98,000, spurring a great deal of concern within the U.S. healthcare
system. Compounding the gravity of the situation is a growing awareness that many of
these errors could have been prevented through the adoption of concrete policies and
procedures calculated to head-off their occurrence. Tully et al, define medical errors in
general as constituting the implementation of ineffective and deleterious strategies in the
pursuit of the goals of care and treatment. While medical errors typically conjure up the
notion of actions that constitute ‘mistakes,’ this category applies equally to any failure to
implement a prescribed step in a course of treatment.1 In light of the severity of problems
that require stays in the ICU, it is entirely foreseeable that errors, no matter how
seemingly insignificant, may prove fatal.
In 1999 the Institute of Medicine (IOM) released a cogent report on how frequent
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and widespread concerning the prevalence, frequency, and ramifications of medical
errors. The report includes data across the board for the field of healthcare, documenting
the number of individual people experiencing the consequences, neutral or adverse, from
medical errors. The Institute of Medicine’s findings detail the tremendous costs involved,
in terms of both the abstract notions of human health and well-being on one hand, and the
more tangible expenses of mitigating, rectifying, and/or compensating for errors, on the
other. Among the more sobering of the statistics in the report is that medical errors
account for more deaths in the U.S. than do all forms of cancer, AIDS, and automobile
accidents combined. The release of the report triggered the need for advanced research on
the rates of medical error and their potential adverse effects as well as the financial cost
involved. This 1999 report highlighted the necessity of both further research more
specifically tracking the frequency, prevalence, and consequences of medical errors,
whether intangible, statistical, or financial.2
This chapter presents an overall description and assessment of scope and extent of
medical errors in intensive care units of hospitals across the United States, concentrating
on the prevalence and frequency of errors, in general terms, and then more specifically,
the variety classifications of errors, relating to some extent to their causes or origins. An
essential preliminary step in this dissertation’s larger goal of analyzing the causes of
medical errors and proposing ways to prevent or minimize their occurrence and to
mitigate, ameliorate, or rectify their damages is to explain how medical errors have been
conceptualized and categorized within the field of healthcare. Further sections of the
chapter classify the types of medical errors and the causal circumstances and actions that
lead to their occurrence. Beyond this, the chapter provides a survey of relevant statistics,
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documenting the frequency and severity of the problem, and analyze the principal risk
factors that increase the probability that errors will happen.
Chapter 2.A. Errors Concerning the Hospital ICU
This section of the chapter will examine several definitions of medical errors in
the literature, providing several perspectives on what the term encompasses, analyze the
propensity for such errors in general, and discuss ways in which scholars have
categorized them. This analysis will present the case arguing that, to some degree, a
correlation exists between certain commonly occurring types of errors and the medical
settings in which they most frequently occur. The hospital ICU is one such case and its
connection to certain error types will prove crucial to proposing policies and procedures
aimed at preventing or minimizing medical errors in this setting. Throughout this section,
the discussion will frequently relate directly to the intensive care unit as a unique setting
in which there exists a pronounced tendency for certain errors to occur.
Chapter 2.A.1. Defining Medical Errors
A consensus exists in relevant literature that medical errors are not only common,
but also prevalent enough to be considered a daily occurrence in medical and healthcare
practice; moreover, the hospital ICU has been repeatedly the focus of investigation into
this phenomenon. This attention is to be expected in that its role in the hospital is to deal
with the critical, often life-threatening problems of patients who are, because of such
injury or illness, in physically weakened condition with little stamina or resiliency.
Predictably, whether admitted directly or transferred there, these patients need
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complicated, multi-faceted treatment, for which timing is immediate or precisely
calibrated, and which requires vigilant monitoring, communication, and coordination by a
larger network of healthcare professionals in different locations. Ironically, the setting in
which medical errors can least be tolerated due to the heightened risk of adverse
consequences is the very same environment in which they are the most prone to
happen. If indeed, as Grober notes, “Medical errors represent a serious public health
problem and pose a threat to patient safety,”3 the intensive care unit is the environment
where this problem and threat is most acute.
As a starting definition for the purpose of analysis, a medical error any event or
situation which deviates from prescribed treatment, care, or observation of a particular
patient, and which furthermore is not a characteristic of the original illness or injury
being treated. This definition portrays medical errors as being very broad in scope, yet it
is necessary in order to encompass the full range of incidences occurring regularly within
the ICUs of most hospitals. This broad range covers missteps as diverse as errors in
medications, infusions, mistakes done using medical equipment, failure to conform to
standard protocol and any other human errors, which may happen in the course of the
practice of medicine and healthcare. The Institute of Medicine’s scope is broader yet,
including errors of omission, describes as any failure to follow through to completion on
a prescribed plan or individual step in of treatment, in addition to the intentional
implementation of any inappropriate plan or steps in such a plan.4 Moskop et al, assert
that, “In some cases, the application of this definition is unambiguous. In symmetry
errors, for example, a procedure is performed on the wrong side; in medication errors, a
dosing protocol or route is incorrectly administered. Other actions, particularly those
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involving diagnostic processes and other cognitive processes, may be much more difficult
to characterize as error, particularly given the information available to the provider at the
time.”5 Clearly, some types of errors are the results of chance occurrences beyond the
bounds of human influence or causation. Despite the severity of their consequences, these
are not identified as medical errors, as the term is conceived of here. Ultimately, such
negative patient outcomes will occur despite perfectly provided and administered
treatment, and thus should not be categorized as medical,6 in particular not for the
purpose of investigation in this dissertation.
Yet another way of defining medical errors is to describe them as the failure to
implement any designated action in the intended manner, or to implement either the
wrong strategy or an appropriate strategy by the wrong procedure in spite of attempting
to accomplish the goals of treatment. While not clearly implied in these definitions,
medical errors typically incur adverse consequences for patients. Again Moskop et al.
contend that, “Medical errors often result in harm to patients, and this explains our
increased efforts to identify and minimize such errors. It is important to recognize,
however, that there is no necessary connection between medical error and patient harm.
Some errors may not harm the patient. For example, an obvious error may occur in a
patient’s treatment, such as administration of a medication prescribed for a different
patient, but the patient may experience no ill effects from that medication.”7 Beyond what
these researchers allude to in this quote, medical errors extend over an entire continuum
of severity of consequence, varying tremendously as to the level of seriousness they
create. Angus and Carlet have observed that the effects of a given medical error could be
so minimal that it ultimately made no discernable physiological or biochemical difference
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in the patient. As such, that error would necessitate no corrective or compensating
actions.8 For instance, a highly preventable adverse outcome known as the near miss, a
category that can overlap with several others, is distinguished by the occurrence of an
error, which however does not lead to any negative consequences. By contrast, over most
of the spectrum of consequences of medical errors additional treatment is mandated
beyond what the original injury or illness warranted- treatment specifically required to
undo or at least ameliorate the negative effects of the error in an effort to restore the
patient to the level of health prior to the error. Needless to say, that level was already in
jeopardy in the case of an ICU patient; furthermore, regardless of the patient’s previous
condition, the effects caused by the error can be either temporary or permanent, the most
severe form of the latter being fatality.9
In order to create a standard for gauging the ramifications of medical errors,
researchers from the Ohio State University developed a Severity Scale bearing the
institution’s name and consisting of a seven level categorization for assessing the effects
of the medication error on the patient. These levels include: a) Level 0, which denotes an
error that is identified and handled swiftly enough that the patient suffers no ill effects; b)
Level 1, which indicates that the error causes some effect but leads to no change in
clinical outcome; c) Level 2, which identifies an error that will require close monitoring
but may not need action; d) Level 3, which denotes an error that necessitates additional
laboratory tests, or leads to an alteration in the patient’s vital signs; e) Level 4, which
signifies an error that requires additional treatment or procedures, including admission,
readmission, or a protracted stay in the hospital; f) Level 5, which denotes an error that
either necessitates admission to the ICU, requires an invasive procedure, or causes
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irreversible harm; and finally g) Level 6, which means that the error so designated led to
the patient’s death.10
In his writings concerning medical errors, Bedevian has highlighted medical
errors, as distinct from complications, which he describes as adverse reactions on the part
of the patient to a medically justifiable procedure. The corollary to this assertion is that
medical errors are intrinsically preventable to the extent of current medical knowledge,
beyond the limits of which anything that in hindsight proved to be deleterious would not
be classified an error. The fact that medical facilities routinely have in place and attempt
to follow established standard operating procedures indicates an understanding that it is
possible to forestall many if not all medical errors. As the specific subjects of these
procedures implies, medical errors can be connected to either medical products or
procedures, to general medical practices in a given setting, or to the medical system
itself.11
Chapter 2.A.2. Potential for Medical Errors
The fact that all those working in the hospital ICU are, despite the intensive
training they typically have undergone, fundamentally human beings, which in turn
makes the inevitable that they will, at least on occasion, commit errors.12 Furthermore,
given the nature of hospitals and their intensive care units, they are setting where errors
are especially likely to occur.13
The Institute of Medicine’s 1999 report, bearing the clichéd title To Err is
Human, deserves credit for focusing the healthcare community’s attention on the
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prevalence and seriousness of medical errors and their adverse repercussions for both
patients and the healthcare system.14 Inherently containing a higher potential for error,
given that its patients have life threatening conditions, the ICU bears a more urgent need
for preventing or controlling the effects of medical errors. These conditions may include
serious complications from accidents, infections, surgery, stroke, or cardiac arrest.
Therefore, ICU patient are typically in need of critical care, involving continuous
monitoring by the health care providers. In the process of delivering such care, a high
potential exists for the occurrence of medical errors.15
The potential for medical errors is intrinsically related to the fragmentation of
healthcare services, in contrast with their integration in a functioning network system.16
This fragmentation propels the patient into interactions with multiple providers of various
aspects of treatment in a variety of contexts. McGowan and Healey posit that the
subsequent lack of access to complete information, coupled with the disincentive on the
part of healthcare professional to take on responsibilities beyond their personal
involvement or to admit responsibility for mistakes, creates an environment that actually
encourages medical errors, exacerbating the frequency at which they happen.17
The accreditation and licensure of medical and healthcare professionals give
adequate priority to ensuring that they are trained and prepared to prevent medical errors.
This deficiency is arguably one of the primary causes of errors.18 On the other hand,
medical errors are also closely connected with faulty systems and processes, along with
other conditions that provoke people to make mistakes, or be unable to prevent their
occurrence. The clear inference is that, not all errors occur because of recklessness on the
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part of health care providers. As McGowan and Healey give prominence to in their
article, “The system must be better designed so that it becomes more difficult for
mistakes to be made. Brownlee argues that the system requires far too many people to do
everything right every time in order to arrive at a successful patient outcome. This type of
system is perfect for ‘latent errors.’ These are mistakes in medical care delivery that are
waiting to happen.”19 Even though they are quite often labeled as never events they are
occurring all too frequently causes health costs to rise and patients being hurt by the very
system that is supposed to heal them.
Particular circumstances or combinations thereof tend to increase the probability
of errors occurring. For example, a hospital or other healthcare facility may be in the
practice of stocking all their drugs in high concentrations, in spite of the known toxicity
of such drugs when administered as an overdose. Such a procedure may elevate the risk
of a healthcare provider administering such medication without diluting it first. Such a
medical error would be far more attributable to the faulty system than to the healthcare
provider who neglected to dilute the substance.20 Healthcare institutions need to establish
and support systems that reduce the likelihood of medical errors; in this case, it must
create procedures for storing such drugs in diluted concentrations. Intensive care units
need to prioritize implementing functioning systems, designed to ensure, to the greatest
extent possible, the safety of the patients. If such a system fails, the chances of medical
errors in the unit will increase. In addition to faulty health systems, individuals may
sometimes be responsible for errors if they have neglected to maintain the required level
of vigilance. The criticality of the intensive care unit seems to increase the potential of
medical errors occurring.21

67

While healthcare professionals, scholars, and researchers in the field all concur
about the continual occurrence of medical errors, statistics documenting their exact
frequency prove to be elusive. Although it is evident that medical errors occur, it proves
difficult to estimate or measure their exact frequency. This is because healthcare
providers only report some medical errors while a broad range of other errors go
unreported. Challenging the representativeness of existing data, experts concur that such
statistics are an underestimate actual occurrence, making the potential for medical errors
difficult to adequately quantify.22 Unfortunately, as it can be quite difficult for
researchers or even other medical professionals to spot a given instance of medical error
and recognize it as such, obtaining a precise, reliable estimate of the frequency of medical
errors is barely possible. Given this difficulty coupled with the obstacles to fully
accessing relevant data, the general consensus in the field is however, that whatever
estimates are put forth are grossly underestimating the numbers of medical errors which
actually occurring.23
Chapter 2.A.3. Types and Causes of Medical Errors in the ICU
This section presents a picture in the broadest scope of the prevalence and
frequency at which medical errors of various types, causes, and characteristics occur in
the intensive care units of hospitals throughout the United States. The first subsection
surveys errors in terms of general activities into which the treatment of an individual
patient may be divided. The second subsection analyzes medical errors, categorizing
them in terms of general causes.
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Chapter 2.A.3.a. Types of Medical Errors Regarding Hospital ICUs
This subsection of the chapter presents a classification system for medical errors
the kind of activity within the ICU during which certain errors are likely to occur. This
system of classification consists of the following seven areas: 1) devising and setting up a
course of treatment, 2) diagnosing the injury or ailment, 3) implementing the treatment
plan, 4) the preventing foreseeable ill-effects or complication, 5) prescribing and
administering medicines, 6) ensuring the proper functioning of communication and
equipment systems, and 7) avoiding negligence in medical management.
(1) Errors in Planning and Execution
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) highlighted different types of medical errors that
are considered prevalent. These different types of medical errors have been categorized
and described by a variety of researchers. One of the most common types of errors is that
of execution, as its name implies, occurring in the phase of carrying out a planned action.
Healthcare providers may effectively planned the appropriate treatment; however, that
action may not be executed in the manner in which it was intended leading to a definite
error. In other cases, healthcare providers may fail in the planning process. Obviously,
healthcare professionals need to plan their actions or intervention strategies effectively, in
order to avoid errors. Some individuals fail in this, the initial planning phase, while others
fail in the execution.24
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(2) Errors in Diagnosis
Diagnostic errors form yet another category of medical errors that happen
frequently in the intensive care unit, there is an accurate diagnosis of the patient’s
condition is a prerequisite before any treatment can be launched or medication given. 25 In
the ICU, where all the patients have been diagnosed as being in some level of critical
condition, effective diagnosis is indispensable. It is self-evident that any errors stemming
from the diagnostic process may further threaten the life of the patient. Some diagnostic
errors are simply the result of unnecessary delays of the diagnosis process.26
Prompt diagnosis, with the greatest accuracy that state-of-the-art medical
knowledge and technology permit, is a prerequisite to any level of quality medical care;
medical professionals and institutions are responsible for ensuring that it occurs. In
practice, numerous factors can interfere with this goal. For one thing, circumstances such
as work overload may force healthcare providers into delaying diagnosis. Alternatively,
misinterpretation of diagnostic data or overreliance on previous experience in the
decision-making process may result in an inaccurate diagnosis. Another source of
diagnostic error is inaccurate or irrelevant data stemming for the failure to employ
standard diagnostic procedures or reliance on outdated methods of diagnosis.27 Two
documented precipitators of diagnostic errors consist of: 1) healthcare professionals using
outdated diagnostic kits, even when proper procedures are followed, and 2) healthcare
professionals neglecting the required monitoring and control in performing tests, for
example skipping less obviously necessary steps in the diagnostic process, even when
using up-to-date procedures and equipment.28 Still another cause of diagnostic error is the
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tendency on the part of many healthcare providers to trust expert medical opinion even
when it appears to conflict with test results or when the validity of those results may be in
question. This tendency indicates that critical thinking on the part of all those involved in
the diagnostic process is essential to achieving the goal of preventing or minimizing
errors.29
(3) Errors in Treatment
The difference between treatment errors and diagnostic errors is that the former
implies an accurate diagnosis and the optimal plan of treatment. The error consists of a
failure in appropriately implementing non-diagnostic tests or other procedures ranging
from changing dressings to performing major operations. Although they have been
frequently categorized as medication errors, failures in administering the proper
medication or dosage may also be considered treatment errors, as subsequently described.
At times, follow-up procedures are not in place for healthcare workers to conduct or
alternatively these workers are otherwise unable to or fail to carry out these procedures
when or as required. During and in the follow-up to all treatment procedures, health care
providers need to monitor the patient’s condition as fully as the protocol calls for.30
In the manner that delays in diagnosis constitute medical errors, preventable
delays in the treatment process must be characterized as treatment error. Alarmingly,
Kleinpell et al, have documented instances in which healthcare providers have
intentionally administered care inappropriately through deliberate delay. 31
(4) Preventive Errors
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Preventive medical errors are also common, if less well understood; easily
comprehensible examples would include healthcare providers not treating as a priority to
administer standard prophylactic treatment preventive errors and providers neglecting to
properly monitor any treatment. Granted, it is impossible to prevent all negative
developments in treatment any given patient; the failure to take feasible, reasonable safe
prophylactic measures is by definition a preventable error, the consequences of which are
potentially critical. Anticipatable and preventable adverse outcomes further expand the
class of prevention errors.32 Among the easiest to eliminate of these causes of error are
the instances in which proper planning and appropriate execution of the intended
procedure is known to obviate any negative consequences. In some studies, researchers
have adopted a related category, named the slip, defined as an error that result from a
misdirected routine in the execution of a procedure. As a type of error, researchers note
that a large number of health care providers report this error to be common, occurring
frequently.33 There appears to be little evidence, however, as to whether as the name
implies, this type of error tends to lead primarily to Level 0 or 1 on the Ohio State
University Severity Scale.
Preventable errors can occur, simply because a health care professional fails to
initiate a routine, prescribed action in the course of treatment as the result of a memory
lapse stemming from a number of root causes. Alternatively, “knowledge based errors”
occur when medical professionals and workers analyze a case thoroughly, yet based their
treatment on either misinformation or faulty analysis. All of these errors are preventable,
along with their adverse outcomes can be categorized as either errors of omission or of
commission.34 Errors of omission are those in which the provider leaves a critical action
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or procedure undone, while those of commission occur when a health care provider
performs any action considered within medical practice to be inappropriate in this
situation.35
(5) Errors in Medication
The most prevalent of this type of errors consists of slips and lapses. Exacerbating
the risks of medication errors in the ICU, the situation for the typical patient in critical
condition tends to have on average twice as many medications prescribed as do their
counterparts in the rest of the hospital.36 With this fact in mind, unsurprisingly the
severity of a patient’s condition constitutes the strongest predictor of becoming the victim
of an adverse drug event (ADE). On top of this risk factor, given that they are in critical
condition, the fact that ICU patients are in critical condition means that they have fewer
and significantly weaker natural defenses; thus they are far less able to cope with the
physiological stresses of ADEs.37 Furthermore, even when the conditions of these ICU
patients improves and they transition toward recuperation and/or less intensive levels of
care, they face a significant lack of coordination and continuity in their care as soon as
they leave the ICU. This extensively documented flaw in the medical care system creates
an additional vulnerability to medical errors for the patient during this transition phase.
Thus, coordination and communication between ICU staff and the patient’s subsequent
caregivers constitutes an essential, albeit neglected aspect of care.38 Given all these
barriers to coordinated care, it is unsurprising that errors involving medication constitute
the most frequent of any type in the ICU, accounting for approximately 78% of all
serious medical errors.39
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As has been alluded to previously in this discussion, medication errors cover the
scope of all types of potentially preventable, yet frequently occurring errors involving the
administration of medicine in the broadest sense of treatment.40 In terms of
administration, such errors amount to giving a drug in the wrong dosage, following the
wrong protocol in giving it, or simply in giving the wrong drug. These errors, in turn,
may be the result of a medical or healthcare professional prescribing either the wrong
pharmaceutical agent or the prescribed agent at an inappropriate dosage. Furthermore, at
any stage in the process, misinterpretation of communication or inadequate attention paid
to it may torpedo the required procedures for effective, safe administration.41
Beyond the obvious errors of administering the wrong medication or in the wrong
dosage, the system of prescribing, procuring, delivering, and administering medicine,
particularly in hospital settings, lends itself to creating delays, which also constitute
medical errors.42 Furthermore, what pharmacological experts understand while the
healthcare providers who administer medication may not, is the necessity of continuously
monitoring both the physiological and biochemical effects of drugs, individually and in
concert with all other medications and procedures that the patient is undergoing. In
theory, all healthcare professionals understand this. However, when healthcare providers
fail to put the concept into practice, medication errors can have dire, even fatal,
consequences for the patient.43
(6) Failures of Communication and Equipment in Health Systems
In addition to the above categories of errors, research has revealed that within the
ICU any failure to communicate effectively may actively contribute to medical errors.
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Healthcare providers are obliged to develop effective channels of communication with
regard the status and progress of patients in an effort to minimize the probability of errors
occurring. Intensive care units rely on numerous technologies to sustain the life of each
patient. Such equipment can and often does succumb to a wide range of technical failures
resulting in medical error.44 Various types of equipment failure have been described as
preventable because they can be avoided if health care professionals ensure that all the
facilities are functioning properly, as they the providers are required to do. Sometimes,
however, such checkups often fail to identify a dysfunction in the equipment eventually
resulting in an error. Intensive care units usually operate using a defined health system.
Any failure in this system may result in medical errors.45
(7) Poor Medical Management
Inherently, institutions such as hospital have extremely complex organizational
structures, and in order to function safely and prevent medical errors, they must at all
times maintain efficiently coordinated interacting systems.46 It is, therefore, both
surprising and distressing to find how often, how, and how extensively many institutions
fail to address this need for effective management in the ICU. Poor management systems
in hospitals are a leading contributor to the occurrence of medical errors.47 This is
because poorly managed systems or networks neither facilitate nor foster the efforts
necessary to ensure that all the institution’s systems are working in tandem to advance
and protect patients’ safety. Guard maintains that despite the efforts of a significant
number of management systems, they fail to place their investigations at the level of
patient safety within their respective facilities. Furthermore, poor management promotes
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negligence, which in turn increases the propensity for medical errors.48 In numerous
documented cases of significant medical errors, poor medical management has been
ascertained to be an underlying cause, first of medical error itself, and second, of the
negative consequences. Obviously, healthcare facilities must make conscientious
management a high priority in their respective institutions for a numerous, wide-ranging
array of reasons, beyond simply the prevention of medical errors. Because of the
seriousness of the conditions of ICU patients, hospitals must give top priority to ensuring
the proper management of this area of the institution.49
Chapter 2.A.3.b. Causes of Errors Referring to Hospital ICUs
Research has indicated that different factors contribute to the occurrence of
medical errors. More specifically, various theories have been developed to describe the
circumstances under which medical errors are more likely. It is critical to understand the
complexity of causes of medical errors in order for any reduction of these types of errors
are to be successful. The following discusses causes of medical errors, causes that are at
least theoretically preventable. These causes may be categorized as, 1) Adverse events, 2)
Adverse drug events, 3) Error in medication, and 4) Human errors which includes a)
Fragmentation of the health system, b) Cognitive errors, and c) Ineffective skills and
inadequate knowledge, and d) Long working hours.
(1) Adverse Events
Much of the investigative work of researchers has been directed toward the goal
of identifying the principle causes of medical errors. One of these, which has been the
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focus of work in recent years, is known as adverse events, a rather loosely defined
category, but one that acknowledges the fact that multiple factors, often difficult to
disentangle, contribute to the occurrence of medical errors.50 As Bohomol et al, have
indicated, “The causes of MEs are multifactorial, crossing many lines of responsibility.
At the same time, they involve similar circumstances. Leapeet al. defined broad
categories in which the underlying problems that result in MEs be found, such as lack of
knowledge of the drug, lack of information about the patient, violations of rules, slips and
memory lapses, transcription errors, faulty interaction with other services, faulty dose
checking, preparation errors and others.”51
There is an urgent need to adopt effective approaches to managing any medical
institution, merely to ensure that all the operations in every unit of the hospital are well
coordinated.52 The intensive care unit requires a high level of efficiency in management,
given that patients’ lives are at stake. Despite awareness of the need for effective
management, some institutions typically fail to guarantee that proper management is
implemented in the ICU. This situation alone can trigger errors in the ICU. Researchers
have classified errors resulting from poor medical management as adverse events.53 Like
other medical errors, adverse events can be prevented if health care institutions
considered proper management to be a priority. Regarding the ICU, health care
institutions must ensure that proper medical management is adopted.54
(2) Adverse Drug Events
Adverse drug events is the classification term for what is being identified as a
leading causes of medical errors. This term denotes any damage caused by a faulty
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medical intervention, specifically a drug administered incorrectly. Administering drugs
wrongly, usually causes unwanted, often deleterious physiological and biochemical
effects in the patient.55 Medical errors of different levels and types quite frequently
involve a range of adverse drug reactions. Some of these effects include fever, vomiting,
nausea, kidney failure, body rash, low blood pressure, diarrhea, heart rhythm
disturbances, mental confusion, and bleeding.56 Some medical errors typically present a
combination of these events, forcing health care providers to plan and implement
intervention strategies, specifically to counter the consequences of these adverse drug
events. All drugs have the potential to trigger adverse reactions even when administered
properly.57 Nonetheless, adverse drug events stemming from medical errors are
potentially preventable if the right drug is administered properly and in the right dosage.
Normal adverse drug reactions, resulting from properly prescribed and administered
medicines, are not classified as medical errors, given that they are usually beyond human
control. In the United States and many Western nations, drug testing and licensing
procedures are in place to ensure that any such adverse drug reactions are manageable
and do not cause any permanent organ damage. In contrast, adverse drug events due to
medication errors have the potential of inflicting permanent organ damage.58 Thus,
adverse drug events usually require health care providers to develop prompt intervention
strategies in an effort to alleviate the adverse consequences. It is possible to prevent
adverse drug events if the proper prescription and administration of drugs occurs.
Therefore, healthcare workers need to be alert for any signs of improper medication this
vigilance will help prevent critical adverse drug events that might otherwise lead to death
or serious complications. Certain studies have found that medical errors may occur as
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health care providers prepare or dispense drug solutions. Some drugs need dilution, a
factor that needs the health care providers to have adequate knowledge on the proper
ratios for doing so.59 There is evidence that health care providers make mistakes
relatively frequently in the dilution process and when transferring drug solutions from
larger to smaller containers. This finding underscores the need for management systems
to ensure that these procedures are properly monitored, to ensure that errors are
minimal.60
(3) Medication Error
Far more than that more commonly envisioned process of obtaining medication
through visits to a physician and a pharmacist, the process of prescribing, dispensing, and
finally administering medicine to in-hospital patients is vulnerable to many types of error,
whether or not they are ICU patients. Predictably, this latter group will need the most
medications in terms of both number and complexity of administration of any group in
the facility.61 As an obvious means of simplifying and minimizing delays in deliver,
along with keeping costs as low as possible, institutions typically set up their own
systems of procuring, storing, handling, and dispensing drugs, separating bulk medication
in large containers to smaller, often diluted doses units for administration to individual
patients. The system for managing this complex process within the institution plays a
critical role in either augmenting or reducing the risk of medication errors, as well as the
nature and severity of the effects they produce.62 The delivery of every specific
medication to each individual patient in the ICU involves five steps: prescription,
transcription, preparation, dispensation, and administration; as stated, this procedure is
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overly simplistic however in that there can be several hundred sub-procedures There
exists, of course, a risk of various forms of error at each stage in the process. Thus, the
risk of error for any given patient is high; it is therefore noteworthy and laudable to ICU
staff that the frequency and severity of errors, alarming and harmful as it is, is not far
greater.63 As an example of one of the many opportunities for errors with medication,
Dhillon reports that some health care providers have registered errors when prescribing
dosages of drugs.64 According to David et al, in relatively serious cases, health care
providers exhibited delays in responding to patients’ needs, and at other times failed to
make any attempt to reversing wrong procedures which constitute medical errors.65
(4) Human Errors
According to Donchin et al, human errors are considered to have possible the
highest potential for causing medical errors.66 The following subdivision of this section
of the chapter analyze specific forms that human errors can take, leading to a variety of
medical errors. Health care related institutions are dependent on the expertise and skill of
professionals on many different levels within the broadest sense of the field of medicine.
The Institute of Medicine’s 1999, acknowledges that it is an inherent part of human
nature to make mistakes, clearly leading to the corollary that over a long enough period it
is impossible for human being to consistently perform flawlessly. 67 While many human
errors occurring in medical settings pose no significant threat to the well-being of a
patient may easily be overlooked, human negligence is also at the root of errors that lead
to serious and at times irreparable harm, even to the point of fatality. Among the authors
in the literature who have indicated that that human errors account for 80% of all medical
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errors,68 Bohomol et al, go on to assert that this statistic highlights the need for
emphasizing enhanced vigilant and caution in the fight to prevent and minimize the effect
of medical errors.69 In recent years, researchers have posited a number of explanations in
analyzing the role of human error plays in the constantly increasing number of errors in
medical settings. One of the most popular of these constructs is the bad apple theory.70
The assumptions behind this perspective of medical errors leads administrators
and researchers to view the staff member and medical professional whose actions led to
the error as being individually negligent or incompetent, and subject to isolation from the
larger group of competent healthcare professionals so that the ‘bad apple’ will not corrupt
the rest.71 While such attitudes and action validate the feeling of those at whom no blame
is being directed (whether or not they are actually culpable), this conceptualization is
fundamentally inadequate when it comes to explaining human errors, addressing many of
the ultimate causes, or combatting the problem of medical errors in general. Other recent
research has shown that numerous health systems such as hospitals operate largely in a
state of dysfunctionality, a flaw in the system that puts health care professionals in
circumstances which exacerbates any tendency they have to commit an error.72
4.i) Fragmentation of the Health System
One of the ultimate reasons for dysfunction in healthcare systems is the lack
effective communication, especially in relation to the numerous health care providers,
whose activities the hospital must coordinate. One main symptom of a dysfunctional
health system is poor channels of communication.73 Poor communication contributes to a
range of medical errors because health care providers are unable to update each other on
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the level of care needed for specific patients. Furthermore, distributed and dispersed
responsibility, whether fragmented or not, inherently necessitates better-coordinated and
ultimately more extensive communication.74 Thus, the dysfunction of many healthcare
systems results from fragmentation. A fragmented system guarantees miscommunication,
which inevitably leads to medical errors.75 One study found that, “A communication
failure among services’ caused 8% of MEs. In these instances, institutional routines were
not obeyed. These types of errors were particularly related to high-alert medications, such
as psychotropic or sedation drugs that could only be requested using a handwritten
special formulary. Failure to complete this special formulary often prevented the nurse
and pharmacist from processing the request.”76 Boettger contends that this fragmentation
stems from the absence of proper designation of authorities and responsibilities within the
hierarchy of the facility or institution. Consequently, many responsibilities remain
unassigned and the actions they represent remain unexecuted because each agent in the
system assumes that someone else should and will carry out the particular duty.77
McGowan and Healey explain saying, “The current health care delivery system is a
fragmented system of care that usually requires patients to see multiple providers in many
locations virtually guaranteeing that these providers do not have access to complete
patient information. Making matters worse, there is no incentive to improve safety and
quality of care. These medical errors are caused by a faulty system that actually
encourages mistake.”78
Among the results of this fragmentation is a level of general confusion, as levels
of authority among staff members are unclear, precluding the effectively performance of
responsibilities. Compounding this problem is the tendency of those overseeing faulty
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healthcare systems to assume that automating a system will guarantee the elimination of
medical errors.79 While this solution sounds good in theory, in practice it is fully
counterproductive in that the automated systems themselves necessitate constant
monitoring and administration by properly trained experts in order to do their jobs
without become another source of medical errors.80 Research has shown that the absence
of effective information sharing systems in some hospitals has contributed to a causing
greater numbers of errors.81 In hospitals and in the ICU in particular, a large number of
different staff members attend to any individual patient. When these workers are
prevented from sharing information and coordinate their actions with those of other
healthcare professional errors will occur. This lack of information sharing severely
impedes the accurate assessment of a patient’s medical condition, as well as the
monitoring of treatment, all of which contribute to medical errors.82
4.ii) Cognitive Errors
One major group who are prone to a specific form of human, cognitive error are
physicians who fall into a type of thinking, which does not conform to logic or reason.
Such thinking processes constitute cognitive pitfalls and may be a type of occupational
hazard. At times, some doctors hold certain beliefs held that hinder their level of clear
judgment.83 For instance, a medical professional may hold fast to an interpretation of
initial data concerning a patient and then ignore conflicting data from later phases of
treatment that present a different picture of the case. In other cases, dramatic events in
medical practice often impede the physician’s critical judgment exhibited. Such cognitive
errors are significant factors that contribute to human errors in medical practice.84
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Hurst declares that, along with errors of commission, cognitive errors of omission
are undoubtedly among the most prevalent types of medical errors. These errors can be
broken down into two types; those that result lack of or incorrect knowledge and those
that occur as the result of misusing or not using knowledge. Although almost all
healthcare providers commit these medical errors on occasion, it is apparent that such
errors can be minimized.85 In this regard, physician-patient communication is very
important in healthcare settings. The doctor needs to have an appropriate feedback from
the patient before introducing medication; otherwise, lack of information can lead to
cognitive, and in turn, medication error. Given that certain diseases have distinct subsets
requiring divergent forms of treatment, a generalist needs to screen all aspects of the
patient and to collect a complete set of data in order to identify correctly the patient’s
actual condition.86
The application of knowledge is at the heart of the type of care the patient
receives. Often, the physician lacks all the known information needed in caring for a
patient. Beyond diagnostic related information, it is crucial for medical professionals to
have feedback on the treatment decisions they make, promptly as implemented.87 This
involves first ensuring that what the physician writes, says, thinks, and does correlates
with what is documented in the medical record. In addition to this, the healthcare
providers must ensure that all subsequent information produced in the course of treatment
is duly recorded and compared with the initial data, diagnosis, and prescribed treatment
plan. All this important information must be kept in an uncluttered form and displayed
conspicuously for rapid retrieval.88
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Obviously, healthcare professionals need to be continuously improving their
knowledge base, and thus avoid cognitive errors rooted in out-of-date information while
providing care for their patients. Improving knowledge is the responsibility of healthcare
providers for their entire careers in medical activities and research. In tandem with this, it
is apparent that prevention of cognitive errors cannot be achieved if the trainees are not
only trained with the most up-to-date information, but also are molded into the time of
professional who is continually seeking out new knowledge, understandings, and
techniques.89 Additionally, it is advisable for all healthcare providers, up to and including
the most compassionate of doctors, to seek professional help when in doubt concerning
any aspect related to treating a patient. Healthcare providers need to try as much as
possible to avoid cognitive errors, but it is equally crucial for medical decision makers to
appreciate the impact and contributions of cognitive errors in medicine. Everyone in the
field should endeavor to prove false the notion that cognitive diagnostic errors are
unavoidable, in addition to dismissing the pessimism that impairs approaches to reducing
cognitive bias.90
4.iii) Ineffective Skills and Inadequate Knowledge
Boettger contends that a significant number of human errors are attributable to
ineffective skills and inadequate knowledge, deficiencies that compromise the effective
performance of health care providers.91 Many of the institutions preparing healthcare
trainees do not prioritize offerings in the required training that would equip health care
providers to minimize medical errors, especially if they find themselves working in the
ICU. Unfortunately, such training institutions often do not recognize the seriousness of
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medical errors and their potential effects on patients. Health institutions, at times hire
such healthcare providers to work in the intensive care unit, even though these new
employees do not understand the pressing need to reduce medical errors through
increased vigilance.92
Yet another area in which there is a lack of skill or knowledge in the ICU are the
healthcare providers who have not received the proficiency training required to operate
the specialize highly complex equipment routinely used in the unit. Moreover, some
healthcare institutions do not offer advanced training on the use of modern diagnostic
kits, which are the products of the new technologies.93 Such health care professionals are
then unable to utilize new technologies and techniques, critical to care of ICU patients.
Undoubtedly, some negative patient outcomes seemingly arise because of chance and do
not appear to be attributable to any specific medical error; nonetheless, they may be
preventable with best practices for minimizing errors.94
4.iv) Long Working Hours
One of the most significant human factors, contributing to the increase medical
errors is system of scheduling healthcare providers to work long hours at a stretch,
leaving them exhausted long before they are able to rest and recuperate. Even breaks
between workdays or shift are frequently insufficient. Such constant fatigue affects their
capacity to think and carry out tasks accurately, making them much more prone to error.95
Evidence from the field of psychological has established that fatigue affects one’s level
of concentration, a critical faculty in even greater demand when working in the ICU.
Healthcare workers are well aware of the strain they are under in such circumstances, and
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thus ironically their motivation to deliver the highest quality care in spite of the fatigue
level they feel adds to the stress of they experience, potentially triggering further errors. 96
As mentioned above, healthcare providers are too often working in a state of sleep
deprivation, further eroding the quality of care they are able to deliver. Since these
workers must deliver constant care in the ICU, most health care providers in the
environment are physiologically engaged in a constant internal battle with sleep while
attempting carry out medical procedures. This explains why medical errors are higher in
intensive care units whenever health care professionals are assigned longer working
hours.97
Chapter 2.B. Statistics of Medical Errors in the Hospital ICU
This section of the chapter begins with an overview of statistical data, which
document the cost of ICU care under the best of circumstances, frequency of medical
errors and their associated costs both in general and specifically in the intensive care unit,
comparing in-patient versus outpatient errors rates. This discussion attempts to
demonstrate that, despite the frequency and causal complexity of risks factors for medical
errors in the ICU, these factors are nonetheless amenable to isolation and analysis as a
prelude to their elimination or at least minimization and mitigation.
Chapter 2.B.1. Medical Errors Rates and Costs
In the absence of precise statistics, Curtis et al. have posited that an estimated
20% of people in the U.S. who have passed away in recent years have in the prior months
spent time in a hospital ICU. However, regardless of the outcome of a patient’s stay, it
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will involve significant pain or discomfort, along with enormous financial obligations in
its wake. According to the researchers cited above, approximately one quarter of the
average individual’s lifetime healthcare costs re incurred during the final year of his or
her life. Curtis et al. go further by suggesting a limitation on the time that patients with
unstable medical conditions due to life-limiting, usually chronic, illnesses spend in the
ICU, reducing suffering, expense, and risk of medical error all at the same time.98
In their effort to put concrete cost estimates on ICU care in general, Multz has
calculated a figure of approximately $62 billion for United States in 1998, and has given
that figure context by characterizing it as 34% of a typical hospital’s budget and about
1% of U.S. gross domestic product.99 Obviously, the potential benefits of feasible and
properly administered treatment are as enormous, if less quantifiable, as are the costs of
ICU care. All these considerations serve to magnify the vital significance of the problem
with medical errors in this unit of the hospital.100
While the expenses incurred by a stay in the ICU are tremendous, not all of them
can be justified. According to Garland et al, physicians working in or with patients
destined for stays in the ICU exercise broad discretion in ways that influence the costs,
deciding which patients to admit to the unit and what tests, therapies, and medications to
order, for example radiology imaging, lab tests, blood bank, or echocardiography.101
Unfortunately, while this discretionary authority influences spending and thus costs, it
has demonstrated neither quantitative or qualitative difference in terms of better clinical
outcomes. According to Garland et al, found on the first day alone, of an ICU stay, the
median discretionary costs was $1343 for 10.6 hours of stay while the costs created by
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intensivists and their attending assistants, amounted to an interquartile range of $788$2208.102 A lack of cost awareness on the part of ICU intensivists is likely a major
contributing factor in this problem; at the same time, it should be noted that every added
test, treatment, or procedure carries the inherent additional chance of a medical errors
happening at some point during the course of treatment. Backing up this contention,
albeit with international data, a study of French ICU physicians found that only 29% of
their estimates of the true hospital costs of 46 common prescriptions were within 50% of
the true cost. The most widely (and by the greatest amount) underestimated cost were
those for expensive medications.103
Significantly, the medical error rate for the ICU in comparison any other hospital
unit was two-to-one or greater.104 In a major study, Camiré, et al assert that for every
critically ill patient who has spent time in an ICU, approximately 1.7 medical errors of
some level of seriousness have occurred. Chillingly, these researchers found it to be quite
common that any given patient will experience at least one life-threatening error at some
point in his or her ICU stay.105 Best estimates of other researchers concur in that this
statistic represents a gross understatement as to frequency of medical errors, given that
the above statistic way based on self-report data, known to be extremely vulnerable to
underreporting. Even in teaching hospitals with their intensive monitoring procedures and
the high priority that they stringently place on reporting, a huge gap is believed to exist
between the intention to report and the act of doing so.106
Admittedly, it is extremely complicated to ascertain conclusively whether any the
death any given patient is the direct consequence of a medical error, and most evaluations
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end with judgments that are open to subsequent debate.107 In contrast, consensus exists
that a reasonably accurate general estimate stands at somewhere between 44,000 to
98,000 annual death, directly attributable to preventable medical errors.108 This figure
would constitute approximately 2%-4% of the total annual deaths in the U. S.109 in
making these claims, McGowan and Healey turn for support to the 1999 Institute of
Medicine report. The report found that that up to 98,000 deaths per year were attributable
to preventable health care errors, resulting primarily in adverse drug events (ADEs) and
preventable complications, such as inadequate nutrition, incontinence, falls, pressure
ulcers, and delirium.110 Coincidently, older adults, more frequently the patients in
intensive care units, exhibit greater risk of experiencing these types of errors. While in
this latter context, they are typically reported as geriatric syndromes, they consist of
specifics that include pressure ulcers, delirium, functional declines, and falls.111 In
response to the severity of the problem and the lack of institutional responses, Sultz and
Young have charged that the problem of medical errors in hospitals is well known
throughout the healthcare community, but is for the most part ignored by those with the
power and authority to effect change.112
In the 1999 report by the Institute of Medicine’s Committee on Quality of Health
Care in America entitled To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System, Kohn et al.
asserted that the annual cost associated with adverse events caused by medical errors was
17 - 29 billion dollars.113 According to Vlayen et al, adverse events constitute health care
management processes that result in unintentional complications, errors, morbidities,
mortalities, or extended hospital stays.114 According to more-recent data from the
Millennium Research Group in 2008, such losses amount to a more modest $19.5 billion;
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nevertheless, this total is still distressingly high, particularly when added to the estimated
$17 billion lost each year through prescription errors.115 Underscoring the severity of the
problem, several studies assert that more individuals have died from consequences of
medical errors than those who have been killed in motor vehicle accidents or died from
either breast cancer or HIV. In response to this, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) instituted a major policy change beginning on October 1, 2008, which
identified eight categories of medical errors and denied payments for their consequences,
describing them as preventable hospital-acquired conditions (HACs), preventable
medical errors (PMEs), or occurrences they called never events. These include pressure
ulcers, falls, trauma, surgical site infections, vascular-catheter infections, urinary tract
infections, administration of incompatible blood, air embolisms, and foreign objects
remaining in the body after surgery. The CMS refuses to pay for correcting these
conditions unless they are preconditions, which existed prior to hospital admission. Two
more conditions were added to the list in 2009 following the CMS final ruling, namely
deep vein thrombosis associated with knee and hip replacements and manifestations of
poor glycemic control.116
One factor adding to the costs of medical errors is that patients in the ICU run up
huge additional expenses any time a medical error must be corrected, extending their
stays in the unit along with the added costs of new, corrective procedures and/or
prolonged original treatment.117 According to Nilsson et al, a full 20% of patients in
Swedish hospital ICUs typically suffer from adverse events (AEs); 50% of these were
judged preventable and probably consisting of medical errors, despite being typically
labeled procedural complications. These included bleeding after a tracheostomy, low
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saturation during the tracheostomy, nosocomial infections, and adverse drug events
(ADEs); each of these “complications” correlated with 6-8 unanticipated days of hospital
stay.118
Medication errors constitute a sizeable percentage of medical errors in U.S.
hospitals in general, and likely the ICU specifically; according to Rothschild et al, such
errors probably amount to two thirds of medical errors in these settings.119 Approaching
this phenomenon from another perspective, Gorbach et al estimate that each patient in the
U.S. is likely to experience at least one medication error per day of hospital stay. These
researchers further estimated that each ADE increases patient time in the hospital by 1.74
days that translating into approximately $2,000 for each ADE. In total, the annual cost of
preventable ADEs in the U. S. is estimated to amount to $3.5 billion in 2006 dollars.120
One of the most striking findings of this study is that medication errors increased as a
function of the number of orders verified by each pharmacist during any given shift;
specifically, any excess of 400 orders per pharmacist per shift correlated closely with the
highest risk of error. Since most hospital systems only employ a voluntary reporting
system, these researchers caution that their findings need to corroboration from additional
studies at various hospital facilities. It is generally conceded that ICU patients are
administered more drugs and have twice as many ADEs as non-ICU patients. Risk
factors are also elevated due to the high potency of these drugs, their complexity of
administration, such as through gastric tubes and central venous catheters, not to mention
the life-threatening context of the ICU itself.121
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Chapter 2.B.2. Inpatient Injuries in the Hospital ICU
While relevant literature includes research comparing inpatient and outpatient
care,122 the subject of this dissertation’s focus is the cost of medical errors occurring
during institutional inpatient care, specifically within the ICU, and therefore such
comparative research is only addressed here to the extent that it can provide context or
insights not available elsewhere in the literature. Unfortunately, research into the specific
costs of medical errors occurring during stays in the ICU, even in the context of specific
regions or hospitals, is virtually nonexistent, making accurate estimation for the entire
U.S. woefully imprecise.123 Unquestionably, any patient admitted to the hospital for any
purpose will incur an elevated risk of suffering from the effects of a medical error than
would an individual entering the same institution on an outpatient basis. Furthermore,
among all those of the general hospital inpatient population, those in the ICU are at
greatest risk. One known cost of medical errors is that for all hospital inpatient medical
errors combined, including the ICU, which in recent years has reached and perhaps
surpassed $2.7 billion annually.124
Although the largest portion of the combined costs described above involve
medical errors related to inpatient care, outpatient medical errors are also included in that
statistic, albeit to a largely unknowable extent. Contribute a share of errors and costs,
although they are mostly unknown. On one hand, many of the underlying causes of or
circumstances leading to medical errors, such as staff fatigue, the handling specimens and
related laboratory work, misdiagnosis, and medication errors may all occur as easily in
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the hospital’s process of providing care and treatment on an outpatient basis. Moreover,
those receiving outpatient care are particularly susceptible to some of the same risks from
discontinuity of care as do many elderly ICU patients when they are transferred from one
care setting to another or when they transition from inpatient to outpatient status, both
situations which are discussed in detail later in this section. Outpatient care inherently
creates built dangers for patients with chronic conditions including diabetes,
hypertension, lipid disorders, depression, and coronary heart disease.
One risk factor in particularly with regard to a phenomenon known as clinical
inertia. While the statistical prevalence of this condition is difficult to ascertain, much
less the extent to which it leads to medical errors in the ICU or elsewhere, its causes and
mechanisms of operation have been the subject of some research. Clinical inertia has
been defined the failure to intensify pharmacotherapy when evidence-based clinical goals
for the patient are not achieved within a critical period of time. Clinical inertia always
incurs preventable negative consequences, ranging from elevated treatment costs to
disability and even death. According to O’Conner et al, the causes of critical inertia can
be comparatively quantified, with about 50% attributable to physician factors, 30% to
patient factors and 20% to office system factors.125
The category physician factors refers to behaviors and attitudes on the part of
medical professionals that would tend to increase the likelihood or exacerbate the extent
of clinical inertia or its consequences. These factors would include: 1) a mindset or
habits of reactive rather than proactive care, 2) not allotting enough time with patients for
effective communication, 3) neglecting to investigate and deal with comorbid conditions,
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4) setting inappropriate or unattainable goals, and 5) delays in beginning treatment as
promptly as warranted. Several attitudes or presumptions common among physicians can
increase the tendency towards clinical inertia. For example, many physicians may
exaggerate the quality of their own patient care, at least in their own perceptions, and in
the process miscalculate the number of patients who actually need intensified
pharmacotherapy.126 Some doctors rationalize the avoidance of intensifying care,
invoking such pseudo-justifications as faulting the patient for supposedly not following
previous directions or prescriptions, not being able to raise the issue at office visits due to
time constraints, or by presuming that the patient will resist any proposal to intensify
care.127 Moreover, other physicians will offer as defense the lack of everything from
training to tools to time to office infrastructure in order to assert that they are ill prepared
to cope with the changing needs of patients with chronic diseases.128 Besides standard
treatment, effective chronic disease management requires attention to various other
inherent considerations which explains and supports the idea that many physicians are not
well prepared to resist clinical inertia and are thus more frequently prone to errors.129 The
changing circumstances of any chronic disease in a given patient over time necessitate
more intensive record keeping via distinct procedures in order to accurately chart and
track both the condition, along with decisions concerning how to management it. Such
decisions include: 1) target identification and goal setting, 2) organized attempts to
discover optimal treatment, and 3) the titration of treatment in order to achieve the initial
goals, as the disease or condition changes. Medical errors can occur either in the context
of making these decisions or in implementing them. For instance, goal setting is a
dynamic process needing continual reevaluation change over time, yet this may be
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handled in such a way as lacks consistency to the point that the overall goal is never
achieved; there exists a name for this phenomenon, thematic vagabonding.130 Treatment
goals may themselves be inappropriate based on a physician’s familiarity with the
medical condition as opposed to the particular patient’s needs. In such cases and in terms
of the patient, the goals of rehabilitation and restoration of health have not been reached
due to goal fixation.131 Without adequate monitoring on the part of the physician,
treatment trials may fail to provide critical information or feedback in a time-sensitive
manner, distorting the results as they relate to the reality of the situation, stripping away
the physician’s understanding of or control over the circumstances as the patient is
experiencing them.132 At minimum, there are three kinds of errors that can occur in the
context of titration of treatment: 1) adhering to incorrect or non-existent timing,133 2)
choosing an ineffective treatment or inefficiently coordinating multiple actions over the
course of their implementation,134 and 3) pursuing action despite a poor understanding of
its potential side effects.135 Medical errors occurring for any or all of these reasons can
result in the deterioration of the patient’s health or other unforeseen negative
consequences.136
The second source of clinical inertia, patient factors, consists of attitudes and
circumstances that while residing within the patient should not be interpreted as making
the patient culpable for medical errors; these include: 1) denial of disease or affliction, 2)
illiteracy concerning health or medicine, 3) taking too many or poorly coordinated
medications, 4) lack of effective communication with the physician, 5) mistrust of the
physician, 6) depression, and 7) substance abuse. A patient’s mental model of various
aspects of healthcare, such a disease, medication and treatment, the role of a physician,
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can create obstacles to effective treatment that amount to clinical inertia. Refusing to
accept that a disease or condition exists, is happening to oneself, or is causing poor health
can lead to not making a decision or taking appropriate, timely action. Motivations aside,
pharmaceutical companies understand, to their credit, the power of their marketing
pitches in persuading people of the reality of certain diseases and of potentially effective
remedies and therapies. Thus, despite their potential for fostering unwarranted concern,
such marketing does promote the right mental model for combatting clinical inertia.137
The third significant source of clinical inertia lies with deficiencies in office
systems, namely; 1) an absence of outreach efforts, 2) incomplete or ineffective
communication among staff or between staff members and physicians or others involved,
3) the absence of leadership or coordination required for a team approach, and an absence
of clinical guidance.138Furthermore, physicians who do not individualize their practices
to match the diversity of their patients, not to mention the numerous ways in which
various chronic diseases present at different stages and in different may well compound
the problems of clinical inertia.139
As mentioned above, while it is difficult to quantify medical errors related to the
discontinuity of care that occurs when as inpatients are discharged and continue to
receive care in another setting, even possibly as outpatients of the same institution, the
risk is undeniably heightened. The Institute of Medicine defines this discontinuity as
medical error whenever it leads to non-completion of planned and intended care or
treatment.140 Typically, hospital physicians prepare discharge plans for patients leaving
their direct care; such plans will specify medications, test procedures, and designated
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recipients for test results, normally the patient’s primary care provider (PCPs).
Unfortunately, Moore et al. have documented a rate of receipt that is less than 50% on the
part of the PCP, thus corroborating earlier research contentions. The primary result is an
increased likelihood of rehospitalization, along with the attendant increased costs.
Obviously, had the primary care physician also been the attending hospital physician,
there would have been continuity of care, with less chance of rehospitalization and a
better patient outcome.141 However, such a situation is growing more infrequent as
healthcare becomes more complex and specialized, and moreover, is especially unlikely
in the ICU of a hospital.
Further contributing to the difficulty in accurately assessing the extent of medical
errors in the ICU is that the predominant group making up the patient population in this
part of the hospital are senior citizens, who are typically receiving medical care in various
settings under the auspices of multiple facilities or institutions, for example between or
among any of the following: the ICU unit of a hospital, rehabilitation centers or nursing
homes, clinics, or at home. The involvement of multiple administrations and staffs
greatly increases the need for coordination and efficient, timely, and thorough
communication. To achieve all this cooperation requires significant outlay of time and
resources while the lack of any part leads to a high likelihood of discontinuity resulting in
less than optimal health care at best and the severest of medical errors at worst. The
period of transition from being under the care of one facility and staff to that of another
constitutes the period of highest risk of errors, arising from the following: 1) physicianpatient breakdowns in communication, 2) issues concerning preparation for transfer, 3)
unmet health care needs not communicated to the receiving caregivers, 4) dosing and
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administration errors with regard to medications, 5) misplaced diagnostic results and
updates, and unanticipated needs for treatment or care.142 The role of clinicians during
these hazardous periods are undefined or poorly defined as Critical to the potential for
problems and the increased risk of medical errors going unnoticed or escalating in
severity of consequences is that no one physician is given responsibility and the authority
necessary to coordinate and ensure continuity of care.143 One study delineated time
constraints, high staff turnover, the absence of communication protocols, a scarcity of
staff performance feedback, and the lack of patient access to appropriate clinicians, as
being among the most significant obstacles to effective care and treatment, while at the
same time contributing to the occurrence of medical errors.144
Chapter 2.B.3. Percent Occurrences by Error in the Hospital ICU
A variety of studies have documented the varying frequency of different types of
medical errors, in relation to the origin and type of the error, as well as other
interconnected factors.145 For example, in the context of medical errors arising from
human mistakes, either overburdening individuals or the staff in general with excessive
responsibility or understaffing, which precipitates the same situation, tends to increase
both the rate and frequency of errors. In contrast, equipment failure is not influenced by
the same forces.146 According to Blot et al, a positive correlation exists between the
length of shifts that ICU nurses are required to work and the rate of medical errors in that
particular ICU. The stress and tension of managing critically ill patients on a daily basis
dealing with death, suffering, and grief can be wearing, distracting and lead to
psychological impacts such as depression, burnout, and PTSD.147 Camiré et al. report that
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interns working 77-81 hours per week on a critical care clinical rotation made 17.3%
more errors than a similar group of interns following a 60-63 hour workweek.148
Supporting these findings, Landrigan et al. concluded that sleep deprivation on the part of
interns led to 35.9% more identified serious medical errors, and 56.6% more nonintercepted serious errors; this depravation was defined by their working frequent 24 hour
shifts, as opposed to working shorter shifts in the ICU.149
Despite the apparent complexity in the interaction of contributing factors, the
research reveals undeniable common trends, which go a long way toward explaining the
relative frequency of specific kinds of medical errors.150 Despite the complexity of
analyzing rates of individual types of errors, one overarching factor in determining the
types and frequency of those errors that occur in the ICU is the healthcare system that is
in place in the specific institution in question. Procedures for drug storage at one facility
may contribute to a tendency to experience medication errors, while another institution
might be vulnerable to other types of errors owing to flaws in its communication
systems.151
One factor which extensively impedes efforts to accurately and thoroughly
document the occurrence of adverse events in the ICU, events that are directly related to
medical error, is that reporting at all levels is voluntary. This leads typically to an
underestimate of the incidence, frequency, and magnitude of any phenomenon where
negative consequences, in this case patient harm, can be anticipated, along with
culpability and blame. In terms of attempting to document medical errors in the general
setting of a hospital, alternatives such as direct observation and comprehensive chart
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reviews are much too labor intensive and thus not cost effective. In the ICU, such
methods could even conceivably interfere with the appropriate and necessary care and
monitoring of patients. Australian researchers have a procedure they named a trigger tool,
a form of systematic randomized screening of medical records for pre-defined event
markers, to detect detected 25 times more adverse events than voluntary reporting in a
pediatric ICU, where they tested the method. This tool was able to detect 90.1% of all
adverse events, using both the trigger tool and voluntary reporting. Because of its
success, this tool is considered reliable for use with the general adult hospital
populations.152
Medical errors differ extensively in terms of the severity of their impact. Among
those with the greatest potential for causing serious consequences to ICU patients in the
ICU are errors related to the labeling and handling of specimens. These can occur even
prior to admission to the Unit, in fact anytime specimens are collected, labeled,
transported from the ICU to the hospital laboratory, handled there by clinicians, or the
results are recorded and disseminated. Particularly vulnerable to mistakes are samples of
blood, urine, sputum, stool, and issues of fluid or viscous substances.153 Given that
laboratory testing has a 60-70% stake in ensuring that each ICU patient is accurately
diagnosed and receives the proper treatment,154 errors with the labeling of specimens can
have among the most severe of consequences.155 Even the minority of these errors which
appear to only delay, impede, or misdirect options can have ramifications leading to
irreparable injury or death.156 Furthermore, when the consequences are catastrophic, both
the ICU and the laboratory, the ICU, as well as the hospital, suffer financially and in
terms of the reputation. Unfortunately, in spite of the many sophisticated procedures and
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technology that are already in place to prevent or minimize specimen errors, such as
barcode matching of patients to specimens with wristband and bedside readers and
scanners, electronic health records, and computerized entry for doctors’ orders, far too
many specimen errors still occur.157
Studies by Bhat et al; Green; and Kaushik and Green found that errors happen
more frequently during the preanalytic phase of a patient’s stay in the ICU than they do in
all the subsequent phases combined.158 Specifically, Green found that preanalytic errors
may amount to as much as three-quarters of all medical errors in this category.159 Beyond
that statistic, this researcher calculated incorrect patient identification to be among the top
four most frequent forms of pre-analytic error.160 Similarly, Dunn and Moga found in a
root cause study of the Veterans Health Administration, that 182 of 227 (or 80%) of error
involved misidentifying the patient, and that 132 out of 182 (or 79%) of these
misidentifications happened during the pre-analytic phase.161 Prominently occurring
mistakes included putting the wrong wristband on a given patient, removing specimens
from the bedside or from their place in the lab and then mislabeling them, and making
typographical errors in a patient’s identifier code.162 Ultimately, these types of human
error proved the most recalcitrant to eliminate or even reduce. According to Martin,
Metcalfe, and Whichello, one of the more surprising finding was the unexpectedly large
number of errors resulting from the nurses deliberately overriding the barcoding.163
Undoubtedly, reliance on technology in terms of automating infrastructure and
support system functions in the ICU has the potential to reduce both the frequency and
the severity serious errors in the ICU medical errors, not to mention those occurring in
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other parts of hospital or clinical facility. Nonetheless, some of this automation may
simply trade the risk of one type of error for another. For instance, Idemoto et al., report
that in applying a computerized systems for dispensing medication according to an order
entry system provided several benefits, namely reducing patient disruptions, fostering
task efficiency, increasing safety, and cutting down on prescription errors.164 At the same
time, other researchers have documented unforeseen problems created by this reliance on
automation.165 For example, dependence on the automated system has led to errors in
relation to the timing in administering medication, resulting in doses administered too
close together. Infrequently as such errors have so far been documented, they can be
extremely dangerous for weak and vulnerable ICU patients, who may thus receive double
doses of medications the likes of antithrombotic agents, narcotics, opioids, or insulin.
Control systems are in place in some institutions designed to alert medical staff to
such potential problems, yet these systems are themselves dependent upon human
monitoring, which has its own propensity for error. In the ICU, as elsewhere in the
hospital, the technology for maintaining and accessing computerized health records has
the potential to improve the timing, safety, efficiency and accuracy of patient
interventions.166 On the other hand, according to Carayon et al, the implementation of
electronic health records (EHR) in the ICU increased the time that doctors had to spend
on review and documentation by 40% or 50%. These researchers also found that the use
of the EHR system led to increases in alternating among multiple tasks from 117 to 154
per hour (an increase of 32%) for residents although for attending physicians the same
statistic decreased from 138 to 106 (a decline of 23%). While the frequency of
conversations between physicians and patients in their care did not change, the limited
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ability of many ICU patients to communicate extensively may have been a factor. While
the study could not answer questions about possible improvement in patient care or
possible reduction in the rate of medical errors, it did document increased attention to and
prioritization of clinical review and documentation. This increase of switching between
tasks was significantly disruptive and distracting although not so much as to be atypical
of hospital intensive care units in general. Given that to date many hospital ICUs have
only short term experience with the system, more research will significantly into the
future will be needed to assess the ultimate benefits and impacts of electronic health
records.167
Chapter 2. C. Risk Factors for Medical Errors in the Hospital ICU
Researchers have sought to highlight risk factors for medical errors in the intensive
care unit. It emerges that several factors can be categorized as potential risk factors that
increase the occurrence of medical errors.168 This section of the chapter presents an indepth analysis of the different risk factors elaborating how they prove to be triggers for
medical errors. These risk factors may be categorized as relating to: 1) the patient, him
or herself, 2) the medications involved in treating the patient, 3) the ICU equipment used
in treatment, and 4) the multiplicity of providers involves in the care and treatment of the
patient.
Chapter 2.C.1. Patients
Several factors surrounding the patient have been grouped as risk factors for
medical errors in the intensive care unit as highlighted below. This sub-section of the
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Chapter discusses: 1) the severity of the patient’s primary illness or injury, 2) any age
related seeds the patient may have for special care, 3) whether the patient is in the
hospital or ICU for an extended stay, and 4) whether, as is likely, the patient is under
sedation.
(a) Severity of the Primary Illness
Admission into the intensive care unit can be triggered by a considerable range of
life threatening conditions. Despite this classification, the severity of these conditions
differs.169 Health care providers may find themselves confused by the atypical
characteristics of some of these most severe illnesses. In addition to the severity of their
conditions, patients may be suffering from multiple complications, each of which medical
professionals must disentangle and isolate, in order to treat simultaneously. Many
patients admitted to the ICU are experience dysfunction with multiple physiological
systems; thus, the level of complications and severity of the condition in general is, for
any given patient, a primary risk factor for medical error. In handling and treating
patients with severe or urgent cases, healthcare professionals are markedly more prone to
committing errors. In a bid to save the life of a patient, these professionals may feel
pressured into making hasty decisions or executing the wrong treatment strategy. 170
Moreover, given their greater vulnerability, patients with complicated medical conditions
are significantly more likely to suffer negative consequences from medical errors. These
propensities have been documented in the work of numerous researchers who have
analyzed differing aspects of this issue.171 For example, Tourgeman-Bashkin and Zmora
have found that medical errors occur more readily in situations in which a patient’s
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condition represents a complex medical case. This tendency explains why the recorded
number of medical errors is highest in the hospital’s ICU; patients admitted to this
department require critical, often emergency care.172 Marik asserts that whenever the
severity of illness necessitates hospitalization, the likelihood of medical errors occurring
increases significantly. Patients with the most complicated medical conditions or those
who require the most complicated regimens of treatment are susceptible to the greatest
burden in terms of the consequences of medical errors simply to the extent that their
conditions demand critical care and treatment. Ultimately, healthcare providers are bound
to commit mistakes as they strive to offer highly complex and demanding regimens of
care and treatment.173
(b) Age Related Need for Special Care
According to Taib et al, the age of patients correlates closely with their
susceptibility to medical errors. Patients admitted to the intensive care unit are of
different ages and present a variety of life threatening conditions.174 However, research
has revealed that patients at the two extremes of the human life cycle are in need of more
delicate handling as patients in the ICU, namely very young children,175 and seniors of
advanced age. Compared to patients of school age, adolescence, and adulthood, young
children require special medical care because of the lack of development of the biological
systems, with the need for special medical care increasing exponentially when a life
threatening condition is involved. Given the immaturity of physiological processes in
children, healthcare professional face additional challenges when handling young
children.176 Children require dosages of medication and treatment procedures, which are
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different from those commonly administered to adults, and which moreover, involve
much narrower margins of tolerance for over or under administration. Furthermore,
making wise decisions on the type of care for to children in the ICU represents an
experiential gap in the knowledge of many health care providers, causing them to be
more prone to error. As with patients of all ages, some errors may cost the life of children
while others may be rectified with effective intervention strategies; however, with young
children the former category is proportionally greater. In order to minimize the potential
severity of the consequences of medical errors, healthcare professionals need to be much
more assiduous in monitoring and administering care to young children in the intensive
care unit, tasks already under-performed with regard to ICU patients as an entire
group.177
Within the context of voluntary reporting, health care workers tend to report an
increased number of medical errors while treating and caring for children, a situation to
be anticipated given the developmental stages children are progressing through both
physically and mentally. Rathert et al note that it is easy to confuse the types of
healthcare a child requires and the ways in which they are distinct from those of an adult
leading to a variety of medical errors.178 Moreover, children become highly depend on
caregivers when ill or injured, particularly when hospitalized. Since children are unable
to be proactive in taking care of their needs, caregivers must operate with special skill in
order to elicit the relevant information needed to provide the required care. According to
Nguyen et al, this dependency itself constitutes an additional risk in that it increases the
likelihood of medical error.179 Moreover, certain diseases exhibit distinct
epidemiological symptoms in juvenile patients from those which are typical in adults,
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placing children, especially the very young, in need of special care and increasing their
risk for suffering adverse effects from any medical errors. Furthermore, children from
various demographic groups, especially those already hampered by poverty and racial
disparities in health care, may be at increased risk of suffering negative consequences
from medical errors. Naylor contends that their reliance solely on public insurance and
need to seek services in government hospitals should be deemed a risk factor for medical
errors by itself.180
Toward the other end of the life cycle are the elderly, who also require specialized
care compared with adults in general. The aging process coincides with numerous health
conditions; moreover, various biological systems tend to deteriorate toward
dysfunctionality with age. This makes the elderly as a group more vulnerable to life
threatening conditions such as dementia. The physiological challenges that come with age
intensify the challenge of delivering appropriate and efficacious medical care that senior
citizens need when in the ICU. Statistics from various studies have documented the
increased tendency that healthcare professionals have for making errors with this age
groups, particularly in terms of administering medications or implementing treatment
procedures.181 Individuals within this age group may be highly responsive to some
medical procedures yet far less sensitive to others. Such circumstances constitute
dilemmas for the healthcare providers who handle their cases. These dilemmas and the
confusion they engender only function to trigger medical errors.182
Valiee et al have noted that diseases associated with older adults, such as diabetes,
dementia, and heart attacks require critical care, which may compound other injury or
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illness that has caused their admission to the ICU. As healthcare providers strive to
provide such care, they are more likely to incur medical errors.183 According to Mattox,
the risk is higher among hospitalized elders, relying on nursing care to manage their
conditions.184
(c) Extended Stays in the Hospital or ICU
The length of time an individual spends in the ICU may constitute a risk factor for
medical errors. Some patients with complicated illnesses spend months or years in the
unit. During these prolonged periods, medical care providers try to intervene using
different strategies to save the individual’s life and stimulate his or her recuperation. If a
patient does not respond to the various strategies used, the case only becomes more
complicated.185 Healthcare providers face the dilemma of whether to search for different,
and potentially more efficacious, treatment procedures at the risk of causing setbacks or
even harm. Such confusion may lead to potential errors that may compromise the safety
of the patient.186 Sometimes, the situation of patients only worsens with time, prompting
doctors to alter the treatment procedures with other alternatives, leading to a heightened
probability of medical errors. The occurrence of any error will almost certainly prolong
the patient’s stay in the intensive care unit, as medical professional must now work to
correct the situation using relevant intervention strategies. For example, patients who
spent a long time in the ICU are highly prone to serious of infections resulting from
medical errors. A clear illustration is the development of sepsis in long term ICU
patients.187
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(d) Patients under sedation
According to Church and MacKinnon, sedation comprises the administration of
different drugs to reduce the patient’s responsiveness to stimuli, along with awareness of
surroundings.188 ICU patients usually need some degree of sedation, although the need
varies from patient to patient. Prior to the development of modern treatment procedures
and equipment, patients in the ICU relied on different tubes inserted into the body in
order to ensure the proper functioning of their biological systems, usually causing some
degree of irritability and agitation.189 This circumstance necessitated heavy sedation. By
contrast, modern ICU ventilators more efficiently and painlessly guarantee that the
patient has access to ventilation; thus, tubes are becoming less useful in many critical
care units. However, for other reasons, sedation is still fairly common depending on the
diverse needs of each patient. One of the reasons why critical care patients require
sedation is because of the pain associated with many life-threatening conditions.190
Regulations exist as to how much sedation is necessary, given the patient’s condition.
Regardless of level, sedation incurs certain consequences, and various researchers have
identified it as a potential risk factor for medical errors. Since the sedated patient displays
limited and subdued physical response, if any, to different treatment procedures, it
becomes easier for healthcare providers to implement some procedures.191 Yet at the
same time, it becomes easier to commit errors in the diagnostic, the treatment, or the
medication phases, and to do so without immediate feedback in terms of negative
response in the patient. Therefore, the probability of a medical error arising is much
greater in dealing with highly sedated patients.192
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Chapter 2. C.2. Medications
Medications forms yet another classification of risk factors for medical errors.
Different factors associated with medication serve to present health care providers with
potential challenges, hence triggering the occurrences of medical errors. Three of these
factors, as described below, are: 1) special types of medication, 2) the number of
medications a patient is taking, and 3) the number of intervention that a patient is
undergoing.
(a) Special Types of Medication
Accodering to Bucknall, certain types of medication demand a degree of
stringency as to the specific conditions and procedures by which they are administered.
While these medications are recommended only for particular patients with specific
physiologies or conditions, presently numerous brand names exist for pharmacologically
identical drugs or compounds, circumstances that may serve to confuse the healthcare
provider.193 This may occur in the process of prescribing, ordering, or even administering
medication; even a doctor may confuse the different types of medications during his
prescription for a patient in the ICU. In other cases, the nurse responsible for
administering the medication or the pharmacist may confuse the different types of
medications available. Such confusion happens because of the different types of
medications and often leads to a medical error.194
Dodek has documented that with the emergence of new technologies, various
different types of medications, many of which health care providers are not familiar with,
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have become available within recent years. Sometimes, the availability of different types
of medication may bring confusion as to side effects and dosages. For example, two
different types of medication may be used to treat a similar illness but in different
recommended dosages. Health care providers may easily confuse the two types and
administer the safe and efficacious dosage of one in place of that of the other.195
(b) Miscellaneous Medications
The norm for patients in the ICU is a combination of medications to address the
different symptoms that they are experiencing, as well as to enhance the capacity of their
internal systems to recuperate. This combination demands professional competency in its
coordinated administration. For example, some pairs or triads of medication may cause
counter-effects in conjunction with each other; therefore, they cannot be given at the
same time.196 On the other hand, some medications need to work concomitantly in order
to create an efficacious potency. Healthcare providers can easily become confused when
a patient in a critical condition requires many medications within the same time frame.
Thus, it becomes quite easy inadvertently to trigger an error by administering a drug in
the wrong way or in the wrong dosage. The chance for error involving a patient requiring
only one medication is significantly lower than for one who requires a number of
different medications.197 The reality that healthcare providers work in shifts, inhibiting
their opportunity for adequate communication may engender further confusion as to the
number of medications to be administered to a particular patient in the ICU. Although
doctors and pharmacists try to be clear with respect to the dosage, timing, procedures,
and caveats in administering medication to a given patient, errors still occur. These are
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the reasons why the number of medications constitutes a significant risk factor for
medical errors.198
(c) The Number of Interventions
Given the life-threatening conditions that send patients to the intensive care unit
for admission, it is unsurprising that multiple, simultaneous interventions are often
required in order to save a life.199 When a patient needs a variety of interventions, extra
vigilance crucial to their successful execution, in order to ensure that their interaction
poses no threat.200 The developers of different therapies have described the order in
which they need to be executed, which may vary with different patients. In contrast to the
hospital general population patient, who requires only a single intervention, the ICU
patient requiring multiple interventions is considerably more likely to be the victim of
medical error. The challenging environment of the ICU and the level of expertise needed
to deliver high quality care, when multiple interventions are a necessity, may spur an
increase in the rate of error if the health care provider is not superbly competent.201
Chapter 2.C.3. Environment and Equipments in the ICU
Moyen and his colleagues have asserted that since some medical errors are
attributable to faulty equipment, different types of intensive care equipment should be an
identified category of risk factors for medical errors. The following risk factors relate
specifically to ICU equipment.202
(a) The Complexity of the Environment
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The rapid advancement of technology serving the healthcare field as a whole has,
especially the ICU, facilitated an increasing dependence on sophisticated equipment and
systems, which those medical professionals who must use them to deliver vital care,
monitoring, and treatment in the ICU do not adequately understand. Furthermore, from
the level of patient contact to the upper most level of administration, the safety risks and
consequences associated with medical equipment failure are at best poorly understood. In
this context it is impossible to overstate the complexity of the ICU environment.
Compared to other hospital units, the intensive care unit proves to be very complex;
working in it demands an extremely high level of vigilance.203 Researchers have labeled
this complexity in the ICU as a potential risk factor for medical errors in and of itself.
This characterization is because the various equipment providing life support to ICU
patients needs to operate properly in order to yield maximal functionality. There are
different modes of ventilation that support patients in normal physiological functioning.
Healthcare professional working in the ICU must be fully competent in operating
different systems of equipment.204 By themselves, these systems, whether fully
automated or manually controlled, may develop technical issues triggering the occurrence
of technical errors. In other cases, the errors arising involving the use of such equipment
and systems may be attributable to human deficiencies, such as the lack of competency in
handling the system. Concerning the ICU environment, one research noted that,
“Intensive care units (ICU) are specifically prone to having a greater incidence of MEs
caused by the treatment of extremely ill patients, with polymedication prescriptions and
frequent stressful situations for the staff, commonly occurring in conjunction with work
overload in a busy area.”205
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(b) The Need to Handle Emergency Admissions
In a significant proportion of healthcare institutions and facilities, the ICU is the
only unit equipped and staffed to handle emergency cases in which patients require
urgent care and attention. Consequently, at times the typical ICU will receive multiple
emergency admissions at once or in short order, necessitating a high degree of
competence and responsiveness on the part of ICU staff.206 Emergency admissions into
the ICU test of their expertise and critical judgment in offering healthcare that is, at once,
both immediate and of the highest quality. Such cases normally require urgent
interventions and solutions to pressing medical problems; thus, the probability of error is
higher, compared to other situations affording time for thorough diagnosis and
deliberation. Typically, the urgent need to preserve life runs concurrent with the need for
doctors or other healthcare providers to brainstorm the most efficient treatment
procedures for the patient, who presents with a case is far from ‘textbook’ in nature. Such
critical decisions may precipitate higher than usual rates of medical errors.207
Considering the society, its demography, and advances in medical science, it is
unsurprising that the demand for critical care is rising, partly due to an aging population
prone to critical diseases and more complex ailments, which in the past few would have
lived long enough to experience. This trend runs concurrent with the development of
higher-risk medical treatments and therapies. Apart from steep rise in the numbers of ICU
beds, the roles played by critical care specialists extend beyond the ICU.208 They act not
only as members of emergency teams, but also as staff at acute care hospitals. Therefore,
the gap between the appeal for critical care as well as the specialists available to offer it
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continues to widen, placing increased demands on those medical professionals.209 Given
the current financial constraints on healthcare besides the cost associated with hiring
more specialists, many ICUs cannot adopt the high-intensity intensive staffing model
needed to adequately handle the increasing number of critically ill or injured patients. As
a result of this growing gap, many errors are made in handling ICU admissions. For
instance, an ICU staff may be forced to admit patients without running the recommended
checks on the operating functionality of the equipment prior to putting into use in the
course of urgently needed treatment. Any rapid succession of emergency admissions to
the ICU further challenges its staff since they are required to operate simultaneously with
heighten competency and responsiveness in the face of this increase in numbers of
critical care seekers.210 Such conditions are among the factors contributing to unsafe
behaviors in the care of patients, which invariably lead to human medical errors.
Impossible as it may seem in the face of these circumstances, these errors can be reduced
in order to enhance the provision of quality patient care;211 thus, they are legitimately
classified as medical errors. Some scholars might contend that advances in medicine,
together with the equipment and techniques they have engendered, promise to relieve
much of the current pressure experienced in the ICU. However, it must be acknowledged
that the applicability of these advances in the provision of care goes along with
challenges such as start-up costs and the lack of staff trained and knowledgeable about
their use, factors which create a propensity for various other types of medical errors.212
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(c) The multiplicity of care providers
Given that health care providers in the ICU typically work in shifts while ICU
patients need round the clock care, various staff members attend to each patient. With
varying qualifications and competencies and a diverse range of experience, these
healthcare professionals may have conflicting convictions about the most appropriate
diagnostic or treatment procedure for the patient.213 For this as well as many others
reasons, the likelihood of a medical error is higher when the patient is under the care of
different individuals who are this diverse in their backgrounds. If the health care system
neglects to ensure effective communication and sharing of ideas among the multiple
health care providers, the chances of errors occurring are greatly increased. Furthermore,
different health care providers may observe different factors in the patient’s condition or
response to treatment, leading to a confusion concerning the most appropriate next step in
the prescribed treatment or procedure.214
Adequate physician staffing is indispensable to the effective and appropriate
delivery of healthcare services.215 Research has documented, however, that currently
physicians’ shortages exist in both specialties and geographic areas. An inadequate
number of physicians inevitably means delayed care and the medical errors that go along
with it, as well as a propensity for various other forms of human error. In the ICU, this
shortage can lead to further deterioration in the conditions of patients and even cause
premature death.216 An over-abundance of physicians can also impair the quality of
healthcare for patients because, as described above, an increase in the number of
professionals may exacerbate the risk of medical errors. The make-up of the physician

117

population also affects the health of patients, in the ICU, as well as elsewhere. Numerous
number of studies have demonstrated that areas in which a significant number of primary
care physicians are active realize better health outcomes than do those areas with an
imbalance.217
Unfortunately, medical professionals trained for specialized units such as the ICU,
surgery, or dialysis are often need or are required to make themselves available and
continue working even after their regular shifts are finished. Consequently, the majority
of them are prone to making errors because of the fatigue associated with working
overtime.218 Compounding the effects of fatigue, the increased work intensity may also
affect the accuracy of the healthcare provider’s care.
Chapter 2. D. Conclusion
This chapter of the dissertation has categorized the broad range of medical errors,
which are typical occurrence within the Intensive Care Unit of the average hospital.
These errors consist of unintentional failures to provide proper care and treatment, known
either as errors of commission or as errors of omission. The former include errors carried
out in terms of execution, planning, diagnosis, delay, in correct administration of
medication, complex equipment failure, and miscommunication. The latter type of error
normally involves either the lack of prophylactic treatment or the absence or poor
implementation of medical management. One common characteristic of medical errors is
that they and their consequences are not the direct result of the disease, injury, or the
condition for which the patient is undergoing treatment. The possible consequences of
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error in the ICU can be as varied as their causes, ranging from little to no effect to the
extremes of serious injury or death. Within this broad spectrum of errors, those involving
medication predominate. The costs of preventable medical errors in the ICU are
staggering, including 44,000 to 98,000 preventable deaths, compounded by 17 to 29
billion dollars in economic losses. Moreover, the ICU has the dubious distinction of
accounting for over one third of all the medical errors in a given hospital, both in terms of
number of incidents and in the percentage of the hospital’s annual budget, which must be
spent on the ICU when the costs of errors are factored in. It is not surprising in the least
that the ICU is a high-risk area experiencing frequent negative outcomes. After all, the
patients cared for in this part of the hospital are in life threatening situations, possess little
physical stamina or resiliency, have been sedated, and need complicated regimens of
medication.
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Chapter 3. Ethical Problems Concerning Medical Error in the ICU
Introduction
This chapter places medical errors in the ICU within the framework of major
principles biomedical ethics, namely beneficence, non-maleficence, distributive justice,
and autonomy and informed consent, each of which are analyzed in detail. Ensuring the
last two of these principles in the context of the potential for medical errors hindering
patient care and treatment will constitute a significant focus of discussion in the Chapter.
Included in the analysis will be the daily ethical dilemmas faced by ICU staff in the
course of decision-making and its consequences in the context of providing optimal care
and treatment while maintaining ethical standards.
As in every other health-care environment, medical professionals at all levels in
the ICU are typically committed to the ideals of bioethics, ideals that physicians and
medical teams strive to achieve in the ICU. However, particularly in this context, various
of these ethical principles and standards can easily come into conflict, given the critical,
immediate response demanded by the medical realities of the environment. For instance,
ethics dictates that each patient be provided with complete information about his or her
affliction, along with the options for care and treatment by means of thorough elucidation
leading to informed consent. Moreover, autonomy demands that the patient have
unimpinged-upon-freedom of autonomy in choosing or avoiding any and all care and
treatment options, whatever the disease, injury or medical emergency. On the other hand,
informed consent requires competency in terms of background knowledge and
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understanding of causes, related factors, possible consequences of potential courses of
treatment, and above the mental alertness and acuity to deliberate over options and make
rational choices. The pace needed to guarantee this ideal inherently conflicts with the
high pressure and urgency and rapid response demanded by the nature of medical
emergencies the ICU. Furthermore, the circumstances that bring patients to this unit of
the hospital guarantee that physicians and clinical staff will have limited knowledge
about the patient, and therefore much uncertainty about the individual’s response to
treatments or procedures, exacerbating staff stress and pressure. Given the fact that health
care professionals are human and fallible, all these factors combine to create an elevated
risk of medical error under the best of circumstances.
At times, the very nature of the tension between the ethical principles of patient
autonomy, distributive justice, beneficence, and/or non-malfeasance on the abstract,
philosophical level and the limited options of practical reality force medical professionals
to pursue the least detrimental alternative. A case in point is the patient whose disease,
injury, or condition is such as to make restorative treatment futile even in the near term,
and yet the patient’s family is insistent on every conceivable heroic effort being made.
Compounding the issue are the typically exorbitant costs of such measures, the doctors’
consciences, and the internal conflicts between saving life, preventing suffering, fairly
allocating resources.
Two fundamental goals, which cannot normally both be maximized in the ICU
are equity in access to care and treatment, related to distributive justice and efficiency in
distributing resources, related to what is least costly, is most cost-effective, or saves the
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most lives. What must always emerge from the tension between these two motivations is
an optimal compromise. In terms of prioritization, given the limits of ICU time, facilities,
and staffing, many conflicting principles exists, such as: 1) first-come, first-served versus
some form of lottery; 2) the most gravely ill or injured first versus the greatest number
who can be treated with limited resources; 3) those with the most urgent need versus
those with the best chance of recovery; and 4) those whose lives most depend on care
versus those who will likely have the longest and potentially most productive futures
ahead of them. Beyond these choices, there are issues of racial, cultural, and gender
equality, as well as age, quality of life and ability to contribute to society following
successful treatment.
All of these questions are nearly identical to those that arise in the context of
disaster relief, the distribution of prophylactics or treatment during epidemics, access to
hemodialysis, the prioritization of organ transplant recipients, and the general rationing of
scarce medical personnel, among patients in any crisis. Relative to these choices, a
number of while some healthcare institutions see the most ethical method of equitably
rationing as being a balanced combination of priorities, others have made clear choices in
their prioritization of one consideration over its alternatives, such as for example,
choosing quality of life outcome along with maximizing the number of added years of
life the patient is likely to gain.
Ultimately, rationing choices in the ICU take the form of decisions over if and
when to withhold or withdraw life support systems, as well as when not to escalate
treatment. Modern technological advances in life-support systems, including mechanical
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ventilators, artificial nutrition or hydration, mechanical circulatory technology,
chemotherapy, vasopressors, renal dialysis, and antibiotics have greatly increased the
stakes in making these decisions, particularly in the ICU. The withholding and
withdrawing of life-support are not the only forms of rationing care or treatment.
Sedatives and pain medication also fall under this category of possibilities; nor is this
possible allotting of ICU services always passive in nature. Transfer from the ICU to
palliative or hospice care is an active step, which may become necessary. Decisions
about whether to withhold, withdraw, or not escalate treatment can be ethically justified
by extraordinary situations involving costs or levels maintenance care, either of which
become unsustainable; extremely grim prognoses or even futility of treatment; or
substantial and irreversible, uncompensatable disability. There are other ethical factors in
such situations that have been proven to be impossible to fulfill – in particular the
equivalence thesis that medical treatment is permissible to be withdrawn if it is also
permissible to withhold the same treatment and vice versa. Even while philosophers,
bioethics researchers, and professional societies officially support the judgment that
withdrawal and withholding of treatment are morally equivalent, clinicians in practice
normally find withdrawal of treatment to be significantly more difficult than withholding
or refraining from escalation, in part because of their feelings of duty to the patient and
the profession.
Chapter 3.A. Relevant Ethical Principles in the Hospital ICU
This section of Chapter 3 of the dissertation examines several inherent conflicts
within the ICU as a medical environment which lead to both ethical dilemmas and the
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propensity for medical errors in this context. In order to provide a framework for
discussion, the section traces the development of codes of ethical behavior from 1847 to
the present, and examines numerous relevant theories of ethics, including
consequentialist, utilitarian, and the deontological theory of principlism. Beyond this
analysis of theories of ethics, this section of the chapter will examine the principle of
autonomy and its limitations, distributive justice, beneficence, and non-maleficence, as
principles in the field of bioethics together with the historical antecedents of each.
Chapter 3.A.1. Ethical Conflicts
The entire field of medicine and all endeavors of healthcare come under the
purview of bioethics and the issues which arise from balancing the goals of satisfying
patient preferences, following advanced directives, fulfilling the duties of the physician,
and equitably handling social concerns such allocating limited resources for care and
treatment, that contribute to ethical conflicts. It goes without saying that every
professional in the field of medicine needs to have a working understanding of the
fundamental principles that constitute bioethics, as well as their practical application in
the healthcare facilities where the professional working.1
Such working knowledge must be deeply internalized in settings like the ICU,
where rapid, yet appropriate decisions are routinely called for. The dependency of most
ICU patients on the physicians and unit staff creates a situation necessitating constant
vigilance in protecting autonomy and self-determination of patients, while ensuring
beneficence and justice in the equitable distribution of resources, and the absence of
maleficence.2 Obviously however, giving in to a patient in every instance is not the
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solution, as illustrated by San Francisco General Hospital study in which 22 out of 24
patients’ families concurred with neurosurgeons against the patients themselves in terms
of prognosis and treatment plans.3 For this reason, various ethicists have promulgated
guidelines for doctors, nurses, and other medical professionals to follow in providing
optimal healthcare to patients. Internationally, bioethicists have collaborated to create
protocols and guidelines with the goal of formalizing ethical standards globally.4 In
circumstances in which these standards of bioethics are not in place due to cultural or
legal conflict, it is the society at large that is disadvantages in suffering both the financial
and physicians and other medical professionals are considered in violation of professional
conduct if they fail to disclose medical errors. The AMA itself is the most explicit in this
regard with its obligatory ethical intangible loss from medical errors.5 Research findings
indicate that as many as 5 percent of ICU deaths involved patients lacking advanced
directives, in situations in which healthcare alone had to make most decisions about the
patient’s care and treatment in the absence of ethics committee review.6 In the wake of a
patient’s death, a ethic committee has little function or input.7
Chapter 3.A.2. The 1847 Code of Ethics and Subsequent Developments
The 1847 Code of Ethics put forth by the American Medical Association (AMA)
represented a revolution in the approach to medical practice. Five subsequent versions
from 1903, 1957, 1980, and 2001, as well as the AMA’s latest revision of 2004,8 have
attempted to keep pace with the changing nature of society, technology, and medical
practice. Moreover, the AMA code is merely the best known of numerous declarations of
ethical principles that have had a powerful effect on medical ethics in this country.9
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Along with these others, the AMA code stipulates that a doctor has an ethical obligation
to apprise a patient about any mistake which causes even minor medical complications
for that patient.10 This responsibility extends to informing the patient concerning all
relevant details regarding the causes, circumstances, damages or harms, steps to rectify
and prognosis for recovery from the consequences of the error. Errors which do not result
in any material consequences for the patient’s health are the only mistakes not covered by
this ethical standard, which mandates official reporting.11 Despite the clarity and renown
of this standard, it is likely that not every physician is aware of the extend of his or her
ethical responsibility in the matter.
Unfortunately, to date his ethical standards of responsibility for disclosure has yet
to be legally codified at federal, state, or any other level.12 Nonetheless, precedent has
been established in the courts as to a fiduciary relationship between the patient and the
healthcare provider, so if a surgeon’s negligence leads to an accident, the at fault doctor
may not hide behind non-disclosure.13 For many years, the hospitals and similar facilities
were considered culpable for the errors of physicians and medical professionals they had
work for them. More recently in addition, the hospitals have be been able to hold
physicians legally responsible to the institution, as well as to the patient. As a whole,
healthcare facilities and institutions have carried on a tradition of responsibility for
disclosure of mistakes apart from any errors to their patients. Thus, even in the absence of
statutes or legislation, the judicial system has created a clear presumption that the duty to
disclose medical errors does indeed exist.14 Furthermore, it is part of the explicit position
of professional medical societies that ethics renders their members duty-bound to disclose
medical errors to any patient experiencing their effects; consequently, disclosure
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guidelines for both practicing doctors and medical trainees.15 Such candor in physicianpatient communication is essential to the discovery of the circumstances surrounding the
error so as to mitigate its effects and prevent its recurrence. In the same manner, the 6th
edition of American College of Physicians’ (ACP) Ethics Manual, asserts that doctors are
expected reveal any and all information concerning errors whether of judgment or in
administering a procedure errors at any time during care and treatment.16 This disclosure
should include all facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the patients’ wellbeing.
Unintentional medical errors do not automatically fall into the category of improper,
negligent or unethical behavior, but a failure to disclose anything to the patient is, in fact,
all three of these things. Although objectively speaking, physicians should have no cause
to worry about an honestly admitted mistake having negative effects on their reputation
for integrity and candor, concerns possibly over reputation for competence, legal liability,
or similar matters has significantly affected their willing to acknowledge mistakes, as
well as the promptness and extent of their disclosures.17
Chapter 3.A.3. Theories of Ethics
Teleological, also known as consequentialist, theory focuses primarily on the
outcome of an action rather than on the action itself.18 An outgrowth of this theory,
utilitarianism, has optimization as its cornerstone principle with the goal of achieving the
greatest good for the most people, considering all the consequences under a given set of
circumstances, resting on the assumption of basic benevolence in human nature.19 In
terms of bioethics, the consequentialist would judge the investment in resource draining,
expensive surgery for a single patient ethically unjustifiable when the same resources
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could possibly have helped hundreds of others.20 Along these theoretical lines of thought,
ethics in the ICU is fundamentally about the outcomes of the care that a patient receives
while there. The environment of the ICU clearly involves urgent, yet complex decisions
be made, particularly with regard to patients in critical condition, thus placing significant
stress on the ICU staff, who must simultaneously handle concerned family members, as
well as ethical dilemmas in the ICU, all the while using their best professional training on
the patient.21 The human dimension of this aspect of medical practice is sadly too often
neglected in one’s medical education.22
Utilitarian theory becomes problematic in that it places a duty on medical
professionals to individualize their care and treatment for each patient. The large majority
of professional codes of medical ethics call for respecting patient privacy and
confidentiality.23 The principle of autonomy compounds this situation by declaring the
patient’s right of choice with regard to the treatment options available. On the other hand,
utilitarianism would overrule this right whenever ‘the greater good’ would conflict with
it. Moreover, theorists raise questions as to how a theory such as consequentialism that is
first and foremost outcome-based ever incorporate respect for the attitudes, feelings, and
wishes of the patient. John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville both labeled this
presupposition shared by consequentialism and utilitarianism as “the tyranny of the
majority,” noting its occurrence in any circumstance in which the greatest good for the
group as a whole is not in the best interests of certain individuals.24 In contrast,
deontology as asserted by Immanuel Kant and John Rawls advocated the fundamental
moral and ethical principle they referred to as deontology, promoting the concept of a
moral duty, rather than results or outcomes, as the moral foundation for ethical behavior.
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This contrast of founding assumptions and values places deontology, in many practical
medical situations, as the antithesis of consequentialism and utilitarianism. At the same
time, however, this preoccupation in deontology with the moral correctness of decisions
with little consideration for their effects impinges on the autonomy of the individual,
unique patient.25
The concept of principlism promises a resolution to such dilemmas in the practice
of medicine by asserting that in the circumstance of multiple moral principles claiming
applicability, one must be honored while the other is justifiably suspended in the
particular situation.26 While this sounds good in theory, in practice it gives no means of
deciding between conflicting principles in various real-life circumstances. One such
circumstance would be that of the healthcare professional who is caught between
respecting the autonomy of the patient who wants to pursue options or courses of action
that the medical professional considers morally untenable. Deontology and its corollaries
allow no flexibility for compromise despite the individuality of each patient. Refusal by
the physician to recommend any form of treatment may be the only option in such
difficult cases, but even this choice runs into conflict with beneficence at some point.
Furthermore, even a refusal recommended treatment can also be characterized as
tantamount to negative autonomy.27
The concept of a guiding moral framework for dealing with the day to day
dilemmas of healthcare in practice has so far been neglected in the literature of research
in bioethics, which has concentrated on how medical professionals arrive at the moral
basis for their behavior. The linkage between the ethics of abstract philosophical
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principles and ethics as it plays out in the routine difficulties of medical practice remains
to be worked out.28 Various moral and ethical questions came into clear focus following
World War II with revelations about lying to or failing to disclose information to patients,
as well as active euthanasia to relieve suffering.29 What came of all this examination was
the unanimous understanding that some human rights are sacrosanct, and thus beyond
impingement, even for the good of everyone else in society. As an extreme example, if a
surgeon cannot sacrifice the life of a healthy individual, making him or her an organ
donor, no matter how many other lives might be saved and even if the healthy individual
agreed to do so. Today, both public opinion and the laws of almost all societies would
prevent such atrocity.30
Chapter 3.A.4. Principle of Ethics and their Historical Antecedents
(i) Autonomy
Among the most fundamental of ethical principles in biomedicine is patient
autonomy, which ensures that is a primary concern -enabling patient has the ultimate say
in deciding his or her care and course of treatment. Autonomy has be advocated in two
distinct forms: 1) the optional model, which affirms the active decision making role that
the patient needs to be given, but allows the patient to defer to others, as opposed to 2)
the mandatory model, which asserts that the patient must, in all case, exert his or her
autonomy, or nothing may be done.31 Choosing to undergo or refuse any particular care
or treatment is an integral component of both models; nevertheless, in practice and
especially in the ICU, the inability of patients to make informed decisions frequently
becomes a critical stumbling block to providing essential treatment interventions in a
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prompt enough manner. While abstract principles are context for discussion of
biomedical ethics, patients in the ICU patients may be unable to exercise their autonomy,
yet the lives may depend on immediate decision-making.32
In more practical terms, as a hypothetical example of the dilemmas that crop up in
the ICU, suppose a patient goes into cardiac arrest after receiving incorrect medication.
When a family member asks for an update on the patient’s condition, should the nurse
reveal the error of neglecting to check the patient’s medical record for any history of
allergies? Ethical guidelines exist to assist medical professionals in making such
decisions; in this case, the overriding ethical principle would be justice.33
Patient autonomy has limitations, which may be classified into three categories,
namely contextual, existential, and conceptual. When a patient is incapable of making
informed decisions due to delirium, depression, senility, or similar circumstance, the
limitations are considered contextual and is a common occurrence in the ICU. The
necessity of prompt action, possibly to save the patient’s life overrides even previously
and competently stated wishes; the assumption is that were the patient competent at the
time, he or she would agree with the physician’s actions. On the other hand, if the
outlook is more certain and the need less urgent, the autonomous choices of the rational
patient would govern the course of treatment.34
The second category, existential limitations, applies when the results of the illness
or injury interfere with the patient exercising unfettered, leading to the commonly
reported situation in which a patient tries to yield decision making to the physician.35 The
third category, conceptual limitations, describes an inherently restricted circumstance in
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which it becomes necessary to sidestep a patient’s autonomy in the name of the patient’s
best interests, with the goal of preventing harm or enabling healing. Obviously, these
three sets of circumstances do in theory, and can easily in practice come into direct
opposition with the concept of totally unconstrained patient autonomy.36
(ii) Beneficence
Beneficence represents the duty of medical professionals to always work toward
the betterment of the patients’ health and well-being. While there are those who focus on
and advocate for either autonomy or beneficence as the preeminent principle to the
exclusion of the other, in reality the two concepts are most often compatible and
frequently mutually reinforcing. Seen in this light, the patient’s exercising his or her
autonomy and informed consent is by definition in that patient’s best interest, and
therefore beneficence includes preserving and promoting autonomy.37
Beneficence, synonymous with kindness, mercy, and charity takes two forms:
positive beneficence and utility. Positive beneficence refers to the act of securing or
providing tangible benefits to patients. Utility or optimal usefulness calls upon the
medical professional to weigh the benefits against the risks and costs in among given
proposed courses of action in order to find and select the optimum. Altruism, love, and
humanity are other concepts closely linked to beneficence. As it is typically used in
bioethics, this term denotes broadest scope of actions undertaken for the patient’s good.38
In totality, beneficence is the moral obligation to act for the good or welfare of others,
even though the actions taken in furtherance of this goal may not be obligations in and of
themselves. According to Beauchamp and Childress, positive beneficence consists of a
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foundation for various more concrete obligations on the part of medical professionals,
such as directly preventing harm to the patient, eliminating or restructuring conditions
that would present danger or the risk of harm, defending the patient’s rights, helping the
patient to surmount barriers caused by disability.39 Beauchamp and Childress conceive of
this obligation to beneficence as morally coming into play anywhere and anytime the
medical professional becomes aware of another person’s need or danger, is able to help
without personal sacrifice or imperilment, and is in an advantaged position to assist. In
the language used by these two scholars, it becomes clear that they allow for conflicting
obligations in certain circumstances to take precedence over beneficence.40
Within the context of beneficence as an abstract concept, Beyond these
considerations, both general and specific forms exist, with the former applying to all who
make up humanity as individuals while the latter relates to designated groups, such as
family and friends, children and the elderly as classes of individuals, and patients as a
group for the medical professional.41 In this regard, certain groups, such as children or
friends, inherently command beneficence from anyone. According to W. D. Ross, a full
definition of general beneficence encompasses the broader scope in the issue of how one
can actively improve the lives of his or her fellow human beings. Shelly Kagan expands
the concept even further to include sacrifice in the absence of limits or constraints for the
ultimate welfare and improvement of humanity.42 In contrast, other scholars contend that
in practice, the duty of beneficence is limited to removing and generally preventing while
promoting good. Even as restricted, this position compels an individual, such as a doctor
or healthcare worker to act so as to prevent negative occurrences whenever it can be
accomplished without personal loss.43 Despite their frequent convergence, in biomedical
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ethics the autonomy of patient and beneficence always have the potential to conflict
under specific circumstances, raising the issue of which should take precedence.
(iii) Justice
Insofar as healthcare is inherently related to the society as a whole, social justice
is inextricably linked to medicine and healthcare, including all the controversial aspects
of providing healthcare, such as inequalities in terms of its access, affordability, and
quality. In fact, significant number of scholars have asserted that access to the highest
quality care at affordable prices is a human right that society is required to make
available to all.44
Definitions of the term justice have focused on three closely related perspectives
with scholars and philosophers thinking in terms of the individual receiving what is fair,
what he or she deserves, or what he or she can rightly expect. A key axiom in the study of
human society is that all individuals, by virtue of their existence, are entitled to certain
benefits, as well as redress and/or compensation should they endure certain misfortune or
injustice. This assumption leads directly to the necessity of agreed upon societal
standards to ensure that such entitlements, whatever the society defines them as
including, are available to every one of its members. According to Beauchamp and
Childress, asserted that this concept of fairness, equity, and suitability is known as
distributive justice and that its ultimate origin and delineating characteristics are rooted in
the cooperative social structure of the society in question. The concept of justice
described here must be considered distinct and discussed apart from forms of justice such
as punitive, rectifying, or compensatory justice, in that these latter types begin when there
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has been a transgression of justice and harm done to victims. In the sense asserted by
these two scholars, justice arises from something like a social contract, with breaches
such as malpractice occurring either as incidents or as an ongoing unethical state of
affairs.45
Two rather abstract principles apply to making judgments about what is ethically
considered just in any given situation, in healthcare as in all fields, namely the principle
of formal justice and the material principle of justice. The principle of formal justice or
formal equality states the individuals with equal status or standing must receive the same
treatment. However, being stated in the abstract this principle neglects to specify what
constitutes equality, either in terms of the individuals or the circumstances. The material
principle of justice focuses more on considerations outside the individuals themselves,
characteristics either physical or qualitative in the environment that must be taken into
account in any fair distribution of benefits or burdens.46
(iv) Non-maleficence
For the healthcare professional, as a principle of ethics non-maleficence means
avoiding any behavior that would or could foreseeably cause harm to a patient, which in
practice becomes much more complicated than it sounds. For example, healthcare
professionals do not even need to be physically with a patient in order to cause injury
through maleficence; it can occur as easily as by not returning a phone call to a patient
with a reputation for malingering or being a hypochondriac. Something as simple as
neglecting return could cause a patient harm in the form of unneeded stress, making
communication failures a type of medical error that causes harm. Whether or not the
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failure involves any intent or is attributable to an electronic or human error, or whether
messages are inaccurate, delivered to the wrong recipients, or involve damage to
equipment, any breach in the flow of correct, timely, communication to all relevant
parties constitutes a medical error of potential, possibly even life-threatening harm.47
While the occurrence of a medical error undeniably violates the principle of nonmaleficence to the extent that the error has caused any harm, it is not clear when and how
the principle applies in the aftermath of an error, particularly if the physician is not
responsible for the error or if the patient’s knowledge of the error or certain aspects about
it, would cause harm through worry, possibly even more harm that the error itself. Given
the present day status of the physician-patient relationship, it is difficult to hold a tenable
position against disclosing medical errors, yet at the same time, non-maleficence dictates
avoid anything that will cause harm to the patient, whether that damage is physical,
mental, or psychological.48
Two factors give physicians a unique status and position in the community and
society at large. First, their patients are, by definition, in a singularly vulnerable position,
and with this dependence normally comes a unique level of trust. Second, a doctor is
presumed to have an almost inexhaustible array of knowledge, skills, and expertiseseemingly even to the point of infallibility. This admittedly exaggerated perception
makes it all the easier for health professionals or physicians avoid disclosing medical
errors, the consequences of which the patient may simply attribute to unexpected
complications of the injury or illness. Given the ease of and natural impulse to conceal
medical errors, the frequency of non-disclosure is to be expected; what is difficult to
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fathom, given the clarity of professional obligations and the strong stance of bioethicists
for disclosing any and all medical errors, is that there are those in the professionals in the
field who openly argue against doing so. Regardless of the controversy, according to
numerous research finding patients want to know about medical errors when they occur
and specifically, in terminology they can understand, the answers to two questions,
namely why the error happened and what can and is being done to prevent it from
happening again.49
While accurate statistics are inherently difficult to obtain, the available findings
reveal physicians themselves admitting that large majority of medical errors go
unreported to patients who must endure their consequences, despite the doctor’s ethical
obligation to the contrary. Approximately 76% of the doctors interviewed in one study
confessed that, at one point or another, they had failed to disclose a serious error to
patients.50 The reason they offered was disclosure becomes complicated when different
various hospital departments had been involved in the error, making disclosure to the
patient a complicated and controversial affair. Although other research findings point to a
somewhat higher rate of disclosure, one study reported as many as 22% of the surveyed
doctors saying that they would not disclose certain medical errors, even if potentially
fatal, given the inherent emotionally disturbing discussions and conversation that would
inevitably ensue.51 Considering all these factors working against disclosure, it is
predictable that an inverse correlation exists between the severity of harm from a medical
error and the likelihood of disclosure to patients and family. On top of every other
disincentive to disclosure is the sense of personal failure it engenders in the mind of the
medical professional.52
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Unfortunately, no manual exists with concrete procedures for disclosing medical
errors. “Physicians must offer professional and compassionate concern toward patients
who have been harmed… An expression of concern need not be an admission of
responsibility. When patient harm has been caused by an error, physicians should offer a
general explanation regarding the nature of the error and the measures being taken to
prevent similar occurrences in the future. Such communication is fundamental to the trust
that underlies the patient-physician relationship, and may help in reducing the risk of
liability”.53
Chapter 3. B. Ethics in the Hospital ICU
This section of Chapter 3 relates the roughly 50 years history of ICUs in United
States hospital in relation to their implementation of biomedical ethics and the principles
it advocates. Over this period, adherence to such principles has greatly benefited many
critically ill patients, and yet such principles of ethics have not been universally adopted
in hospital ICU. A variety of factors work against uniform and full implementation of
bioethics in the ICU, with some factors being inherent in the setting and its mission and
others the results of factors that can be altered.54
According to one study, as many as one-fifth of all Americans die while in the
hospital ICU in pain and suffering due to a terminal illness or injury.55 According to
Multz, ICU costs in the U.S. accounted for approximately a third of hospital budgets,
translating into roughly $62 billion in healthcare costs, which was about one percent of
the nation’s GDP that year. While ICU benefits can be great, so are their costs, making
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them emblematic of the miraculous possibilities and tremendous burdens of modern
medical care.56
One of the cornerstones of bioethics in the broader field of medicine are Childress
and Beauchamp’s four principles elaborating on the ethics of beneficence: 1) nonmaleficence, the avoidance of whatever might harm the patient, 2) a respect for patient
autonomy, 3) the patient’s right to self-determination, and 4) the equitable distribution of
medical resources.57 These principles are too abstract to serve as a manual of ethical
practice,; however, they are useful in recognizing situations and defining issues in which
goals of ethical practice are coming into conflict, such as when the goals of respecting
patient autonomy and justice may lead to contradictory courses of action if a patients
demands access to limited medical resources that should go to other patients who have
priority for other reasons or might derive greater benefit from them.58
Although Johnson asserts that beneficence and non-maleficence have long existed
as principles of bioethics, until more recently these principles did not imply any need for
proper disclosure to the patient. Given the norms of the physician’s role of near
omniscience in society, not to mention widespread acceptance of the concept of one
human owning another, i.e, slavery, the absence of expectations of disclosure is not
surprising. In concord with the thinking of that era, Percival’s 1803 medical text, while
incorporating medical ethics, provided no statement that could be used to support the idea
of patient making medical choices for themselves. Even the AMA Code of Ethics from
1847 and based on Percival’s does not appear to even foresee rise of autonomy as
fundamental concept of biomedical ethics. In fact, it was the mid of 20th century before
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informed consent was clearly established in the literature as a principle of ethics. One
reason for this breakthrough was a growing legal acceptance of the right of every to give
or withhold informed consent.59
In some form or another, the rights of patients to accept or reject medical care has
been acknowledged for several centuries, in part through common law in England and the
U.S. In the last 70 years or so, the principle of informed consent while a subject of
debate has been elevated to the status of legal right through the response to revelations of
World War II atrocities committed under the guise of medicine, not just in Axis Europe
but also in studies such as the Tuskegee syphilis case, as well as in response to the
movement for greater equality and civil rights for minorities. From the outset, the
physician’s duty to practice beneficence has been construed to protect patients from
suffering any harm not the direct result of the injury or illness. This precedent is
particularly relevant to the frequent issues of withholding ICU care from patients ICU
given the more cost effectiveness of home care, a situation that has occurred repeatedly
with patients suffering from cancer or AIDS.60 Until the 20th century, neither English nor
American courts had deemed informed consent a prerequisite to intervention for
treatment or research. Court records of this period document a few instances of healthcare
professionals supporting the notion of informed consent through their testimony, but none
in which they advocated patient autonomy.61
Beginning in the early 20th century, various U.S. court case rulings created and
expanded the precedent for legally mandating informed consent. In Schloendorff v.
Society, 1914, the U.S. Court of Appeals in New York ruled against a hospital, stating
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explicitly that every adult person had the right to decide what could or would be done
with his or her body. Some four decades later, in 1957 the U. S. Court of Appeals of
California ruled that clinicians must disclose all relevant facts affecting a patient’s rights
and interests. By 1970, the Supreme Court of California had further defined the scope of
the physician’s legal duty, in terms of disclosure to the patient, as being measured by the
patient’s need to know any and all relevant information material to decisions concerning
care and treatment, with Cobbs v. Grant serving as the basis for their ruling.62
An examination of the transcripts of these cases leads to the conclusion that
informed consent in this country was motivated by a growing resistance to the
paternalistic model of medicine, based on an ethics which permitted doctors to define the
best interest of a patient without concern for his or her wishes or opinion. What has
emerged from this historical shift has been participatory clinical decision-making,
eschewing rigid medical paternalism, but concurrently ushering in greater complexity in
doctor-patient communication and relationships.63
Chapter 3.C. Ethical Issues in the Intensive Care Unit
This section of the Chapter 3 describes the concept of futile medical care, issues
involving the ethics of allocating limited resources, and the controversies and realities
surrounding the withholding and withdrawal of life support in the ICU. In order to frame
the discussion of these topics, all of which have engendered considerable debate, it is first
necessary to briefly examine the special circumstances of ICU patients with regard to
autonomy and their informed consent, as well as the special responsibilities that these
circumstances place on the ICU staff.
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Presenting fundamental challenges to ethical principles such as autonomy, ICU
patients frequently have diminished ability to make informed decisions due to any or
several of various hindrances, such as confusion, disorientation, psychosis from organic
illness, metabolic upheavals, pain, sleep deprivation, or medications such as sedatives.
These consideration make it imperative that ICU staff be vigilant about their
responsibility to ensure that patient is given every opportunity to exercise what capacity
he or she possesses at the moment when critical decisions need to be made. The goals of
preserving patient autonomy and informed consent must be balanced with avoiding lifethreatening delays in decision making, while allowing for a patient’s possible ability to
make some, but not all, decisions about his or her care. The medical staff of the ICU team
needs to be vigilant and constantly prepared to reassess a patient’s capacity for decision
making, knowing when to bring in outside experts for a formal cognitive or psychiatric
assessment.64
Chapter 3.C.1. Futile Medical Care
The term futile medical care implies that used to describe medical treatment that
has little or no, or at most meager hope of achieving the goals set for it, such as regaining
function the patient has lost through injury or illness, or improving the patient’s quality of
life.65 This phrase is loaded with connotative meaning for almost all parties involved,
including medical staff, families, surrogates, and stakeholders have interpreted the
meaning of ‘futile medical care’ differently and sometimes contentiously from each; thus,
predictably it has frequently thwarted attempts to communicate among attending
physicians, other ICU staff, patients themselves, their family members and/or surrogates.
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From an exclusively rational perspective, the ICU is the setting where the end-of-life is a
very real consideration and the idea of futility is likely to become a possibility under
certain circumstances. However, these same circumstances do not tend to promote
rational thinking on the part anyone with emotional concern for the patient. Probably
precisely because of medical and technological advances, leading to heroic life saving
through such measures as cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), mechanical ventilation,
pacemakers, and dialysis, life may be sustained for a potentially indefinite period even in
the face of an incurable condition.66
The rise in prioritization of patient autonomy has had a profound effect on the
nature of physician-patient relationships.67 The power which the growing emphasis on
autonomy as a pillar of biomedical ethics provides to patients and their surrogates, along
with relatives in some cases, can encourage them to put a medical professional in position
of going against the latter’s conscience and conflicting ethical principles in providing
care that goes against professional evaluation. In such cases, doctors, nurses, or other
ICU staff may find it impossible to deal with stress of the moral and ethical conflict and
will consequently withhold or withdraw treatment, either by conscious or subconscious
action, rationalizing the effort as futile and interpreting beneficence according to their
professional ethics as requiring them to treat only patients who can truly benefit from the
care.68
In an attempt to settle some of the disquiet surrounding the term, certain scholars
have posited a distinction between physiological and qualitative futility. A hypothetical
situation involving chemotherapy serves to illustrate the difference; a doctor rejecting the
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treatment judging that it will not arrest the progress of a cancer is assessing it to be
physiologically futile, whereas the same doctor upon deciding that the same patient could
not endure the negative side effects of the chemotherapy, that would be assessing the
identical regimen to be qualitatively futile. The value in distinguishing these notions of
futility is that it allows specifying the motivations for making the determination in ways
that are possible to more easily communicate and accept.69
Yet another attempt at circumventing the immediate emotional responses to the
term futility in medicine has been to speak in terms of low survival or success rates of
what are sometimes called futile therapies. In this light, Peberdy et al. note that among
patients receiving CPR in European hospitals, at most 6% are successfully resuscitated,
and of those CPR, and merely 17% eventually left the hospital alive.70 By it very nature,
CPR, especially in the ICU, does violence to the human body, insofar as it involves
procedures such as the administration of electric shocks, the intubation of airways, the
injection of heart medication, or the direct massaging of the heart in an open chest.71
However, in spite of the exceedingly slim odds of its success, many palliative patients
and family members continually push for it, even when they are aware of the odds,
because of the social and cultural ritual that has become rather than because of its
functionality or prospect for success.72
According to Mohammed and Peter, one the important aspects and functions of
CPR is its symbolism in affirming that the medical staff pursued every conceivable
avenue in the effort to sustain the life of a patient, despite any apparent futility.73 Thus,
the staff removes any logical possibility of attributing death, should it be the outcome, to
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a failure of human effort. Furthermore, these researchers contend that the typical ICU
protocol of withdrawing technological life support technology at a slow, deliberate pace
is aimed at replicating the natural process of dying, permitting the family of the patient to
prepare themselves psychologically through the gradual shift from medical intervention
to nonintervention.74 To this end, some ICUs have proposed encouraging the members of
a patient’s family to witness CPR or other resuscitation efforts so that they may be a part
of the process leading to the patient’s in a way that is more open and meaningful.75
When disputes arise over whether a given course of intervention or treatment is
futile and the existing physician-patient or surrogate relationship is incapable of dealing
with the issue, mechanisms, protocols, and procedures, either formal or informal have
been emerged for resolving the issue.76 One such formal procedure, known as the
Houston Policy for Medical Futility was developed in that city and was in operation until
the Texas Advanced Directives Act with its broader scope involving patients, surrogates,
and physicians replaced the policy and incorporated an interdisciplinary committee from
the facility and a procedure to resolve disputes.77 On a national scale, the American
Medical Association (AMA) published recommendations for a multi-phase resolution
procedure, notable for providing a mechanism for patients or their surrogates to have a
different attending physician, or even move to another medical institution if agreement
cannot be reached.78
Taking into account the three aspects of patient treatment, namely its
effectiveness, its benefits, and its drawbacks and cost, financial and otherwise, Edmund
Pellegrino created a guideline system for determining the best course for a given patient
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in his or her individual circumstances.79 According to Pellegrino, while the effectiveness
would be best evaluated by the medical professional, the patient would be the best judge
of benefits in the subjective terms of his or her lifestyle, with the assessment of burdens
and cost arrived at through a collaborative effort of the physician and the patient. In this
model, each person would be responsible for deciding upon the best approach. In this
context, the person or group responsible for their segment of through this process,
Pellegrino envisions a balanced consensus emerging as to whether any course of medical
care or treatment should be considered futile.80
Advocating distinctly against Pellegrino’s model, Grossman and Angelos warn
that it is likely to cause a communications breakdown, especially when it comes to the
concept of futility.81 Moreover, these authors contend that the very notion of futility
inherently puts the physician back into the authoritarian role of the past while it
undermines patient autonomy. Grossman and Angelos posit the use of the term “goals of
care” instead of “futility” so as to foster physician-patient dialogue and discourage
contentiousness, especially given that patient’s surrogates and family members may also
be involved. According to these scholars, the idea of establishing goals, clear
expectations, and advanced directives with such features as “do not resuscitate orders”
and “required reconsideration” go a long way to forestalling conflict when critical
decisions of this nature confront those involved.82
Insofar as they command the trust of all those directly involved with the patient’s
care, third parties such as ethics consultants or palliative care teams,83 social workers,
chaplains, patient advocates, or medical committees are in a position facilitate consensus
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on questions of futility of care. Such ‘external’ groups or individual bring broader
perspectives, help diffuse the emotional ramifications of potential decisions, sideline
ethical issues such as cost and rationing of resources and thus reduce their potential for
conflict, and alert the other parties to additional or unconsidered options for care and
treatment.84
According to Bradley and Brasel, surgical ICUs in particular could benefit by
establishing the following five circumstances as automatic thresholds for calling on the
services of palliative care specialists, which these authors distinguish from hospice care
and which they arrest will avoid futility becoming an independent point of contention: 1)
by request of the family, 2) by the medical team’s determination of futility, 3) by
contentious family disagreement, 4) by an assessment that the end-of-life is imminent, or
5) simply by one month having elapsed with the patient in continuous ICU care.85
Chapter 3. C.2. Ethics of Allocating Limited Resources
Through history and in all societies, medical services and resources have been
almost always insufficient to meet the community’s needs causing ethical dilemmas in
terms of equitable allocation.86 There have been those who, on the basis of moral
imperative, are against any limiting of medical care even for the terminally ill, resulting
in the cost of care and treatment rising far beyond either the willingness or the ability of
individuals or society to pay.87 Lest this position seem an exaggeration, 2013 statistics
for health care spending in the U.S. reveal a total of spent $9,255 for each individual,
healthy as well as ill or injured. This adds up to a total of $2.9 trillion dollars, in excess of
a four-fold increase from the $714 billion spent in 1990 and totals 17.4% of the nation’s
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2013 gross domestic product (GDP); furthermore, it amounted to two to three times as
any other industrialized nation for that year.88 Of even greater concern, forecasts
anticipate additional growth to average 5.8% yearly through 2024 reaching 19.6% of
GDP.89
The fraction of this staggering amount which is being directed towards end-of-life
care is far greater than proportional under any system of categorization.90 Evidence
shows this disproportionate spending to be stable over the long term, as annually from
1978 to 2006 approximately 5% of Medicare patients accounted for between 25.1 to
28.3% of the program’s payments during the final year of life, typical of these patients
was repeated hospitalization and greater use of ICU services, especially during the final
few months.91 Statistics confirm that for any given patient, approximately one-third of
their lifetimes Medicare bills are for care and treatment during the last month of life.92
Numerous scholars and policy advocate contend that such imbalances make the rationing
of limited medical resources economically inevitable and even morally justified, no
matter how unpalatable.93 End-of-life care is the most visible, yet not the only, intensive
consumer of medical resource; for instance, premature neonatal care can encompass
many months of hospitalization and expensive care at times exceeding $1 million per
child. Such situations, as with other disproportionately expensive care, occurs within
some sector of the ICU.94
Possibly due in part to the inherent nature of the medical care it provides, the
hospital ICU has not been able to find an optimum balance of efficiency, effectiveness,
and ethical acceptability, which has avoided spirited controversy. Difficult situations,
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which are likely to involve the ICU, include emergency or disaster triage, priority for
organ transplantation, access to vaccines during epidemics, priority for ICU admission in
general and its forms of critical care in particular, and the decision of when to suspend
futile end-of-life care.95 Beyond any denial is the assessment that the equitable allocation
of resources and the life and death decisions involved constitute one of society’s most
morally and ethically difficult challenges.96 Any given procedural proposal can be
challenged on the ground that it sacrifices fairness to efficiency or vice versa, too
complex to be implementable or else too efficient to be applicable to enough specific
situations, or otherwise too controversial in one respect or another.97 In theory, the ethical
principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, and justice should provide
guidance in any medical situation; however, in practice they may easily come into
conflict with each other, leaving no clear guidance for the specific decision. The
following examples from research illustrate concrete situations and quandaries that has
raised difficult ethical issues.98
In terms of prioritizing kidney transplant recipients, the first-come, first-served is
relatively straightforward to comprehend, defend as being equitable, and administer
efficiently, yet it shuts out consideration of the realities of medical need and the quality of
the outcome. Well documented in research literature are cases of hospitals being forced to
significantly amend or even abandon this guideline in the face of heated controversy. In
some instances, critics contended that the first-come, first-served rule discriminates
against those with a lower standard of living who are disadvantaged in terms of
communication and transportation technology. In such an example, favoring efficiency
may prevent tragic outcomes should something go wrong in the system, while insisting
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on equity may lessen contention. However, in most cases both goals cannot be fully
satisfied.99
While lotteries for access to limited medical resources, such as in the ICU enjoy
the precedent of proven use in the military draft, immigration and receiving green card
status, as well as the distribution of vaccines, these systems themselves have not occurred
without challenges to their fairness. On the positive side, selection by chance can be
quickly, simply, and efficiently administered; moreover, they ostensibly ignore the
obvious and egregious form of inequity. This blindness to individual considerations,
however, is the very source of objection to lotteries precisely because many scholars,
medical professionals, and members of the general public feel strongly that without
taking into account these ignored differences, no lottery type system can claim to be
ethical.100
In the United States, according to established guidelines, priority in admission
into the ICU goes to patients being readmitted over first time admissions despite the
relative urgency of their conditions. Thus, given limited bed space in the ICU, even a new
patient in need of immediate life-saving procedures cannot supercede a patient needing to
return to the unit, creating an ethical dilemma. In these circumstances, resource
limitations prevent medical professionals from acting in each patient’s best interest. From
a different perspective, this guideline unfairly prioritizes existing doctor-patient-ICU
relationships over similar relationships that as yet do not involve the ICU even when
those other patients may derive greater benefit from ICU care. Needless to say, such a
rule while ethical in the sense of being clearly set down beforehand and administered
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consistently, has been highly controversial, with many scholars and practitioners
advocating revision with the goal of maximizing the number of lives that can saved
through ICU treatment and care.101
The prioritization of patient admissions for hemodialysis is an example of the
dilemmas faced by the ICU in dealing with inadequate resources. If the chances of
successful treatment are calculated from a medical perspective and prioritized, patients
with the best prognosis would be treated first, which could in the process consign sicker
patients to pain and fatality.102
Treatment of those who are the sickest first prioritizes those with the worst future
prognosis ahead of all others. This rule follows the moral principle of the rescue rule in
the face of imminent death. By contrast, prioritizing those patients whose need is most
critical, as is done with vital organ transplant and disaster triage typically maximizes the
saving of lives.103 However, opponents argue that requiring those who appear healthier to
wait allows their progressive conditions to worsen, ultimately costing more, and possible
causing them to miss a window of opportunity for being cured or stabilized with much
less impairment. Opportunities lost in delaying treatment of those with the best chances
can even end up as a lost opportunity to save a life.104
The pros and cons of prioritizing the youngest patients tend to mirror the
arguments for and against prioritizing the worst off. The reasoning is that those who had
the least opportunity to live should, in fairness, be given a more equal chance at a
normally long life. The often heard counter argument would point to a hypothetical
young adult who has been the recipient of much more family and societal investment of
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time, energy, and resources than an infant, and yet has had no more opportunity to live so
as to represent a return on that investment.105
Two example of prioritizing the goal saving the most lives has been the allocation
of influenza vaccine106 and responses to bioterrorism,107 predicated on the assumption
that the opportunity to save ten lives trumps the chance to save just one. Nevertheless,
relying on numbers is too simplistic for concrete, critical situations in healthcare, such as
can be common in the ICU where among other things the numbers tend to be not so
heavily lopsided. Ethically laden judgments often must be made over whether to
prioritize women and children over men, whether to prioritize educational attainment or
other greater potential to benefit society, whether to prioritize those with potentially
longer to live and thus contribute more, or whether to prioritize those with the greatest
prospect for survival. These questions must be dealt with when performing triage in the
wake of disasters, when distributing limited supplies of penicillin, or when creating
priority lists for receiving organ transplants.108 Saving the most lives will not aid in
allocating resources it these questions of who and how many are to be selected first have
not been determined authoritatively prior to the emergency or other urgent situation.109
As implied in several of the questions above, social usefulness has at times been
utilized as ethical criteria for who will be prioritized.110 The justification in this case
resides within specific individual rather than a particular value applied equally to all.111
One form of this criterion is known as instrumental value allocation, characterized by the
hypothetical situation in which a government agency such as the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), would endorsed individuals such as key political leaders
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as being indispensable and therefore prioritized above the otherwise first-come, firstserved basis for the rest of the community, This would be justified by the rationale that
certain leadership functions would be necessary for the society to cope with whatever
prompted calamity. Yet another possible prioritizing scheme based on social usefulness is
Reciprocity value allocation, which would in a sense reward individuals who may have,
for example, put their lives at risk for their nation or community, donated organs to save
lives, or volunteered in an important, critical capacity for the public good.112
It becomes clear that, first, no individual guideline for allotment can satisfy all
relevant moral principles in the attempt to ethically allocate insufficient resources, and
that, second, the basic principles of autonomy, justice, beneficence and non-maleficence
are almost certain to come into conflict with one another.113 Regardless of the allocation
system, whether on a single method of selection or a combination, objections can and
have been made that its disadvantages are significantly great as to render the system
unworkable, unethical, or both. A number of organizations have promulgated hybrid
allocation systems although they have typically ended up with some degree of complexity
issues.114
Persad et al. have analyzed the hybridized principle systems put forth by the
following four groups: 1) the United Network for Organ Sharing point system, 2) the
Quality-Adjusted Life Years allocation system, 3) the Disability Adjusted Life Years
allocation system, and 4) the Complete Lives system.115
Merging three prioritization options, The United Network for Organ Sharing
(UNOS) utilizes a combination of the first-come, first-served and sickest-first principles
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with the prognosis principle, adapted for antigen, antibody, and blood type matching of
donors to recipients. In practice, weighting of the principles depends on the type of organ
that is donated, creating flexibility. Criticisms have focused on the lesser weighting
prognosis, the susceptibility to fraud or bias by those misrepresenting their urgency of
their need, the use of multiple transplantation lists, and of permitting multiple organ
transplants per individual instead of possibly saving more lives.116
The procedure developed as the Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALY) allocation
hybridizing the priorities of quality of life-years and prognosis with the former being
dominant and others disregarded. This method has been criticized as inherently biased
against the disabled, disregarding fundamental human equality, and ignoring the other
principles.117
The Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALY) allocation, like the QALY, avoids
distribution based on factors, while attempting to create some equity in terms of
disability, ultimately ranking a person’s life-year with his or her age as a weighting
modification. Although it carries the endorsement of the World Health Organization
(WHO), the DALY system has been criticized for inherently favoring patients who are
younger and for justifying selection on the basis of instrumental value.118
As its name suggests, five distinct principles are incorporated into the Complete
Lives system: 1) youngest-first; 2) prognosis; 3) save the most lives; 4) lottery; and 5)
instrumental value, only in terms of public health emergencies.119 The use of youngestfirst in this system actually emphasizes adolescents over infants, given that they represent
a greater investment by parents and society, as well as greater personality development.
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The Complete Lives system also weights prognosis for living a full life span. In this
respect, one criticism is that it works against those with a poor prognosis who are in poor
condition or are less likely to fully recover. The principle of saving the most lives is
interpreted in terms of more people having more complete lives. Those between the ages
of 15 and 40 are prioritized because they have the best prospect for doing so. Advocates
claim various advantages for the system, namely that it 1) prioritizes younger people,
improving data tracking and leading to greater protection from abuse of the system, 2)
motivates attending physicians to endeavor to improve each patient’s condition as much
as possible, and 3) achieves the optimal degree of distributive justice by weighting human
lives as opposed personal qualities experiences, in spite of its bias against those of
advanced years. While the Complete lives system is undeniably complicated, and in some
circumstances unwieldy, many researchers consider it the best available.120
Unfortunately, none of these systems directly addresses one of the most important
causes behind the need for an ICU to make resource allocation decisions. In the hospital
ICU, the lack of capable personnel may prove to be the most widespread trigger for the
need to prioritize patients, either because the needed specialists are not geographically
accessible or are preoccupied with other medical commitments, or have scheduling
conflicts preventing timely attention to a patient’s medical needs.121
Chapter 3.C.3. Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Support
Forgoing life-sustaining medical care can take any of three forms, namely
withholding life support, withdrawing life support, or not escalating the level of treatment
when otherwise called for. As the names imply, withholding must be chosen before
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treatment commences; afterward, it is withdrawing life support. Deciding not to escalate
treatment implies continuing treatment at its current level either because it would give no
additional benefit or would not be needed at the time of the decision.122 Life sustaining
technologies and treatment regimens likely to be involved in such decisions include: 1)
mechanical ventilation, 2) artificial nutrition and/or hydration, 3) mechanical circulation,
4) chemotherapy, 5) vasopressors, 6) renal dialysis, and 7) courses of antibiotic treatment.
A decision to withholding or withdraw care should not be construed to involve all care
and treatment of a particular patient, nor should it be interpreted as passive; for instance,
withdrawal or withholding often coincides with the administration of sedatives and
opioids for relief from pain.123
Withholding and withdrawing life support is The ethical justification for
withholding or withdrawing life support from a patient rest in circumstances such as a
course of treatment so extremely difficult to maintain as to be burdensome, a great
probability the end of life is imminent, or a substantial likelihood of severe disability
even if the treatment is non-fatal and non-futile. Further criteria are employed but
individual institutions and espoused by some ethicists; for instance, the University of
Utah and Intermountain Medical Center make it part of stated policy to withdraw life
support regardless of other considerations when: 1) a surrogate asked to have it done it, 2)
an external standard of reasonability is fulfilled, 3) a minimal time period, allowing for
the patient to make requests has elapsed, and 4) certain psychiatric morbidity thresholds
have been crossed.124
As many as a quarter of all patients admitted to the ICU die there; 125 most
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frequently in the wake of a decision to withhold, withdraw or not escalate life-sustaining
treatment.126 It is common that medical staff in the ICU make decisions to withhold,
withdraw or not escalate life support.127 The Equivalence Thesis (ET) is a principle of
ethics avowing that withholding, withdrawing, and not escalating life support treatment
are all legally and ethically equivalent. The ET holds that it is permissible to withdraw
medical treatment if it is also permissible to withhold the same treatment and vice versa.
In contrast, Non-Equivalence (NE) considers it acceptable to withhold treatment while it
would not be permissible to withdraw the same treatment once started.128 While ET has
the endorsement of many scholars, philosophers, bioethicists, and professional
guidelines,129 it is nonetheless controversial with numerous opponents,130 and is far from
being the consistent practice of the medical profession.131
One group that has resisted the Equivalence Thesis are physicians in the ICU, in
part due to concerns over the possible legal interpretations of withdrawing something
previously acquired and in part because it feels like a violation of non-maleficence.132
Furthermore, some religious authorities such as Orthodox Judaism consider any
prohibition of treatment even at the end of life as potentially causing premature death.
The dominant position among medical professionals is based on NE even though that
position has resulted in both absurd and unacceptable situations.133 Medical staffs have
an inherent bias, both psychologically as human beings and as professionals towards not
actively stopping even questionable treatment once it has begun.134 Moreover, in many
concrete case with particular patients, specifics of the case would weigh in favor of
NE.135 Thus, it is understandable that many medical professional are not persuaded by
the Equivalence Thesis despite guidelines, scholarly recommendations, or even some
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court ruling. Ironically, even resource limitations that force allocation decisions in the
ICU often favor the NE position given the prioritization principles they follow. In the
context of this controversy, several compromise solutions have been tried, including short
term trial therapy with an ICU patient for whom the efficacy is questionable before
committing to the intervention as treatment, and pre-establishing a lower mortality
threshold for withdrawal.136
Chapter 3.D. Maintenance of Patient Autonomy and Informed Consent
This section of Chapter 3 describes ethical principle and issues involving respect
for patient autonomy, and in particular for informed consent in the ICU. At the heart of
these considerations is the determination of a patient’s capacity, as distinguished from the
legal concept of competence, a determination which is critical in upholding autonomy
and informed consent in the ICU.
Chapter 3.D.1. Respect for Patient Autonomy
Typically, the source of ethical dilemmas concerning ICU patients lie with
conflicts, which grow out of interpretations the four fundamental principles of bioethics:
1) patient autonomy, 2) distributed justice, 3) beneficence, and 4) non-malfeasance as
they apply to a given case. For instance, a hospital’s ethics committee might have to
weigh conflicts among these principles over whether healthcare professionals should give
to employ lifesaving medicine and heroic treatment with its prognosis in doubt, when the
medical staff pushes for it in spite of either contradictory expert opinion or the patient’s
unwillingness to give consent.137
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The policy on patient autonomy of the American Medicine Association illustrates
how ethical issues can arise concerning principles such as full disclosure and informed
consent. Legally established precedent and biomedical ethics concur in the absolute right
of a patient to refuse any form of medical care or treatment, even if is the only way to
sustain life. However, this position presumes the patient to be fully capable of analyzing
the options and understanding the ramifications of any decision. In considering the issue
from a medical perspective the concept of capacity must be distinguished from
competency since legally all adult are presumed competent unless a court has formally
ruled otherwise,138 while any individual under the legal age of adulthood, legally
competency, regardless of their intelligence or maturity, except in formal court ruling of
emancipation. On the other hand, capacity is more fluid and functionally determined,
meaning that a given patient, due to his or her condition, may migrate in and out of
capacity or be capable in terms of some decisions but not others. Criteria for initially
determining a patient’s capacity include: 1) the ability to comprehend information about
his or her condition, 2) an understanding his or her right to choose from the possible
treatment options, as well as the right of complete refusal, and 3) an understanding of the
risks and consequences of the available options. Beyond these fundamentals of
comprehension, in order to have capacity, a patient must be able to assess all this medical
information in relation to personal values, morals, and goals, so as to weigh alternative
choices. Ultimately, the patient must be able to communicate the decisions made,
consistently and meaningfully.139
Children and minors constitute a unique situation within the field of Biomedical
ethics needs to give special consideration to issues of informed consent when children or
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minors are the patients. A cornerstone of the ethical approach known as principlism is
that all competent individuals have the right to choose the option that accords with their
best interest. Obviously, in medicine, as in other fields, many children lack in the
cognitive development to understand various aspects of their situation and, thus, cannot
give informed consent.140 By strict definition, informed consent can only be given by the
individual directly experiencing the consequences of the decision. According to abstract
ethical standards, what even a parent or guardian decides is not informed consent if it on
behalf of a child, despite the adult having legal custody. Thus, some scholars and
clinicians have coined the term informed permission for such cases. Although not
instinctively obvious to the physician, With minor such as older adolescents, the
physician must determine whether the patient exhibits sufficient maturity to qualify and
be treated as an adult with respect to that minor’s capacity for making informed choices,
and therefore needs to be treated, for bioethics purposes, as an adult.141
From the standpoint of bioethics, the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that a
minor’s well being and best interests are carried out rests with the physician, regardless
of parental or surrogate’s objections. If resolution between parties looking out for the
child cannot resolve the issue, Legal avenues exist for situations that cannot be resolved,
for example, if a medical determination of needed treatment conflicts with a guardian’s
religious beliefs.142 The child patient should be brought into the discussions as far as
feasible even though his or her consent may not needed nor his or her wishes respected;
in all cases, the child has the right to be informed to the extent of his or her ability to
comprehend, ask questions, and to communicate his or her desires, concerns, or fears.
Should parents insist on prohibiting a proposed treatment, the case becomes a legal
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matter and increasingly complicated; the physician needs to look for mutually acceptable
alternative options suitable to the child’s medical needs.143 In the absence of these, the
physician must look to ethical or legal avenues in order to obtain permission for
treatment.144
Chapter 3.D.2. Respect for Informed Consent
While the abstract principle of informed consent principle makes straightforward
sense, in practice the concept of providing the patient with options for treatment pushes
the medical professional towards a model of care reminiscent of a store clerk offering a
customer models or brands of a type of product. This model tends to neglect the role of
the clinician’s expertise and appears to expect the doctor to stand back and follow
whatever the patient chooses.145 Nonetheless, the patient’s having and being informed of
all options, whenever feasible alternatives exist, as well as being free to select or reject in
fundamental and critical to protecting the patient from unwanted interventions and
inappropriate paternalism. While healthcare professionals are responsible for explaining
all nursing procedures to the patient it is the patient must be the one to decide whether a
treatment option would be more burdensome than beneficial and ultimately whether to
reject anything as simple a pain reliever or as involved as a surgical procedure, 146
frequently the only context in which doctors habitually think about informed consent as
an inherent part of the process.147
Both Autonomy and informed have the patient’s competence to deliberate and
arrive at rational decisions.148 In practice, ensuring these principles in ICU treatment is a
complex process, rich in nuance, and inseparably linked to the conditions which have
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brought patients to this unit of the hospital, inhibiting their cognitive recognition and
comprehension and thus limiting what autonomy some patients can exercise. An
additional layer of complicating the process of ensuring autonomy and informed consent
is the narrow scope of the nursing perspective, which is restricted to ascertaining whether
the patient actually signed the appropriate informed consent documents, and had received
all required-to-be transmitted information prior to signing it?149
Patients themselves may hesitate to exercise their autonomy in making choices
out of a lack of confidence in having received or understood the medical information that
they have indeed been given. Consequently, such a patient may view the efforts to
preserve his or her autonomy as abandonment by those whose expertise and wisdom the
patient has put faith in. this feeling is especially likely when healthcare professional limit
themselves describing the various possible treatments without explaining the rationale for
specific choices, and most important if nothing is recommended. Regardless of the
complexity or difficulties involved, informed consent is a requirement in all medical
circumstances, not just the ICU, and must include information about procedures and
protocols in the event of fatality, should there be even the remotest possibility. The
information required for legally provided informed consent include: 1) the name of the
patient, 2) the hospital, 3) the medical procedure to be performed, 4) the names of
medical professionals directly involved, 5) the risks of any alternative procedures and
treatments, 6) signature of patient or guardian, 7) a statement averring that the procedures
were explained to the patient, the signature of the patient or surrogate, and 9) the
signature of a witness. In the ICU, as well as in any other setting, assuming the timing of
circumstance permits having a friend or someone from whom the patient can derive

178

psychological support present during the explanations is desirable. Showing respect for
autonomy means conveying complete and accurate information to the patient concerning
his or her condition to the extent that the patient fully understands the medical risks,
either consenting to the procedure and its timing, or refusing it; regardless, the patient’s
confidentiality and privacy must be guaranteed.150
Chapter 3.E. Conclusion
All the previous descriptions of ethical principles in practice relate directly to
cases of medical error, these ethical principles as affirmed explicitly by both the
American Medical Association and the American College of Physicians require all
medical professionals, organizations, and facilities involved to provide complete
disclosure, including every relevant detail of errors, and to share them with all those
involved (patients, surrogate family members, hospital, regulators, insurers). To this
extent, both medical institutions and professionals are to hold themselves accountable for
their actions.
The guidelines mentioned above are grounded in consequentialist or teleological
theory with their concern for the outcomes of medical care, as well as by utilitarianism
which advocates such accountability for medical errors through its concern with use of
resources and prioritizing of delivery of the greatest good for the greatest number of
individuals. Even though the antithesis of consequentialism, deontology and principlism
are no less silent or adamant that autonomy, justice, beneficence and non-maleficence
must be preserved in the face of medical errors, whatever the cause.
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Although these ethical principles concur in terms of the need for full disclosure of
medical errors, they remain stand in contradiction concerning their implications for
handling many biomedical ethical dilemmas that are routine to the ICU environment,
with the issue discussed at length above about questions concerning patient capacity for
giving informed consent being a frequent example. Yet another of the areas in which
ethical principles come into conflict, again as discussed at length in this chapter, is that of
medically or psychologically futile situations such as end-of-life care, which are prone to
arising more frequently in the ICU that in any other part of the hospital. In spite of the
futile prognosis, a patient or family members will at times demand that every effort and
expense be spent fighting the inevitable. As the analysis in the chapter has revealed,
forcing the medical staff to conduct procedures that cause them personal moral dilemmas
about violating their consciences and professional ethical standards.
Other ethical dilemmas discussed in this chapter include the equitable distribution
of limited resources, particularly in the ICU, where terminal illness is a common
situation. In these circumstances, treating each patient in his or her best interest is just
not possible. In the face of the impossibility of doing everything medically imaginable,
painful decisions with fatal consequences must be made without time for extended
consideration in terms of whom to admit to the ICU. The chapter has examined numerous
allocation strategies such as treating everyone equally in order, favoring those in the most
dire condition, maximizing the number helped and the extent of benefit (i.e,
utilitarianism), or promoting and rewarding social usefulness. As the discussion has
shown, no single principle was either predominantly acceptable or objectively fully
ethical. Thus, systems that integrate multiple principles go further toward satisfying
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more ethical principles, yet do so at the expense of greater complexity, which can itself
cause frustration and dissatisfaction. Finally, the chapter has addressed the issues
surrounding the withholding and withdrawing of life-saving treatment, actions typically
the precursor to death in the ICU, and a source of conflict as to whether the two actions
are ethically or legally the same. Choices such as those described in this Chapter
constitute the daily required routine of the ICU. It is in this context that medical errors
occur and is the context within in which they must be handled.
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Chapter 4. Ethical Obligations in Terms of Honesty to Patients
Introduction
In medicine, virtually complete and readily accessible information about the
status of a patient’s health history and condition is considered a prerequisite for providing
the best care and treatment. All these characteristics, however, are vulnerable to a variety
of human errors. To the extent that patients and family are aware of the possibility, they
will have expectations of the hospitals and other institutions involved. Not only will
these healthcare providers be expected to be forthright in taking responsibility, thorough
in explaining the causes and consequences, and diligent in pursuing corrective or
mitigating actions, but also to be prepared for the eventuality by having pre-established
procedures for preventing and for handling such events when they inevitably occur.
Among the expectations society has of individual physicians are that they will
prioritize the treatment and care of the patient over any other aspect of conducting their
practice, which includes the way in which they deal with medical errors. One clear
example of this idea is the importance of properly handling the emotional impact of
communicating to a patient the circumstances, especially the consequences, known or
potential, of such an error.1
In accord with the trust inherent in any physician-patient relationship and the
ethical principle of non-maleficence, it becomes paramount that the physician not cause
additional harm in the form of anxiety or emotional trauma.2 Both the American Medical
Association (AMA) and American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) explicitly
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require completely honesty in such matters as a standard of the profession.3 Moreover,
consensus exists that the principle of beneficence dictates full truthful disclosure of
medical errors even to the detriment of a physician’s finances or professional reputation.4
It goes without saying that medical errors in the ICU necessitate the physician taking
every step that is possible, non-harmful, and potentially efficacious to remedy the damage
done. All of this depends on complete honesty; such is the ethical standard for the
practice of medicine in the event of any medical error.
While professional duty in terms of communication is thus broadly construed, it
does not mean that every fact or detail must be provided, apart from all that is directly
related to the patient’s medical condition and treatment.5 This limitation would rule out
sharing information that: 1) is so technical as to be confusing or worrisome, 2) would be
too psychologically traumatic if disclosed, 3) is irrelevant or insignificant, especially if
confusing, or 4) would be in violation of another person’s privacy or confidentiality to
communicate.6 Even these guidelines for what to communicate and what not to are
sufficiently imprecise as to leave doctors unsure in dealing with errors in the ICU,
assuming the best of intent to uphold ethical standards of honesty.
Bioethics offers another tool for physicians’ to gage whether to disclose
information about a medical error by invoking the principle of informed consent as a
guide; in other words, asking whether the patient would need particular details in order to
make an informed decision concerning treatment options. Just as a patient will need to
know what could go wrong and the potential consequences before consenting to a
procedure, in the aftermath of a medical error, he or she would need to know what did
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happen and the need for any new or corrective treatment, risks, consequences, and so
forth. Conversely, extraneous information, especially if it would confuse or unduly
worry the patient would be omitted in disclosing an error, just as equivalent details would
be prior to obtaining consent. Furthermore, special procedures, such as those that involve
written acknowledgement and consent, along with plans of action and understanding of
any elevated risk of error, injury, or death, can be applied in the same manner when
dealing with the consequences of medical error, in the ICU or elsewhere. Applying these
same protocols for documentation can be seen as a minimum acceptable standard for
handling a medical error.7
Chapter 4.A. Western Cultural Expectations in Relation to Medical Errors in the Hospital
ICU
This section of the chapter commences by analyzing the attitudes derived from
Western cultures and religious beliefs, which have led to expectations of how medical
professional should deal with the occurrence and response to medical errors, with special
consideration of anticipated patient expectations. As these expectations feature aspects of
disclosure and apology, the section continues with an evaluation of the barriers to full
disclosure and the ethical principles involved. The section stresses the necessity of a
preset disclosure process that is specific in its details and examines the key characteristics
of such a process. Thus, the section is divided into three subsections covering; 1) western
cultural expectations, 2) cultural competence in medical errors, and 3) a justification for
the obligation to disclose errors.
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Chapter 4.A.1. Cultural Expectations
In what are termed Western societies, many factors contribute to the increased
likelihood that a patient, as well as his or her relatives and associates will become aware
of a mistake or medical error should it occur and, in addition, will be more motivated and
better empowered to be proactive in addressing the situation. Furthermore, JudeoChristian traditions, which have historically been dominant in these societies, form a
conceptual foundation for responding to injury such as that cause through a medical error,
specifically the concepts of confession, repentance and forgiveness. Berlinger and Wu
assert that, “When one misses the mark in terms of another person, Jewish and Christian
traditions prescribe a series of concrete, reciprocal practices: confession, which includes
disclosure and apology; repentance, which includes the actions that the person who has
harmed another undertakes to compensate for the error; and forgiveness, through which
the person who has been harmed signals that he or she has been adequately compensated.
These practices may serve as a lifelong reference point for ethical conduct”.8
Cultural expectations are built upon these Judeo-Christian traditions and, in turn,
become the framework for creating procedures to address the occurrence of medical
errors.9 In particular, it is anticipated that, in terms of the physician-patient relationship,
the process of resolution consists of confession or disclosure, an expression of repentance
in the form of apology and, ultimately, forgiveness by the patient, as well as selfforgiveness on the part of the physicians. More specifically, following Judeo-Christian
tradition, confession entails disclosing all relevant information and judgments about the
situation, while repentance entails apologizing in the form of accepting responsibility and
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expressing regret for any harm done.10 Moreover, this second step inherently involves
actions to reverse or, if not possible, mitigate damages and to compensate the injured
individual.11 The final step in the process, in this case between doctor and patient, is
forgiveness, involving the offering and accepting of compensation, along with a sincere
commitment to prevent recurrence, which formalizes the restoration of the relationship
with the acceptance by the patient and the absolution of guilt.12
Thoroughly understanding the assumptions, emotional reactions, and
expectations of the affected individual is a prerequisite for developing policies and
procedures for the disclosure and apology in the wake of medical errors, all the
more important in the ICU because as part of a medical institution, many
complicating factors become involved, which may diminish the focus on the injured
patient. For example, whereas an apology made be of paramount concern to a
patient and his or her relatives, such an apology may be tantamount to admitting
fault, and thereby legal liability, from the institution’s (and the court’s) point of
view.
While the term repentance is the most overtly theological of the three
concepts, in the context of medical errors, it indicates actions and communication,
which represent to the patient and relatives who have been harmed that the medical
professionals involved understand, take seriously, and regret the injury caused by
the error, along with accepting their culpability. According to the traditions
described here, these forms of repentance and confession, place the injured party,
the patient, under some measure of pressure in the expectation that he or she will
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grant forgiveness; at the same time, the apology has already given the patient an
elevated standing in the relationship, and forgiveness restores the original
relationship.
Robbennolt defines the act of apologizing by stating that, “An apology is a
statement given by one who has injured another that includes recognition of the
error that has occurred, admits fault and takes responsibility, and communicates a
sincere sense of regret or remorse for having caused harm. At their most complete,
apologies may also include promises to refrain from engaging in similar conduct in
the future and compensation for the harm that has been done”.13 Continuing her
analysis of the process, Robbenolt cites a number of effects that an apology
predictably exerts on its recipients through its admission of fault, sincere expression
of remorse, and at least the implied promise to prevent any recurrence; all these
should stimulate the impulse to forgive, in line with Judeo-Christian traditions.14
Chapter 4.A.2. Cultural Competence in Disclosing Medical Errors
The U.S. is increasingly becoming a culturally diverse nation. As evidence
of increasing diversity in the United States, the 2000 Census calculated the nation’s
population to consist of 30% racial and ethnic minorities.15 The following, 2010,
enumeration reported 36.3% who claimed racial or ethnic minority status.
population rose to 36.3%; moreover, in the Western region of the country, the figure
was as high as 47% self-identified minorities. More specifically, the states of Texas,
California, Hawaii, New Mexico, and Texas, as well as the District of Columbia all
reported that those identifying as minorities actually constituted a majority of their
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population.16 The terms shattering culture, and cultural environments of
hyperdiversity have been coined and used in the literature to describe this
phenomenon. This rapidly increasing heterogeneity has prompted scholars and
bioethicist to assert the need for medical professionals to develop greater cultural
competence, on only in the interest of providing better healthcare, but specifically to
counter the increased risk of medical errors stemming from cross-cultural and crosslinguistic misunderstanding.17 This potential for miscommunication either owes its
existence to patients not comprehending the nuances of medical language,
understanding the “culture of medicine,” or misinterpreting medical directions, or
alternatively to biases, stereotyping, or general insensitivity on the part of medical
professionals, which only becomes evident in non-verbal communication.18 The
ways in which culture influences doctor-patient relationships, as well as interactions
with healthcare workers, has prompted the Department of Health and Human
Services to promote cultural competency and education toward achieving this
goal.19 In contrast to this endeavor, some researchers in anthropology and related
fields note that the effect of such education has been to create a plethora of
stereotypic cultural identities and their expected behaviors, ignoring the and
dynamic overlapping components of race, ethnicity, national origin, language,
educational background, cultural affiliation.20 Consequently, these scholarly argue
against the use of culture as a vehicle for understanding and combating the
problems of miscommunication between healthcare professionals and their patients
or the disparities in the quality of treatment that some of the latter group
experience.21 For this group of scholars, individual inquiry of each patient and they
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aspects of culture he or she chooses to embrace is more effective in preventing
inaccurate assumptions, stereotyping, and miscommunication,22 insofar as group
internal cultural diversity is frequently more determinative how to effectively
communicate than are cross-cultural differences.
As a result of these realities, the doctor-patient relationships is currently
examined most often in terms of its dynamic qualities and effectiveness on the level
of the individual encounter and interaction of each medical visit. This approach
rests on the assumption has a far more decisive role in the relationship than does the
overall understanding that either party has of general culture attributes.23 One factor
which contributes to this state of affairs is the broadness and abstract nature of
culture as a concept, which encompasses everything from first language to taste in
food or music to religion to moral and ethical values to gender role expectations to
concepts of politeness, such as turn taking in conversation.24 Communication
barriers in any given physician-patient relationship could be rooted in any
combination of the aforementioned aspects of culture, as well as in others too
numerous to list here.25 Beyond all these group components of culture, the
communication styles and assumptions related roles and anticipated patterns of
interaction expectations are liable to diverge between medical professional and
patient.26 Consequently, as is quite possible between any two individuals, the
physician is likely take a different interpretation of what has just occurred in an
encounter, including the issues, priorities, and feasible options for treatment, as well
as patient understanding and concerns, from that with which the patient leaves the
encounter. In this interaction of the two parties, a satisfactory outcome depends on,
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but only in part on, the norms and expectations of each person’s culture.27
The most important factors in determining the degree of success in the
results of any doctor-patient interaction are: 1) how comfortable the patient feels
about the encounter immediately thereafter, 2) how well the patient follows the
doctor’s counsel and prescription for treatment, and 3) how the patient’s health
improves within the realistic prognosis for the patient’s illness, injury, or
infirmity.28 Another set of cultural norms and expectations that influence the quality
of communication between doctors and their patients: 1) how the patient handles the
unequal power dynamic with the physician; 2) how the doctor and the patient adapt
to their differences on a temporal basis, and 3) how the two handle their distinctive
communication styles.29 A patient who is comfortable with relationships on a closer
to equal footing may anticipate greater interaction and reciprocity than a physician
is prepared to give;30 on the other hand, a patient who envisions the doctor as being
on a much higher level of status in the situation may want a significantly more
authoritarian stance from that physician. Differences in communication style are
also responsive to differences in status; for example, patients who see themselves on
a footing closer to equal will tend to expect more direct spoken, two-way interaction
with far more questions for them to answer, in contrast with those who put the
physician on more of a metaphoric pedestal and thus will high-power distance
patients more indirect or one-way declarative communication and spend more time
listening.31 One result of diverging communication style between doctor and
patients may be a reluctance by the latter to fully disclose information needed for
accurate diagnosis and treatment;32 another may be a disinclination by the former to
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adapt either medical explanations or the diagnosis and treatment process to the
patient’s needs and sensibilities, in other word to culturally tailor the message. Any
obstacle to a full, trust-based candid exchange of information, ideas, concerns, and
preferences may prove to be the ultimate cause of medical errors.33
Putting cultural competence in perspective, while language and other
cultural differences can be barriers that prevent clear patient-physician
understanding, extant research has revealed that it is principally the quality of the
patient-physician interaction - specifically high quality communication that
ultimately determines successful patient outcomes including the avoidance of
medical errors caused by miscommunication Even with the current emphasis on
promoting cultural competency, research continues to show that achieving and
maintaining a high level of quality in the nature of each individual physician-patient
relationship is the greatest factor in avoiding miscommunication based medical
errors.34 The hallmark of such quality in the doctor-patient communication is
consistently effective clarity and reciprocal understanding of the content conveyed
in both directions.35 The prerequisites to this type of communication are consistent
effort to build an enduring relationship founded on mutual attentiveness; diligence
in eliciting, interpreting, and fully conveying information; understanding and
empathy with the other’s viewpoint; communication in terms of transparent and
understandable information; patient participation and autonomy; and adroitly
handled, collaborative decision-making.36 Indications that a given doctor-patient
relationship is functioning optimally would include mutually understood directions
for treatment plans, expectations that are adaptable and appropriate to the
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circumstances, and self-management in terms of compliance and adherence by the
patient as called for.37 Patients experiencing long enduring or chronic infirmities,
comorbidities, or any serious illness that requires repeated physician-patient
encounters will necessitate effective communication due to the inherently complex
nature of the decision-making process.38
While the characteristics of such a doctor-patient relationship may be ideal
in a generalized sense, various studies have indicated that many individuals on both
sides do not feel naturally at ease with such interpersonal interaction.39 Aside from
the personalities of these individuals, factors that have the potential to create
barriers include differences in cultural background, in the medical setting in which
the interaction takes place, the nature of the patient’s medical or healthcare needs,
and increasing in modern specialized medical practice the anticipated duration of
the relationship. Regardless of factors that can inhibit the ideal physician-patient
relationship as it is currently envisioned, the underlying dynamic is socially and
psychologically interactive, in contrast to older models, which were dominated by
the doctor as knowledgeable expert and paternalistic authority.40 Under this new
model of the relationship, the ability of the medical professional to engage in active
listening becomes crucial,41 and, furthermore, has come to be what patients
expect.42 Key components of active listening involve asking open-ended rather than
yes-no, multiple option, or “one-word answer” type questions, along with
paraphrasing and summarizing received communication, and asking follow-up
questions for clarification, all for the purpose of confirming mutual understanding in
situations, such as negotiating treatment options or clarifying instruction for taking
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medication. At its most fundamental level, this type of relationship leads to
considerable empathy felt and expressed by the medical professional, which is
evident in the ability to get the patient to be forthcoming about concerns and
feelings, the time taken to process and reflect on comments, staying with the topic
as the patient sees it, and being attuned to the patient’s, as well as the physician’s
own, non-verbal communication.43 On the other hand, behavior such as neglecting
to actively listen to the patient, providing a combination of glib advice and
reassurance, and dealing in inquiry that is compartmentalized and close-ended, as
with that which merely elicits yes-no or multiple choice answers, tends to squelch
deeper communication, lead to misunderstanding, and make medical errors more
likely.44 One of the regrettable trends in modern healthcare has been the transition
from long-term, close, interpersonal dynamic of the doctor-patient relationship
towards care managed through casual contact or even specialists unknown to the
patient, supported by state-of-the-art technology, but which leaves the patient
feeling in the hands of an impersonal, uncaring entity instead of a concerned fellow
human being.45
Chapter 4.A.3. The Ethical Justification for the Obligation to Disclose Medical Error
In recent years, a slow migration away from a prevalent attitude among those
working in the medicine that medical errors are best handled by denying whenever
possible and when not defending against any culpability has been underway. The
direction of this attitudinal shift has been towards full disclosure on the premise that
patient safety is paramount and that being forthright reduces the likelihood of malpractice
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litigation.46 This shift, however, proceeds in the face of numerous obstacles, including the
basic dysfunctionality of the healthcare system, along with specific real or potential
cultural, psychological, legal, and economic, deterrents, making it necessary to risk
various ramifications in fully disclosing the circumstances of a medical error.47 One
factor spurring on this attitudinal change is realization that numbers of medical errors and
their resulting expenses are increasing exponentially, not to mention the attendant adverse
impact on individuals and society. This growing understanding of the problem has led to
a realization of the need to reexamine the ethical foundations of the relationship between
patients and the healthcare system, as well as the understanding of medical errors from
the level of a concept on down to the specific occurrence.48
Pioneering in the history of medical ethics in the United States Dr. Richard Cabot
drew upon the works and ideas of Ralph Waldo Emerson, C. S. Peirce, William James,
and Josiah Royce, as he brought together theories of medical ethics in his practice at
Massachusetts General Hospital and his teaching at Harvard Medical School.49 Cabot’s
approach was anchored in the axiom that medical practitioners, being human, were
inherently fallible. What follows from this, Cabot asserted, is that ethical advancement
depends on the doctor being aware of and acknowledging responsibility, thus providing
the foundation of moral responsibility. Cabot saw virtue as being grounded in
accountability, with the latter being the only mechanism driving change and improvement
through a process of real growth through trial and error, evaluation, and revision.
Unfortunately, the clinical practices which Cabot pioneered are in present use, much
more so than his ethical practices.50
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The 1969 work by Beauchamp and Childress, entitled Principles of Biomedical
Ethics, has been instrumental in spurring the modern development of this branch of ethics
as an independent field. However, it was not until 1994, when the authors added a chapter
specifically arguing that, for medical professionals and institutions, fully disclosing
medical errors constitutes a moral and ethical obligation, that the healthcare community
began to prioritize the issue.51 The core foundation of these authors’ contention, building
on Cabot’s position, is that particular components of character form a set of qualities
every healthcare profession must possess in order to provide effective care and treatment.
According to Beauchamp and Childress, these traits include: 1) compassion, 2)
discernment, 3) integrity, 4) trustworthiness, and 5) conscientiousness; moreover, they
must be so ingrained in the personality of the medical professional that implicitly guide
all aspects of interaction with patients. Cabot learned from experience that simply
dressing wounds and distributing antibiotics alone was insufficient in medical practice.
Just as Cabot was convinced that to be efficacious all treatment and healthcare must be
fundamentally humanistic and holistic, so too Beauchamp and Childress insist that for a
patient to recuperate, he or she must be able to trust in his or her doctor’s compassion as
much as in the doctor’s knowledge and skills, their need and want to be assured that their
physician is trustworthy and compassionate rather than judgmental and condemning. The
physician must have these characteristics so internalized that the patient senses them and
responses with trust and a level of candor that reveals all the insignificant, yet relevant
behavioral, psychological, and emotional aspects of the patient’s perspective, which will
in turn guide the physician toward optimal treatment.52 It goes without saying that such
levels of trust and such a doctor-patient relationship entails full and immediate disclosure
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of any adverse turns of event, including in particular medical errors, along with corrective
action as soon as possible given other circumstance of the patient’s condition.
While the bioethical standards that these authors have propounded have been in
circulation in the field for decades, these scholars’ ideas have been slow to gain
traction.53 Even though as early as the 1970’s a significant study of medical errors in
California hospital admissions found errors in 4.6% of cases, the concern generated by
this rate was strong but limited in gaining public attention.54 It took another 20 years
before a Harvard Medical Practice Study (1984) backed up the impact of its finding of a
3.7% rate of medical errors by judging 58% of those to have been preventable, Moreover,
this study involved 51 hospitals throughout the state of New York and included over
30,000 patients selected at random, all features which bolstered the significance of the
study.55 Subsequently, research into the occurrence of medical errors became more
frequent, and included a 1992 study of facilities in Utah and Colorado,56 which found
that, out of errors involving 3% of admitted of which 54% were preventable, a full 5.6%
of these errors led to fatality, Furthermore, in this study medical errors related to surgery
errors led to permanent disability or death in 15% of cases, while fatalities from surgery
accounted for 12.2% of all hospital deaths.57 Projecting the finding from the UtahColorado study to a nationwide scale gives an estimate of 44,000 deaths in-hospital
annually due to the consequences of medical error; estimating from the Harvard study
would suggest well over twice that number.58 Nor is this strictly a problem in the United
States; all developed English nations including Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand, along with others such as Denmark have reported equally serious problems with
medical errors leading to significant rates of injury and death.59 Before the decade was
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over, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) issued a report, entitled To Err is Human: Building
a Safer Health System, which not only confirmed the projections of the Harvard and
Utah-Colorado studies concerning deaths due to medical errors, but also provided dollar
estimates of the costs of dealing with these errors at between $17 and $29 billion
annually.60 The report judged this state of affairs to constitute a major ongoing danger to
society and to the fields of medicine and healthcare. In making so bold a conclusion, the
IOM report brought widespread public attention to the problem, while revealing it to be
systemic in nature, and pervasive in U.S. healthcare.
Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, proposals to stem the tide of
medical errors flooded the literature of the field and included establishing procedures for
error disclosure, removing barriers to apology, legally mandating apologies, improving
organizational team, dismantling the culture of infallibility in the profession, enhancing
the transparency of medical information, increasing effective communication, enforcing
full and timely disclosure, and developing measures to enhance patient safety.61 As the
problem of medical errors persisted despite these efforts, scholars and practitioners in the
field came to the realization that at the core of the problem lay the tremendous, systemic
obstacles to full disclosure. Rather than any lack of recognition or understanding of either
the error’s occurrence or the professional ethics and duties involved, the problem
appeared to be the lack of will, spurred in part by the natural human tendencies of
medical professional, to make full disclosure when medical error occur. The problem was
in fact a lack of willpower or ability to empathize with the patient’s situation, enough to
take the ethically mandated course of action in the face of any and all complex
ramifications or negative consequences, which inevitable arise, in other words, to act in
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the virtuous manner that Cabot advocates.62 Fulfilling the ethical obligation to disclose
medical error depends on the personal commitment to do what is morally right, no matter
what consequences it entails; this type of behavior demands being proactive, honest,
candid, and transparent.63
Before the University of Michigan Health System (UMHS)’s policy shift
described above regarding disclosure of medical errors, they had followed a “deny and
defend” strategy rooted in the fear that any admission of a mistake would open the
figurative legal floodgates of negligence, malpractice, and the ruination of their
professional reputation.64 So institutionalized was this policy that legal counsel for the
system admonished all doctors and medical staff against any mention of errors to
patients, relatives, or friends regardless of the severity of the error’s consequences or
even the lack of any harm it had caused. Thus, the UMHS community was estimated to
have disclosed merely one fourth of all the medical errors that had occurred there, 65 even
though statistically fewer than 2% of all errors lead to malpractice litigation and even in
those cases, compensation, beyond restoring the patient to his or her health status prior to
the error, has been infrequent.66 It was in fact the 1999 Institute of Medicine report which
prompted the UMHS policy reassessment, particularly the high frequency of medical
errors leading, often indirectly and when not dealt with, to fatality. The chief of staff at
the time, Darrel Campbell Jr, set a goal for the institution to become the safest hospital in
the nation.67 Campbell made the deny and defend policy his primary target, in that it was
inimical to any effort to anticipate and forestall errors by setting up fear of legal,
economic (both on the part of the institution and of individual employees), and
reputational ramifications as the dominant motivational force, in turn throttling
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communication between stakeholders seen as potential adversaries in the aftermath of a
medical error, and ultimately actually fostering litigation by creating a climate of
misinformation, suspicion, and predisposition to hostility. In 2001 according to its
reversal of policy, UMHS ceased fighting the majority of its claims all the way through
the courts, saving that as a final resort and opting instead to work through negotiation
toward settlement whenever possible. Under a three principle policy, which came to be
known as the Michigan Model,68 UMHS began a system of 1) rapid, equitable
compensation for all injury to a patient resulting from medical error; 2) medical
restitution whenever reasonable and did not non-disruptive to other patients by distracting
clinical caregivers; and 3) proactive efforts to learn from every medical error so as to
reduce patient injury and avoid recurrence.69 Boothman et al. note that, through
subsequent implementation, the model has come to include seven principles: 1)
capturing clinical issues – problems must be known and understood before they can be
fixed; 2) identification of medical errors – distinctions must be made between medical
errors that deserve compensation and adverse outcomes that did not result from medical
errors; 3) communication – clear, exhaustive, careful and compassionate listening must
take place among caregivers, patients and families; 4) compensation – sincere, willing,
fair, and balanced compensation must be provided for medical errors; 5) learning from
mistakes – the occurrence of medical errors are valuable opportunities to protect future
patients from harm; 6) measurement – exhaustive data collection is an important tool in
providing evidence of effective action; and 7) resources – deploy defense counsel and
others in more appropriate roles than litigation and cover-up efforts.70
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The Michigan Model lead to major improvements in University of Michigan’s
health system over the following twelve years, significantly changing institutional
culture, increasing patient safety, and reducing the financial burden of defending against
malpractice claims. As evidence, the average rate of new claims alleging medical error
dropped from 7.03 claims monthly per 100,000 patient encounters to 4.52; meanwhile,
the average rate of lawsuits filed fell from 2.13 per month to 0.75, again for every
100,000 patient encounters. As part of this same shift, interval of time between reporting
and resolving a claim fell significantly.71 By consensus, UMHS’s greatest
accomplishment has been the progress toward its goal of becoming the safest medical
institution in the U.S, which has been largely due to prioritizing patient safety without
exception. In the process, the system has overcome obstacles to disclosure from fear of
exposure to legal action on down to the worries and psychological barriers in the minds
of staff members, living up to fundamental principles of medical ethics, namely patient
autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice.72
Chapter 4.B. What Patients Desire in the Wake of Medical Errors in the Hospital ICU
This section of the Chapter is divided into two subsections, the first of which
focuses the motivations that prompt patients’ expectations and demands, including
identifying who or what was at fault as the primary driving force and monetary
compensation as a secondary motivator. The remaining subsection of the Chapter
discusses the patients’ need for medical support and how it strengthen the necessity
of full disclosure of all medical errors.
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Chapter 4.B.1. Motivations on the Part of Patients
The multiplicity of potential sources of any given medical error makes it quite
difficult first to document and report and second to explain clearly as part of the
disclosure process. The source may be an individual, a group, a technological component,
a system, or a procedure, and moreover may be an error of omission, something needed
but not done, or of commission, something done that should not have been. The error
may have occurred as the result of any or any combination of the following components
of treatment failing to perform as intended: 1) the diagnosis, 2) knowledge of any aspect
of the case, 3) judgment on any part of the situation, 4) any protocols followed, 5) timing
of any part of treatment, 6) medication, 7) labeling, 8) administration of treatment such as
an injection, 9) record keeping, 10) any medical device or technology, or even 11) the
electrical power.73 While disclosure and corrective measure need to occur promptly,
uncovering the sequence of events that triggered a medical error is typically, and
especially in the ICU, a time consuming drawn out process require in-depth
reconstruction and analysis of actions and circumstances. Furthermore, ultimately gaps
in medical and scientific knowledge or in the sequence of events may render
understanding incomplete and cause or causes of the error will be unknowable.74
Having surveyed a variety of research in the literature, Robbenolt contends
that the primary motivation between much of the legal action in response to medical
errors is to authoritatively determine who or what was at fault and to prevent any
recurrence. Obviously, monetary compensation for physical injury and emotional
trauma may well be an important secondary motivation.75 Anticipating these
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consequences, many hospitals have already adopted policies and procedures,
attempting to forestall formal litigation in the court through negotiated settlement
while maintaining goodwill in the form of a reputation for acting morally and
ethically in the face of medical errors. Ultimately, the civil court system still exists
to ensure that patients and families have their rights protected.76
Chapter 4.B.2. The Patient’s Need for Medical Support
Beyond and probably before the desire or need for financial compensation,
injured patients and their relatives are normally concerned with knowing that they
will have medical support and a clear plan for correcting, to the fullest extent
possible, whatever harm the error inflicted. Even when future treatment is not
affected by the occurrence of the error and no corrective measures are needed, full
disclosure is still the duty of attending physicians and institutions involved.
Disclosure then becomes necessary are a matter of maintaining trust within the
doctor-patient relationship, a basic purpose behind the ethical standards of conduct
espoused by the American Medical Association and similar professional medical
organizations. According to Wolf and Hughes, the ethical implications of reporting
and disclosing medical errors and adverse events reveal respect for patient
autonomy and enable healthcare professionals to do their best to prevent any harm
being done to the patient to begin with. In the case of a medical error, the ethical
principles of fidelity, beneficence and non-maleficence, if complied with, guarantee
that any harmful consequences will be minimized.77
As part of the starting foundation of any physician-patient relationship with
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any medical institution or practitioners, one expectation is that the medical
professional bears the responsibility for the well being of the one in his or her care.
Such a relationship assumes trust, including accurate and honest disclosure should a
medical error occur for any reason. Whether consciously or not, the public expects
healthcare providers to put the interest of the patient, being the one in need of
special care, before the medical professional’s own. Despite the obvious discomfort
in reporting medical errors, along with the fear of legal consequences, Gallagher et
al. assert a compelling rationale, which necessitates disclosure as a prerequisite to
complying with the ethical mandate of gaining informed consent from patients and
their families in the context of correcting the effects of a medical error.
Alternatively, rules of medical governing bodies and state laws are available as
unassailable arguments reporting medical errors.78
Chapter 4.C. The Concepts of Disclosure and Apology
This section of Chapter 4 will outline the definitions and characteristics of the
concepts disclosure and apology, highlighting their differences and unique features from
the standpoint of biomedical ethics in the context medical errors, though not exclusively
in the hospital ICU. The discussion will set the stage for analysis of the effects of
nondisclosure versus disclosure on both patients and physicians.
Chapter 4.C.1. Disclosure
At its simplest, full disclosure means providing all relevant details about the
illness or injury quick the patient suffers from along with possible and recommended
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treatment options, prognosis under their implementation, side effects, and so forth. In the
case of medical errors, the same concept applies with the error as injury. In all
circumstances, however, full disclosure is a necessary prerequisite for the patient to give
informed consent. Between bioethical standards calling for informed consent and full
disclosure, only under very rare circumstances, equivalent to literally lifesaving
emergency procedures, can medical professionals justify presuming that a patient unable
to give consent would choose to accept a particular treatment.79 Far from simply being in
a hospital intensive care unit, in order for such consent to an emergency intervention to
be presumed, the patient would have to be unconscious or delirious and have no surrogate
present or available.80 The only justifiable motive for doing so would have to be that the
sole alternative would be disability or death. Thus, as will be discussed in depth in
subsequent section, full disclosure in the case of medical errors is virtually an absolute
according to bio-ethical and professional standards.81
Chapter 4.C.2. Apology
In the context of medical errors, the concept of apology goes beyond a statement
of regret or remorse, depending on whether the medical professional conveying bears
responsibility for causing the error. Rather, in this context it includes an attempt to
clearly present the nature and circumstances leading to the error, the proposal for
correcting its consequences and how that will be paid for, along with steps being taken to
prevent similar occurrences and answers any unresolved questions about the error.82
Because of the many facets in the context of an apology for a medical error, the
communication is neither easy to plan for nor to conduct.83 Many questions surround
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who among the medical facility’s staff is most appropriate to convey the apology;
depending on the patient’s circumstances, equally complicated is the question of who the
apology should be made to. Also open to debate is the timing, with possibly conflicting
argument for immediacy versus waiting for more complete information and the
importance of timing the revelation to minimize psychologically disturbing the patient.
The setting and manner of communication must also be decided, and even then issues of
administrative policy, contractual obligations with insurance providers, and the advice of
legal counsel must be taken into consideration. Consequently, conducting an apology is
significantly more complex than is providing full disclosure.84
Chapter 4.C.3. Effects of Non-Disclosure on Patients and Physicians
The following sub-section of this chapter of the dissertation considers specifically
the negative effects of either selectively withholding relevant information or avoiding
disclosure altogether after the occurrence of a medical error in contrast with the duty and
the positive consequences of full disclosure.
Chapter 4.C.3.a. Effects of Non-Disclosure on Patients
In terms of negative reactions to discovering a medical error, researcher have
reported typical reactions of “anger, bitterness, betrayal, a sense of humiliation, loss of
trust, and suspicion of a cover-up” on the part of patients who have discovered
themselves to be victims of a medical error for which the attending physician offered
neither apology nor explanation. Patients who react this way, clearly consider full,
detailed, and candid disclosure receiving a detailed full and open disclosure as the
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fiduciary, not to mention moral, duty of the medical professional heading up their care
and treatment. The attending physician, whether personally responsible for the error or
not, is ultimately in the best position to alleviate a patient’s anxiety over real or potential
adverse consequences and the general unknown surrounding the aftermath of the error.
Whereas, full disclosure is liberating in that it enables the doctor to focus on more
pressing needs, withholding information and explanations compounds problems in terms
of patient distrust and uncooperativeness, which might hinder efforts to undo the damage
caused by the initial error.85
Despite these findings and the concomitant reasoning, not all withheld
information inevitably lead to negative consequences, nor do all those who feel the
effects of the error want to know every detail. Even outside the scope of medical errors,
“Not all patients want to know everything about their medical care”.86 The full
circumstances surrounding many of the afflictions patients suffer are quite complicated;
too much information can be confusing and stressful to many individuals, requiring a
filtering of the facts and predictions tailored to the specific patient’s desire for and ability
to deal with the information in a psychologically healthy manner. The ethics manual of
the American College of Physicians Ethics acknowledges the risk of harm from overdisclosure. Manual has recognized this negative potential. The term “therapeutic
privilege” refers to the concept that a physician should at times stop short of full
disclosure to the extent that providing all information is reasonably likely to cause further
injury to the patient.87
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Chapter 4.C.3.b. Effects of Non-Disclosure on Physicians
The psychological dynamics on the part of physicians in particular toward
responsibility for medical errors, such as feeling of embarrassment, remorse, or guilt
form a major barrier to disclosure as they show up in the form of denial, concealment,
finger pointing at others, and general refusal to accept responsibility.88 Doctors, in
particular, have an on-going duty to follow through in treating the patient, often in the
context of a longer term relationship, all of which is jeopardized by the error.89 Under
these circumstances, perceived consequences easily override the call to honest integrity in
following standards of ethical conduct.90
In addition, medical professional at all levels fear that any misstep in disclosing
an error could create otherwise nonexistent problems like harmful added stress on the
patient or avoidable malpractice litigation. If these disincentive are ignored or not
challenged, the consequence is the development of a culture of concealing medical errors,
which will obstruct any and all efforts to avoid or reduce the further occurrence of errors.
Once such as culture is in place, the common impulse is mutual defense whereby medical
professionals assist colleagues by concealment and will even actively impede any attempt
to investigate and discipline anyone responsible for the error.91
If the question is posed hypothetically, nearly everyone in the healthcare field will
avow, despite the costs or consequences, the necessity for full disclosure of medical
errors, not only in order to effectively correct problems created by the error, but also to
prevent recurrence.92 Counter to the presuppositions of those in the field, research has
established that full disclosure can often diminish the probability that a given error will
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lead to civil litigation. Far less surprisingly, the chance that a given medical error is
disclosed correlates well with the extent of negative consequences and their being
attributed to the error. This latter point goes against the expressed fears of some
healthcare professionals who think that knowledge of the error automatically creates
additional suffering through stress to the patient. On one hand, the above “concern” can
be an excuse for avoiding disclosure; on the other, there do exist rare circumstances in
which not being informed would indeed be in the best interest of the patient.93 Although
full disclosure is no definitive protection against litigation, the discovery of any attempt
at concealment or distortion of the facts in the case will increase the probability of a
lawsuit, strengthen its claims, and possibly raise the demanded compensation. More fully
rebutting the argument for concealment is the finding of multiple research studies that
what patients primarily want in such a situation is disclosure of the error and a sincere
apology, along with a concerted effort to reverse or mitigate the harm caused.94 To most
physicians’ credit, some research have concluded that aside from worries of ensuing
problems with institutional administrators, health insurance providers, and legal
professionals, these medical professional would overcome their internal psychological
deterrents and opt for complete disclosure and an apology rather than concealing the
occurrence.95
Even though physicians and hospital continue to claim the danger of
psychological damage or incapacitation of certain patients, such concerns lack research
based support. Furthermore, according to Edwin, it is far more preferable for patients and
their relatives to find out about medical errors from an admission by the physicians and
hospitals than from any other source; the author cites various studies correlating honest
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and timely disclosure with lower levels of disturbance and stress in patients.96 Hammami,
Attalah and Al-Qadire, report similar evidence supporting the advisability of medical
errors being revealed by culpable physicians.97
If a patient learns of an error from anyone other those who are responsible, he or
she will probably have to deal with feeling of humiliation, deception, and betrayal of trust
in addition to the trauma and uncertainty of having incomplete information. Moreover,
this element of mistrust can lead patients and their families to suspicions of even greater
errors being covered up, motivating them toward legal advice from those all too ready to
initiate litigation against hospitals and physicians. According to Mazor et al, “Full
disclosure results in a more positive response on the part of the patient or family member
in terms of satisfaction and trust, and reduces the likelihood of changing physicians. The
impact of disclosure on seeking legal advice varied across the error conditions; full
disclosure reduced the likelihood of seeking legal advice in the missed allergy error
situation, but had no detectable impact in the inadequate monitoring error situation”.98
While the rigor and thoroughness of medical school, internship, and residency is
legendary, one of the neglected elements of training is communication with patients,
relatives, and other stakeholders when the subject to be discussed is difficult, for example
in the wake of a medical error. Not only is the situation emotionally charged, but the
causes, the consequences, and the positions and interests of the various stakeholders, such
as colleagues and staff, institution administrators, medical societies, insurance providers,
legal counsel, and government regulators, are not aligned and potentially at odds with
each other. This complexity is exacerbated by the varied contextual characteristics of the
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situation that must be handled in terms of communicating so that the patient is not
confused or left with unnecessary fears and uncertainties concerning the known or
anticipated consequences of the medical error. The absence of training or preparation for
such a scenario adds to the tension and the chances for compounding the problem through
miscommunicate, the consequences of which can include ruining a career or increasing
financial costs exponentially.99 While the majority of doctors both in practice and in
training understand the gravity of the potential ramifications and the need to know how to
handle the aftermath of medical errors, few if any find time to get the help to be prepared
ahead of time.100
Depending on the consequences and how they are handled, one medical error has
the potential wipe out a career based on years or decades of medical training; the
anticipation of this eventually is motivation enough to propel many into avoiding
disclosure. While losing one’s medical license or being assessed a major malpractice
judgment would be the most salient repercussions, losing the trust and respect of
colleagues, patients, and others in the healthcare community could be equally
devastating.101
Nonetheless, the physician, as much as any other professional, is duty-bound to
take responsibility for his or her mistakes, their patients to be held accountable for their
mistakes; this stems from unparalleled level of trust patients place in them, creating a
fiduciary duty that transcends other considerations. This duty includes doing everything
possible to minimize the emotional and psychological trauma of the error revealed,102
which follows from the ethical principle of non-maleficence, the duty to not harm the
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patient in any way that is avoidable.103 Both the American Medical Association (AMA)
and the American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) make the physician’s
responsibility to be truthful with patients an explicit part of their professional standards.
The ethical principle of beneficence further admonishes doctors to invariably act in the
best interests of their patients’ health even to the detriment of the their own financial or
professional best interest. This ideal has already settled the question of whether and how
much should to be disclosed after a medical error has occurred. It is the physician’s
responsibility to mitigate or reverse the mistake to remedy in every respect possible the
harm that was caused by the medical error.104
The concern over possible legal ramification, especially civil litigation, more than
any other single factor, may impede the fulfilling of professional expectation concerning
disclosure of medical errors.105 That fear combined with the forces of medical insurance
concerning doctors, patients themselves, and medical care institutions, create formidable
barriers to achieving professional standards of behavior.106
Chapter 4.C.4. Effects of Disclosure on Physicians and Patients
From the dominant perspective in Biomedical ethics, the disclosing of medical
errors, in the hospital ICU as in any other care setting, is a necessity, regardless of the
consequences to medical personnel or the facility and with few possible exceptions, to the
patient as well.
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Chapter 4.C.4.a. Effects of Disclosure on Physicians
While explicitly taking an oath to do nothing that would harm the patient, medical
students and physicians are not typically instructed that this implicitly includes the duty
to disclose any medical errors or missteps that could result in unintended harm or
additional injury. While both doctors and patients, along with their relatives, would
explicitly acknowledge this ideal as an obligation if directly prompted, the full disclosure
called for is unfortunately uncommon.107
Full disclosure is considered to a complete acknowledgement of the occurrence of
an error, accounting of the chronology and contributing circumstances, along with a
thorough explanation of definite and possible consequences. Accomplishing this task
requires full communication between the responsible medical professional, possibly
along with a representative of the institution and the patient, relatives, and/or proxy. In
the broader context of biomedical ethics, patients have the right to full explanations of
their treatment, both proposed and ongoing. This includes understandably communicated
assessments of potential adverse outcomes, regardless of cause, and prospects for
preventing any negative occurrences.108 Nonetheless, in general, many studies indicate
that far too many patients remain inadequately informed of their condition and overall
health status, even in the absence of medical errors or stays in the ICU.109 Compounding
this problem, close to 33 percent of interns and residents at teaching hospitals say they
had not received information specifically concerning the institution’s policies and
procedures for handling and disclosing medical errors. Understanding what to do was
even less widespread, with only about half of the fully licensed doctors at these same

223

institutions claiming to know how to report an error and fewer that 40 percent feeling that
they could determine whether a particular occurrence constituted a medical error that
needed reporting.110
Considering how varied human beings are in their character, personality, and
reactions to stressful situations juxtaposed with the uncertainty concerning the long-term
effects of many medical errors and the possible disparity between a seemingly
insignificant contributing misstep and consequences as severe as fatality, reactions to
errors can be extreme and dramatic. These factor are inherently amplified in the context
of the hospital ICU, where as much as in any other setting, eventual reconciliation
between patients and relatives on one hand physicians and the institution is far from
guaranteed regardless of how handled. Dramatic emotional responses to learning of a
medical error can go as far as widely circulating public accusations of incompetence and
murder, which can in turn have the significant impact of inhibiting full disclosure of
future errors.
As referred to previously, in disclosing an error, the medical professional must
communicate and inform the patient and family members in a way that is optimally
conducive to minimizing their distress and maximizing their well being. According to
Gallagher et al, an illustrative hypothetical example could consist of an error in the
operating room, leading to a six month instead of one week in hospital recuperation for
the patient who must work to support his or her family.111 A disclosure statement by the
physician worded, “I'm sorry. We made a small mistake in your care, but don't worry,
you'll be fine in 6 months,” can be expected to have a decidedly different impact as heard
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by the patient than would the alternative, “I'm very sorry that we made this mistake. We
are going to do what it takes to make you better and make sure the same thing does not
happen again”.112 Such statement though probably factually similar highlight the care
which must be taken in handling disclosure, in order to relieve rather than compound the
mental or psychological stress of the patient and his or her relatives who may respond in
any number of unforeseen ways, except possibly in the unusual case in which the
physician has a long standing relationship of mutual understanding with the patient.113
According to Edwin, the doctor-patient relationship is inherently fiduciary by
nature, rather than transactional, and therefore, the good faith and trust involve rely on
candor.114 Only through such a relationship can both parties to be autonomous, nonmaleficent, beneficent and just to each other at all times.115 In addition to fiduciary
requirements, Among others, Finkelstein et al., assert that following the standards of
biomedical ethics in and of itself requires disclosing all pertinent aspects of an error’s
occurrence, and not just restoration (to the extent possible) and monetary compensation.
The simple yet fundamental ethical premise behind informed consent, that patients are
entitled to all relevant information in making decisions about their care and treatment, by
clear implication extends to the decisions in the wake of being victim to a medical error,
thus mandating full disclosure.116
Consensus is universal as to the reality and significance of professionally and
psychologically difficult internal ramifications on physicians personally involved in
medical errors, every bit as much as for the patients experiencing the effects of the error.
Given this reality, substantial therapeutic benefits exist, beyond the mandates of
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professional ethics, for doctors to disclose and admit responsibility for medical errors.
Relieving the emotional encumbrance of carrying around the knowledge of responsibility
compounded by concealment frees the professional to forgive him or herself and perform
professional tasks better. Furthermore, relief comes from healing the injured doctorpatient relationship, which being a reciprocal process requires the doctor’s full
participation, should lead to regaining his or her sense of self-identity as a healers.117
Admitting mistakes, whether responsible or not, promotes an understanding of the
patient’s perspective and enables the commencement of corrective measures. Despite a
degree of risk and even when the error has resulted in little or no injury, prompt and
adequate disclosure has positive consequences for both the physician and the patient,
beyond reducing further liability.
In order to prepare physicians to transcend the psychological obstacles to
disclosing medical errors, the process of doing so and in the broader scope handling the
occurrence of errors needs to become a standard part of medical school curriculum. One
factor that could assist with the many cases in which the disclosing physician, normally
the primary attending physician, is not individually culpable, is emphasizing the
distinction between the ‘apology expressing sympathy’ and the ‘apology admitting
responsibility.’ Unfortunately, just as was believed true at one point in the history of the
UMH system, some jurisdictions do legally equate any formal apology with an admission
of liability, prompting medical institutions and their legal counsel to steer physicians
away from disclosing at all, or at least apologizing without institutional approval.
Obviously, the remedy to this obstacle lies in changing the legal system, which is beyond
the scope of this discussion. In the interim, the administration of hospitals and other
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medical facilities must actively create and foster a culture for their respective institutions
that encourage and promotes prompt, candid disclosure of errors by medical staff,
regardless of culpability, along with the appropriate expression of apology. Ultimately,
identification and formal investigation of the medical error, multidisciplinary team
involvement, in addition to appropriate communication with patients and their families,
are all prerequisites to formal disclosure, but must also be followed up by resolution of
the specific situation and improvement in the standards of care so as to prevent future
occurrences.118 Regardless of the situation, if an error is not covered up entirely or
successfully, an option which would be totally unjustifiable ethically, any subsequent
apology will appear devoid of candor, complete disclosure, and sincerity, leaving the
patient suspicious or dissatisfied.119
In terms of the positive consequences of full disclosure, research indicates that it
helps the patient to recuperate both physically and psychologically, in part by reaffirming
the efficacy of relationship with the physician and the medical facility. This form of
disclosure including apology demonstrates that the error has been identified and
acknowledged, that corrective measures including compensation and counseling services
are underway, and that steps to prevent recurrence are in the works. According to
Berlinger and Wu, “Providing fair compensation prevents malpractice suits not only
because patients receive adequate financial settlements, but also because maintaining a
caregiving relationship with patients and families ‘‘diminishes the anger and desire for
revenge that often motivates patients’ litigation”.120
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Chapter 4.C.4.b. Effects of Disclosure on Patients
As will be explained in detail subsequently in this chapter, procedures for
disclosing medical errors are involved, requiring preplanning to address the needs and
positions of the numerous stakeholders who play either direct or indirect roles in the
event. Beyond arrangements to counteract any negative effects of the error and
reestablish the patient’s progress toward optimal health and well being, the next step is to
ensure that the patient is protected from any possible recurrence of the error.121 Hence, it
is essential that all staff involved with the patient’s care are promptly apprised of the
circumstances of the error so as to insure that it is not repeated and that all are vigilant
concerning any negative effects of the error which may appear after some delay.122 The
patient and those close to him or her need to receive a sincere expression of regret for the
error, ideally from the physician in charge of the patient’s care and anyone else directly
responsible for the occurrence. In order for the patient and those others involved to feel as
comfortable as possible in the situation, the healthcare staff need to be sensitive as to
when and how much emotion to express, as well as when to keep quiet and wait for
questions.123 The disclosure needs to avoid all but the most essential Medical professional
need to avoid technical terminology, as it can convey superiority, or lack of concern or
empathy.
In medicine, there is often a fine line between simply unanticipated complications
in treatment and the medical errors that are distinguished as preventable when all is
working as intended; however, patients and relatives may not appreciate the difference,
given that both lead to stressful situations. To avoid exacerbating emotional stakes in the
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situation, health care provider should avoid apologizing for that which could not have
been prevented. Medical professionals must always show empathy is a central to
healthcare, but must also not be perceived as confessing their culpability, unless they
were indeed at fault.124 Such misunderstanding when clarified will tend to leave patients
and relatives suspicious, either by the medical professional or by the patient and his or
her relatives.
Furthermore, the patients and family assume with good reason that the hospital is
ethically by committed to providing any auxiliary care required by the error, including
chaplaincy, social work, or even palliative care. In many cases, the disclosure requires a
both a formal (written) and a verbal apology, the former of which needs to be presented
by the patient safety officer. At the heart of the disclosure process in the wake of a
medical error is the goal of maintaining or rebuilding the medical provider-patient
relationship, as far as is feasible, given what has occurred and, in particularly the case of
errors in the hospital ICU, the fact that family and relatives are almost always an integral
part of that relationship.125
A clear disconnect in perceptions exists between physician and patients in terms
of expectations in relation to revealing medical errors. Doctors and some other medical
professional will see errors in a more narrow scope, which exclude ‘near misses’ and
possibly any medical errors that do not have any significant negative impact, and
therefore will neglect to inform the patient or couch the information in very innocuous
language.126 For the patient, however, anything that was not intended or might have
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caused problems is an assault on his or her peace of mind, calling for explanation and
reassurance at minimum.
If the consequences of the medical error are significant, additional or extended
care and treatment may prove necessary; in these cases, full disclosure aids considerably
in preserving the patient’s trust and gaining his or her consent to the proposed
remediative care. In the large majority of situations, the continuity of care is best for
recuperation from the patient’s initial injury or illness.127 Typically, as family members
communicate among themselves, any suspicions of caregivers being less than forthright
and completely candid can easily escalate into demands for a change of doctor any
possibly legal action, even at times against the wishes of the patient him or herself. Thus,
it is important that the physician communicate all the particulars of how the incident
transpired with members of the patient’s family if they are involved in any way.
Illustrating the factors which need to be explained, Sandars and Aneez, share the
hypothetical example of a man who receives an appendectomy instead of the operation
for a colon infection that he was scheduled for as the result of paperwork being misfiled
by a resident, going unnoticed by the patient’s nurse in spite the name being incorrect on
the charts. As to be anticipated, the patient’s family were unsatisfied with anything less
than a full explanation of what had led up to the mistake.128
Unless attending physicians are forthright in all regards. the patient or family will
see their perspective as being trivialized or ignored and are likely to demand or pursue
engaging a alternate doctor to corrected the effects of the error, as well as possibly seek
legal redress. On the other hand, if the attending physician was not the cause through
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inexperience or incompetence, he or she is the best situated to oversee corrective
measures. Thus, the patient and his or her family need full details in order to be assured
especially if the case was an honest mistake in spite of due diligence or if the medical
professional involved was not negligent. In the regrettable circumstance in which
consequences of the medical error leave the patient unable to give informed consent, the
patient’s designated representative will need full details in order to give permission for
(or deny) corrective treatment. These circumstances illustrate the importance of
maintaining trust with the patient and family, which can only happen in the context of full
disclosure of all medical errors. In accepting responsibility, the attending physician and
the hospital affirm their trustworthiness as prepared to do everything required both to fix
the situation and to repair the relationship.129
Chapter 4.D. The Gap between the Acknowledged Need for and the Incidence of
Disclosure and Apology
This section of the Chapter explores reasons behind the disparity between
duty to disclose medical errors as acknowledged in theory by almost all medical
professionals and the reality, according to best estimates, that less than a third of all
errors are reported and dealt with openly and candidly. Three subsections focus on
this gap in terms of: 1) the differing perspectives of physicians and patients, 2)
additional impediments to disclosure in hospital ICUs, and 3) obstacles to
disclosure grounded in sources other than physicians themselves.
Being human, all physicians make mistakes, which in medical practice are
asserted to be “common, expected, and understandable”.130 While the majority of
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physicians claim that patients need to be informed of any medical errors, statistic indicate
that no more than 30% are followed by disclosure and apology.131 Probably no group
has found this circumstance to be more frustrating than the patients who have
experienced the effects of these errors, having discovered the fact from someone other
than their attending physician. While such distress is entirely understandable,
circumstances surrounding a medical error and its consequences can be extremely
complicated, beginning with the fact that some medical errors are in no way the result of
either negligence or conduct that was improper or unethical.132 Beyond causes, many real
and potential medical, ethical, social, interpersonal, business, and legal ramifications
must be anticipated and dealt with. Beyond merely the patient and medical professional
directly involved, are potentially numerous key stakeholders in any specific case, such as
the medical facility, the insurance provider(s), professional medical associations, the
medical technology manufacturer, the pharmaceutical industry, as well as government
regulators, politicians, the press, religious institutions, universities, the legal system, and
a predominantly well-educated public in terms of the broader issue of medical errors and
the field of healthcare.133 Any of these stakeholders can wield significant influence over
or impinge on decisions concerning disclosure in various ways, six of which are analyzed
briefly in the next part of the discussion.
Chapter 4.D.1. The Gap between Physician and Patient Perspectives
Undoubtedly, discrepancy exists between the perspectives of medical
professionals on one hand, and patients and their families, on the other with regard to
disclosure. If physicians come the conclusion that the risks of disclosure are greater that
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the benefits, they will suppress the occurrence or at least certain circumstances connected
to it, a position obviously at odds with patients’ desire for full details in every instance.
In spite of the needs and wishes of patients to be fully current with the status of
their conditions, when medical errors occur, full disclosure with apologies appears to
happen no more than 30% of the time.134 Scholars and researchers point to a disconnect
between the perceptions of physicians and patients in terms of disclosure of medical
errors in relation to the possibilities and consequences of various projected outcomes.
From the medical professional’s perspective, revealing mistakes and apologizing for
them is difficult in the face of expectations of superior knowledge, skills, and expertise.
In contrast, medical errors frequently involve complicated, interacting contributing
factors strongly suggesting mandatory disclosure. Such disclosure is all the more difficult
to achieve when the errors in question lead to very limited or no injury to the patient’s
short-terms recovery or long-term wellbeing. Fein et al. assert that, “Disclosure of errors
that have not caused significant harm or about which patients are unaware pose even
more complex targets for intervention. These are the errors likely to inform qualityimprovement interventions because they are more common and less frequently revealed.
Disclosure of such errors requires provider knowledge of the patient’s desire for
information and may require disclosure of information to the institution that is not
revealed to the patient”.135 Yet another circumstance in which exceptions are made to the
standards involves patients who are suffering with chronic conditions and the effects of
the error will not alter their prognosis. Beyond these reasons for not fully disclosing
medical errors, medical staff and physicians are prone to shielding colleagues who are
culpable, and may even offer a justification for avoiding disclosure by claiming a conflict
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of interest, citing the possibility of harming the wellbeing of other healthcare
professionals.136
Chapter 4.D.2. Obstacles to Disclosure of Errors in the ICU
In the ICU in particular, a variety of obstacles inhibit doctors and other the staff
from disclosing medical errors, concern over potential malpractice litigation probably
being the most formidable among them. More fundamentally, medical training creates an
inherent barrier in that it dealing explicitly and extensively with the avoidance of making
mistakes, yet pays little or no attention to how to handle medical errors when they occur.
This imbalance in turn, instills a psychological predisposition to avoid acknowledging
errors and to see them as a personal indictment of professional competence and character,
all of which makes it discomforting to disclose errors in the first place. As a result of all
these disincentives, those at fault even tangentially for a medical error are more likely to
provide an implicit, statement deflecting of any culpability, or to avoid disclosure all
together, attempting to hide the error as an unforeseen medical complication.137
Chapter 4.D.3. Other Institutional Barriers to Disclosure
Barriers to fully disclosure of medical errors are not limited to the choices of
individual medical practitioners; medical facilities and institutions normally neither foster
nor reward efforts to identify and disclose medical errors. Moskep et al, contend that
various structural or institutional factors, such as the high levels of patient volume and
‘turnover,’ due to the acute, episodic characteristics what prompts the need for hospital
care have the effect of increasing the chance of medical errors occurring while at the
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same time reducing the likelihood that they will be identified, reported, or disclosed to
the patient.138 Due to system, physician-related, patients related and other legal barriers,
the gap between patients’ expectation regarding disclosure of medical errors and actual
disclosures continues to exist.139
Chapter 4.E. The Process for Disclosure of Medical Error in the Hospital ICU
This section of the Chapter outlines the process which needs to be followed
in order to prepare for and properly disclose the occurrence of, anticipated
consequences of, and plan for dealing with a medical error in the ICU. The first
subsection deals with the preparations which must be made in order to prevent or
minimize any problems that might otherwise complicate the disclosure process. The
second subsection addresses what needs to happen during the disclosure meeting
itself.
There are many elements to consider in establishing a process by which
physicians and hospitals will fully disclose medical errors by compliance with all
principles of bioethics while minimizing additional psychological trauma to the ICU
patient whose health has been jeopardized. The process begins with the planning of a
face-to-face meeting including the attending physician, other involved medical
professionals, the patient and his or her ‘supporting’ individuals. The goals of this
meeting are to disclose the medical error if not previously known to the patient, to
apologize, and to lay out proposed corrective treatment and compensation plans, along
with measure to be taken to prevent any recurrence of similar errors.140
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Chapter 4.E.1. Preparations for the Disclosure Meeting
The first phase of the process involves preparation for meeting with the patient
and those relatives or others affected by the error, during which phase the doctors and
hospital authorities must make sure that various actions have been complete and
organized. The following tasks need to be accomplished: 1) All the relevant facts need to
be assembled and organized; 2) These facts need to be documented, with substantiating
independent expert medical opinion; 3) All system related contributions to the error
should be identified and acknowledged; 4) Corrective measures already underway need
to be documented and available for presentation; 5) Information, documentation, and
paperwork involving liability needs to be assembled and available at the meeting; 6)
Patient and family questions and concerns should be anticipated with answers and
explanations prepared; 7) The wording of potentially confusing or difficult explanations
need to be worked out so as to avoid unintended or unnecessary misunderstanding, alarm,
or provocation; 8) Acknowledgements, apologies, and explanations need to be reviewed
to insure that they are comprehensible for the layperson, i.e, the patient and those
connected to him or her; 9) The previous statements must also reviewed to insure that
they and complete, conveying full candor absent of any dissembling, prevaricating, or
concealing information; 10) The patient’s ethnic, religious, and cultural background must
be considered so that medical professionals involved do not take any action that would
inadvertently offend or cause additional distress; 11) A specific contingency plan needs
to be created if not already in place, to assure the patient of the institution’s sincere
commitment to preventing any recurrence; and 12) All connected parties need to be
notified of the time and place of the meeting, whether attending on not.141

236

Beyond these steps in preparation, hospital administration must support any
physicians who are or see themselves as at fault in dealing with their feelings of
incompetence, failure and guilt, and self deprecation, so that they are ready to handle
their responsibilities when time for the disclosure meeting arrives.142 Certain parties not
directly involved in the occurrence of the error need to be included, such as risk
management experts, and leaders of relevant departments should be consulted in planning
for the disclosure meeting, but should not attend so as to protect the patient’s
confidentiality and privacy, as well as not to create a meeting dynamic in which the
patient or supporters feel outnumbered by medical professionals representing the ‘other
side’.143 On the other hand, patients should be invited to have in attendance whomever
they feel they need for psychological and/or legal support.
Chapter 4.E.2. The Actual Disclosure Meeting
The second phase of the process is the meeting itself. In setting up the meeting,
having a convenient private location away from potential interruptions and scheduling
well in advance to allow for adequate preparations are important considerations. For
example, while the attending physician’s making hand-to-hand (or lower arm) physical
contact with the patient prior to the meeting may be a reassuring gesture, it must be
carefully judged in terms of the cultural backgrounds and the emotional states of all those
present, as it could also do considerable harm to the process if not appropriate in the
given situation. Throughout the interaction, various considerations need to be observed,
including: 1) keeping descriptions and explanation in terms understandable to the
layperson, 2) keeping things focused clearly and narrow in scope concerning what went
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wrong, 3) adapting to what the patient does and doesn’t already know, as well as to how
much detail or background the patient wants, 4) giving the listeners time to process
information and not confusing by overloading with detail,144 5) giving time for questions,
clarifications, and processing implications, 6) maintaining open, i.e, both non-threatening
and non-defensive, body language, generally engaging in appropriate non-verbal
communication. The apology itself must be explicit, completely truthful, and indicate
explicitly any responsible parties without vagueness or shifting of blame, as dictated by
principles of biomedical ethics.
The final steps in the disclosure should be a detailed explanation of a prepared,
proposed course of secondary corrective treatment, including how it will integrate with
ongoing care and treatment for the patient’s underlying condition. This proposal is to be
accompanied by financial details, specifically how any additional expenses will be
covered (presumably not by burdening the patient).145 Alternative options may also be
presented, which might involve obtaining second opinions from specialists or transfer to
the care of a facility or medical professional better equipped to handle to changed
circumstances. Finally, the physician needs to be silent, giving the patient an opportunity
to process the information, respond, and ask questions. The meeting needs to conclude
not with any air of finality, but rather with the sincere encouragement by the attending
physician and institution representatives to continue meeting as necessary until all is
resolved.146
Chapter 4.F. Proper Notification and Documentation Processes in the Hospital ICU
This final major section of this Chapter focuses on procedures which need to
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be in place and implemented prior to the occurrence of a medical error so as to
facilitate the disclosure and apology process when the inevitable error happens.
Chapter 4.F.1. Policies and Procedures
The success of the disclosure process described above relies on the effectiveness
of efforts to promptly and accurately identify medical errors as they occur, as well as to
completely document all the relevant circumstances surrounding them. The first step to
ensuring that this occurs is to have strong hospital or institutional policies and procedures
in place and to have all staff familiar with them. Furthermore, the mechanisms for
gathering the information that will reveal the errors in the first place and then collect the
relevant data essential to analyzing the circumstances is crucial. This is necessary in order
to pinpoint the source or sources of what went wrong, only secondarily to affix
culpability, but first and foremost to find ways to prevent its recurrence. Nevertheless,
certain other obstacles have to be overcome in order for the disclosure process to achieve
it goals, one of which is that the details needed for such reports to be complete and most
useful must come from those who were closest the specific events, decisions, and actions
that triggered the error. These may well be medical professionals or staff who bear “atfault” responsibility, and they may be well aware of the fact or psychological unable to
handle the knowledge.147 These individuals may be unwilling or unable provide the
information required to achieve full documentation. Given that at-fault doctors or other
staff members are not ideal sources of information concerning adverse events, hospitals,
facilities, and institutions need to develop multiple sourced methods of medical error
detection to either corroborate, fill in gaps, or question the objectivity or spin or less
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prone to be reliable sources of information. Rather than isolating those whose objectivity
might be more open to doubt, these multi-source mechanisms should serve to bring
doctors and staff together with risk management specialists, heads of related agencies,
and patient safety specialists, in which all function as a team to investigate, document,
and analyze the event with an eye to making sure that no similar medical error occurs in
the future.148 Beyond the post hoc documentation of the serious repercussions of medical
errors, hospital staff need to watch for and keep records of ‘near misses,’ as well as actual
errors which do not appear to have had any ill effects. Given that such incidents are not
subject to mandatory disclosure, reporting becomes voluntary and rarely is reported if the
reporter has something to lose by doing so. On the other hand, documentation of ‘near
misses’ and incidents with no harmful effects helps to identify vulnerabilities which may
be in the system and, by being pinpointed, may lead to the prevention of a more serious
and damaging error. This is especially true in the hospital ICU, considering the enhanced
vulnerability of its patients.
Chapter 4.F.2. Other Factors and Issues to Consider
While designing a disclosure mechanism, it is also important that hospitals
consider impact of factors like provider issues, as well as patient, error, and
organizational culture factors. Fein et al., define provider issues to constitute how
medical professionals see their responsibility, their fears in the aftermath of a medical
error, and their training in how to conduct themselves in such situations. By patient
factors, the authors mean what the patient wants to see and understand based on his or
her desire for information, degree of sophistication regarding medical and health care,
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and rapport with his or her primary care provider and other medical staff. Error factors,
for these researchers, designates the degree of injury sustained specifically as the result of
the error and whether patients and others were cognizant of its having occurred or of the
damage done. In the findings of these authors, institutional factors consisted of a
perceived tolerance for error and in the presence of a supportive infrastructure fostered
disclosure.149
Chapter 4.G. Conclusion
The values and morals of Western and possibly the majority, if not all, of the
world’s cultures and religious belief systems dictate that any individual or group, whose
actions cause injury to another person or his or her property, are morally obligated to take
responsibility and in most cases make some form of restitution. In the field of medicine,
including the hospital intensive care unit, this translates into an ethical responsibility to
make full disclosure of the circumstances leading up or contributing to any medical error,
along with a full confession and apology (to borrow Western cultural/religious
terminology), and both a proposal for corrective or ameliorative action including
financial compensation and plans for adjustments in policies or procedures to prevent any
further recurrence of the same or similar errors. All these component of full disclosure
and apology are expected by society at large, and agree with the priorities of patients and
their relatives or family members (especially significant in the context of the ICU) upon
finding themselves the victims of a medical error. This latter group of individuals are
most primarily concerned with being informed of the detail of how the error occurred,
what the consequences are or are likely to be, how these negative effects will be managed

241

and corrected, and what is being done to prevent this from happening again to themselves
or to anybody else. Nevertheless, in spite of the pressure of cultural norms, moral
imperatives, ethical standards, professional codes of conduct, institutional policies, and
legal requirements, the disincentives medical professionals experience prompting them to
hide all or critical parts or else distort the circumstances of errors is formidable. Aside
from feeling of guilt and shame, not the least of these forces is the fear of damage to
professional reputation, loss of employment and legal action in terms of civil litigation.
Regardless of the motivators to denial and defense, the consequence of failure to fully
disclose a medical error leave the victim, in this case the ICU patient, open to further
psychological and physical trauma, especially when the error is revealed through sources
other than those appropriately responsible for informing. Ironically, any effort to hide
fault or responsibility can cause the very result, the fear of which had prompted the effort
at concealment. Any action directed away from full disclosure as described in this chapter
leads to patient dissatisfaction, which significantly increases the likelihood of lawsuits.
The disclosure process in hospitals and similar institutions involve significant
preparation as a first step, including the gathering and analyzing of all relevant
information; documenting the same; identifying any of those among the physicians and
medical staff bear responsibility in terms of having taken actions that directly contributed
to the error; preparing to present the facts of the case, the apology, the plan for correcting
or at least mitigating the effects of the error, and the steps being taken to see that such
errors do not occur again. The meeting itself constitutes the second step in the disclosure
process and includes many details concerning time, place, attendees, and who is speak,
when, and how during the meeting; all of these are specifically thought in an attempt to
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maximize communication and understanding while minimizing discomfort and stress for
the patient and supporters at the meeting. However, possibly because this thorough plan
for disclosure is most often not fully or carefully implemented, estimates of patient
satisfaction in the aftermath of a medical error suggest that, approximately 70% of the
time, patients and family members leave with their expectations of what would be done
in the wake of the error unmet. This finding call for a fundamental reexamination of
restructuring of the institutional disclosure process in the wake of medical errors,
beginning with upgrading the notification and documentation components.
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Chapter 5. Medical Error Disclosure Protocols in the Hospital ICU
Introduction
This chapter of the dissertation discusses eight key issues involved in establishing
and implementing protocols applicable to disclosing any type of medical error that may
occur in the intensive care unit whenever it may occur. These eight include: 1) the scope
and scale of the error, 2) the ethical criteria for accepting responsibility, 3) measures to
correct the impact of the error and the prognosis for the patient, 4) strategies to manage
anticipated risks, 5) the timing of disclosure, 6) the various stakeholders and their
interests in the case, 7) the informal and formal acknowledgement of the error and
apologies for it, and 8) the compensation to be offered. Used together in the planning and
implementation of policies and procedure for the disclosure of medical errors, the issues
described in this listing comprise a comprehensive approach which satisfies all principles
of biomedical ethics. Each one of these points represents an issue of substantial breadth
and depth in its scope.
As its name suggests, the first issue in this list, the scope and scale of the error,
involves determining breadth and depth of the various impacts of the error, whether it
involves just one or, less frequently, multiple patients and where the consequences fall in
the range of severity from essentially minor inconveniences all the way to irreversible
calamities such as extreme permanent disability or even fatality. Additionally, this
category of issues covers determinations as to: 1) whether responsibility for the medical
error rest fully with a single individual or is shared by multiple caregivers, such as any
combination of doctors, nurses, aides, therapists, or technicians; 2) whether the nature of
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the error is latent or systemic; 3) whether the error in question falls into one or several
categories of medical errors and which types of error it represents; for example, a drug
dosage error in the ICU can also be the result of an error in communication during the
transfer of a palliative care patient from the emergency room to the ICU; and 4) whether
the medical error under consideration was one of omission, commission, or some
combination of both.1
Numerous ethical criteria exist and form a foundation for accepting responsibility
in accord with fiduciary expectations incumbent on all medical professionals and
healthcare institutions, given the nature of the physician-patient relationship. These
expectations in turn rest on the foundations of the principles of bioethics, namely nonmaleficence, beneficence, patient autonomy, and justice. Protocols have been formulated
to guide doctors and medical facilities as to when and to what extent medical errors must
be disclosed, as well as how to handle potential conflicts between these different ethical
principles when their prescriptions contradict each other.2 Nevertheless, evidence from
multiple sources corroborates the notion that, faced with the situation of being the victim
of a medical error, patients uniformly expect full disclosure of the details surrounding the
occurrence, regardless of how major or minor.
Determining the scope and scale of the medical error or errors in question
functions as a prerequisite and cornerstone for developing measures to correct the impact
of the error, as well as for assessing the prognosis for the patient in terms of recovering
from any negative effects of the error and their impact on the patient’s original illness or
injury. Because it will be based or a least strongly influenced by all of the previously
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outlined considerations, determining the anticipated risk management strategy that
involved doctors, hospital administrators, and other stakeholders will or should adopt
becomes an equally complex issue, in particular because it will greatly affect the timing
of disclosure, which in turn can potentially exert a major negative impact on the patient’s
condition including his or her vulnerability to further harm from other sources.
One factor complicating resolution of issues arising in the wake of a medical error
is the nature of the complex, interrelated, and sometimes contradictory interests of the
various stakeholders in the case. Besides the patient him or herself, who by virtue of
being in the ICU may not be capable of autonomously exercising informed consent,
stakeholders will typically include: 1) family members, 2) surrogates empowered to make
legally binding decisions for the patient, 3) the medical professionals involved in the
case, both those involved with the error and those otherwise involved in caring for the
patient, 3) the hospital itself as an institution, 4) the medical insurance providers for the
patient, which may extend to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), 5)
the insurers for the medical professionals, facilities, and institutions involved, and 6) any
relevant government regulators.
From the perspective of what the patient observes, the acknowledgement of the
error and the apology for it, along with, whatever compensation is being offered are the
most visible and critical issues in the wake of any medical error. A virtually unassailable
number of patient surveys concur that the respondents are deeply interested in learning
and expect complete answers to what happened, who was responsible, how it came about,
and why. The answers to these questions are every bit as important to the patient as are
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what the consequences will be, how they will be corrected, and how similar errors will be
prevented going forward.3
Chapter 5.A. Medical Error Disclosure Protocols Based on the Scope and Scale of the
Medical Error in the Hospital ICU
The planning and implementation of disclosure protocols must take into account
the full range of severity of the potential consequences from being undetectable or having
no effect on the prognosis of the patient’s original illness or injury through a spectrum of
severity to permanent disability or even death. Minor medical errors are defined as those
that may go unnoticed, produce no ill-effects, are minimally disconcerting, or cause only
minor discomfort.4 The continuum reaches its other end with major medical errors which
leave the patient in far worse condition with additional infirmities or disabilities, with
chronic ailments, with life threatening conditions, or which prove to be the cause of
death. Throughout the spectrum of effects of the medical error, the causes may fall into
either the category of those of commission or those of omission. Errors of commission
signify actions that are unwarranted or executed either incorrectly or in the wrong
manner, at the wrong time or to the wrong patient, which at least potentially have
unwanted outcomes. Conversely, errors of omission refer to those warranted actions,
which went unexecuted and thereby lead to unwanted outcomes, whether because of
ignorance of the need in the situation, distraction, neglect, or deliberate choice to refrain
from taking action.5 According to such a broad point of view, any medical error disrupts
and potential inhibits the course of treatment for the patient’s original medical problem,
requiring additional corrective measures or adaptations in the original treatment plan.
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Despite the extremely disruptive sound of these characterizations, a wide latitude exists
in the degree to which a particular level of response or action is called for.6
This section of Chapter 5 is divided into three subsections covering: 1) The
Severity, Disruption, and Cost of Medical Errors; 2) Handoffs and Black Swan, along
with Postoperative Handovers; and 3) Errors of Commission.
Chapter 5.A.1. The Severity, Disruption, and Cost of Medical Errors
The process of developing disclosure procedures needs to take into account the
level of severity, the degree and complexity of the disruption, and costs of medical errors,
all of which could be measured in number of ways. However, the possibly most revealing
of measurements, that of patient outcomes, has been neglected in what body of research
exists on the subject. Instead, the literature tends to focus on costs in terms of the more
easily quantifiable dollar figures as they relate to the hospitals as institutions or the health
insurance providers, and to the costs of compensation or litigation. Errors of omission, by
their nature more difficult to quantify or even unambiguously attribute, are often ignored
in calculations.7 One notable exception to this trend is the Institute of Medicine’s report
from 2000, entitled To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System; it projects
approximately 44,000 to 98,000 deaths per year among patients admitted to the hospital
from both types of errors.8 Estimating the frequency of all severity levels of medical
errors becomes even more difficult although research based on data from 2009 came up
with a nationwide extrapolation that one out of 4 million visits to U.S. hospitals for
treatment of injuries that year resulted in independent medical errors, costing over a
billion dollars. At this average rate, including medical errors of the most minor
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consequences, each would have an average cost of nearly a thousand dollars. Moreover,
such a statistic fails to capture the most expensive of negative effects, such as disability
and fatality, which are inherently almost impossible to quantify with any
precision. Other major limitations on this study’s findings include: 1) exclusion of levels
of care other than inpatient and outpatient at hospitals, 2) exclusion of costs of dealing
with medical errors outside the hospital setting, 3) deliberate underestimating in the
interest of avoiding double counting, and 4) exclusion of any estimates of costs related to
lost work or litigation.9
Chapter 5.A.2. Handoffs, ‘Black Swan’ Errors, and Postoperative Handovers
Beyond formulating procedures and protocols for disclosing medical errors based
on the severity or type of error, specific protocols are needed for errors that happen in
environments with unique features, populations of patients, or activities, such as errors
involving medications, hospital ICU patients, or during the transfer of patients from one
care setting to another, which is referred to as a handoff. In each of these cases, the risk of
medical error is significantly elevated. Specific populations of patients fitting this
categorization would include: 1) those isolated within or outside the health care system,
2) those with limited English proficiency, 3) those with little health literacy, patients who
are members of 4) members of racial and ethnic minorities, and patients 5) those nearing
the end of their lives, including residents of long-term care facilities.10 Such patients will
have difficulty communicating and interacting with medical staff and therefore are more
likely to fail to notice and ask about any irregularities in their care, which might indicate
a medical error.11
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Yet another group of special cases, are labelled “Black swan” errors, referring to
those that don’t fit into any classification scheme for typically occurring or foreseeable
errors. For example, A new technique or procedure for addressing a subgroup within this
category deals with medical errors, discovered and prevented at the last moment, also
known as near misses or recovered medical errors. This procedure involves four steps,
namely surveillance, identification, interruption, and correction.12
Unlike the structure of individuals or small group practice, physicians working for
hospitals in the ICU unit are serving private patients function semi-independently in their
own private practices, responsibility for medical errors within the context of a hospital
ICU principally resides with a healthcare delivery system that is governed and operated
by a complex of rules, protocols, procedures, contracts, regulations, machinery and
specialized subsystems. Even if a private or primary care physician has hospital standing
and privileges, which allows him or her to provide some of the care of a patient in the
ICU, the reality is that a large number of other specialist and medical support personnel
will be involved in the overall care and treatment given the complexity and bureaucracy
of the healthcare delivery system. Even that single physician must rely on a tremendous
amount of communication with and among a wide range of medical practitioners, for
example anesthesiologists, neurologists, osteopathic physicians, pathologists,
pharmacists, nurses, aides, therapists, and technicians, who arguably provide a substantial
part of patient services. These realities make the private physician in question one
subsystem within a complex system of connecting subsystems, all of which must
communicate effectively if they are to prevent medical errors.13
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The complexity of the system which any seriously ill or injured patient finds him
or herself in makes it probable that any occurring medical error or adverse event, if not
detected and counteracted, will be compounded by subsequent treatment lead to further
errors or both. For instance, a considerable body of research indicates that
communication errors occur with some frequency during postoperative handovers, as a
patient is moved from the surgical unit of the hospital to the ICU and all the various
components of the patient’s background and history of treatment, including the anesthesia
administered, the surgical procedures done, medications the patient is currently taking,
the patient’s treatment plan, and the responsible physician responsible for care.14 Among
the various technical errors which can cause delays in accurate diagnostic and effective
therapy are gaps in the patient’s record as transferred, faulty coordination between teams
at each end of the handoff, the absence of essential staff member at critical periods, the
overburdening of staff with excessive concurrent responsibilities leading to inadequate
attention to task, and the lack of continuity in procedures between departments.15 Various
research studies have correlated the effectiveness of postoperative handoffs to prognosis
of patient outcomes.16 On the other hand, in spite of finding over 500 published studies,
31 of which focused specifically on postoperative turnovers, one meta-study’s
investigators concluded that research into the effects of such transfers is in its early stages
and lacking in clear findings.17 Given the obviously variation in procedures and standards
so many aspects both within and between the multidisciplinary teams involved in a
patient’s transfer, the potential for miscommunication leading to a medical error is
great.18 This ramifications of such circumstances are like those of a patient with
concurrent illnesses or injuries such as bipolar disorder and drug addiction who are
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vulnerable if their care for the several conditions is fragmented, such that the different
treatments are contraindicated by each other and receiving both exacerbates both
conditions.19
Chapter 5.A.3. Errors of Commission versus Omission
Errors of commission, by their very nature, are more obvious and consequently
less prone to be ignored or glossed over than are error of omission. For instance, if a
doctor misinterprets symptoms and diagnoses the wrong affliction, the treatment
prescribed whether therapy or medication will result in a noticeably inappropriate patient
outcome, with the significant probability of a discernable unexpected negative effect. In
contrast, errors of omission, because they stem from inaction whether or not intentional
may go unnoticed with their negative effects interpreted simply has the patient’s failure
to respond to treatment.20 As a result, research into the frequency and causes of errors of
omission is distinctly and lamentably lacking; they are, moreover, more susceptible
targets of intentional nondisclosure. Yet another circumstance which can camouflage this
latter type of medical error is any lack of medical knowledge or consensus of opinion
among healthcare professionals in relation to the patient’s original condition, the
scientific diagnosis of its symptoms, or the treatment procedures that are effective in
dealing with it.
While precise statistics are unavailable, it is likely that medication errors
constitute the greatest share, possibly as much as two thirds, of medical errors of
commission in U.S. hospitals.21 Supporting this estimation is the complexity of standard
procedures which must be followed individually for every medication administered to

264

each patient in the hospital ICU. This five-step protocol involves: 1) prescription, 2)
transcription, 3) preparation, 4) dispensation, and 5) administration; while seeming
simple, each step may be subdivided into hundreds sub-procedures. Every sub-procedure
compounds the risk error, whether by a single individual involved or through
miscommunication between several staff members. Viewed from this perspective, it is
remarkable that medication errors are not significantly more frequent and damaging, in
all fairness a credit of the staff of most hospital ICUs.22 Nonetheless, the negative impact
of any error can be especially severe in the ICU, therefore warranting a thorough
understanding of their causes as the first step to their prevention or at least minimization.
Using the aforementioned five-step process as a framework, one research study that
ranked medication errors by frequency in relation to the process, revealing that the
majority of errors happened at some point in the final step, the administration (53%) followed by errors occurring prescription (17%), during preparation (14%), and lastly
during transcription (11%).23 One contributing factor in the frequency of errors during
administration may have occurred in relation to the process known as postoperative
handovers.
Chapter 5.B. Medical Error Disclosure Protocols Based on the Ethical Acceptance of
Responsibility in the Hospital ICU
This section of Chapter 5 is broken into two major subsections; the first
focuses on Medical Standards, while the second covers the Responsibilities of
Physicians and Medical Providers.
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Chapter 5.B.1. Medical Standards
In order to fulfill the fiduciary duties which physicians and others working in
hospitals incur by virtue of the trust which their patients place in these medical
professionals, the disclosure protocols which medical practitioners adopt need to be
grounded in the acceptance of responsibility as it accords with the principles of
biomedical ethics, which in turn grows out of the traditional teachings of Judeo-Christian
ethics concerning confession, repentance, and forgiveness. In theory, this system of ethics
entails the notions that the medical practitioner must: 1) accept responsibility for the
medical error, 2) disclose all the circumstances surrounding the error, as well as its
consequences both realized and potential, 3) sincerely apologize for the error, and 4) be
accountable for the consequences of the error. This last point implies that the medical
practitioner will do his or her utmost to correct or if not possible least mitigate any
negative effects of the error, while preventing any recurrence of the same or similar
medical errors.24 All the following professional medical institutions have explicitly
endorsed these principles as the cornerstone of the medical standards which they
promulgate- the American Medical Association (AMA), American Nurses Association
(ANA), American College of Physicians (ACP), the American College of Emergency
Physicians (ACEP) and the National Medical Association (NMA) – It should be noted
that this group constitutes the majority of most respected organizations of medical
professionals in the United State; moreover their memberships include the large majority
of medical professional current working in the field of health and medicine. These
behavior guidelines and expectations are in complete harmony with the fundamental
ethical principles universally acknowledged in the field of bioethics as pertaining to all
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the physician-patient relationships, namely non-maleficence, beneficence, patient
autonomy, and justice.
While, for medical professionals, following these standards is a fundamentally a
matter of what is owed to the patient, it is equally beneficial to the medical professional,
who thereby is able to experience an absolution of guilt which allows one to begin the
process of self-forgiveness and thereby enables the medical professional to continued
effectively delivering medical care and treatment to the injured patient, as well as to
subsequent patients.25 Arguably, this process promotes psychologically healthier attitudes
toward medical care, specifically attitudes more in tune with the realities of an imprecise
field, in which errors are ultimately inevitable, even predictable. In the final analysis,
such realistic perspectives promote increased trust as a strengthening foundation of the
physician-patient relationship and ultimately more effective care, treatment, and ideally
recuperation. Contrary to the fears which inhibit some in the profession from following
these principles, their practice can lead to a less adversarial relationship in the wake of a
medical error and actually reduce the propensity to engage in malpractice litigation,
which would have the predictable consequence of reductions in the costs of medical
liability insurance and of overall medical treatment in the long run. Other positive results
from medical practitioners’ accepting their ethical responsibility as describe here include:
1) an increased degree of patient safety; 2) significant progress toward reducing the
incidence of medical errors, both individually triggered and systemic; 3) improved
monitoring of active failures, enabling targeted efforts to prevent recurrence; 4) the
revealing of latent or inherent risks for medical errors within the healthcare delivery
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system; and 5) a psychologically healthier set of attitudes within medical culture,
fostering appropriate handling of expected medical errors.26
Chapter 5.B.2. Physician and Medical Provider Responsibilities
Considerable evidence exists to support the assertion that the majority of
physicians are reluctant to operate according to these standards of medical conduct when
faced with an actual medical error situation.27 Reasons for such attitudes and behavior
include the obvious concerns, including: 1) triggering malpractice lawsuits; 2) incurring
some form of punishment, even as severe as incarceration; 3) losing one's professional
reputation, one's hospital privileges, or even one's licensure; 4) as a result of any of the
previous eventualities, losing one's livelihood; 5) being made the 'scapegoat' by being
held responsible for a medical errors the ultimate cause of which was primarily systemic
or cumulative due to the inherent inter-connectivity of complicated delivery of multidisciplinary medicine; 6) feelings guilty over having harmed a patient; 7) being
ambivalent about the degree of severity of the error and whether the details should be
reported; and 8) being shamed by an unforgiving culture which holds unrealistic
expectations of perfection and omnipotence on the part of medicine and its
practitioners.28 With all these inhibitory factors, it should be of little surprise to discover
that while 70 to 80% of physicians pay lip service to the need for full disclosure of
medical errors, merely an estimated 24 to 54% actually do so when the occasion presents
itself.29
In reality, it is not just the physicians who are reluctant. Beyond the imposing list
of factors causing doctors reluctance to fully disclose the errors they discover, a very
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significant number of hospitals and other healthcare facilities have administrations and
institutional cultures which are ill prepared and equipped to monitor for, investigate,
handle, or reward and promote the reporting of medical errors.30 More egregious still, a
very significant number of institutions even actively discourage the identifying and
disclosing of errors.
This reluctance on the part of the medical establishment stands in complete
contrast to the attitudes of patients themselves, their relatives, and advocates, all of whom
generally expect full disclosure and official reporting of errors, regardless of severity of
consequences, candidly and descriptively with complete transparency. Among concurring
research findings, one health maintenance organization (HMO) based in New England
recently polled residents concerning hypothetical cases of medical error and found that
91% of those whom they surveyed felt that each and every one should be disclosed, even
if it never caused any injury or harm.31 In a similar study, a mere 12% considered it
acceptable to neglect or intentionally avoid disclosing a medical error to the affected
patient even when the error had no effect on the patient's health.32 In related studies, this
predominant opinion has been substantiated using focus groups. This position is
unanimously and unequivocally insisted upon in biomedical ethics and through
professional codes of conduct; full disclosure of major medical errors is obligatory, given
the potential, if not already realized, danger these errors patients, the consequences of
which can range as severe as fatality or if not, at minimum, serious physical or
psychological injury. Harm of this significance demands immediate corrective,
preventative, or mitigating action in response. This the minimum effort that society will
morally tolerate, and to do so effectively requires full disclosure.33
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This disparity between what medical standards and bioethics demand, for which
physicians pledge support on one hand and what physicians actually think and do on the
other hand, along with the contrast between the doctors' thinking and that of patients and
other affected by the error, causes great difficulty; specifically, it complicates and hinders
any effort to establish disclosure protocols which deal appropriately with the ethical duty
to accept responsibility. An understanding and acceptance of these ethical standards is
apparently controlling the survey responses of medical providers when situations are
described hypothetically in more abstract terms, but not so when questions are put into
contexts of individual cases and elaborated in terms that presuppose personal
involvement in the situation. Research has demonstrated that doctors and other medical
professionals when asked about what should be done, their responses will exhibit a clear
belief in and unqualified ethical acceptance of responsibility. On the other hand, the very
physicians and medical providers, who responded as described above, will shift to
hesitant, highly qualified, or even blatantly contradictory evaluations of their duties to
disclosure, in the face of legal, cultural, and other practical considerations, especially
when they perceived themselves to be involved in the situation.34 For instance, according
to the “Principles of Medical Ethics” of the American Medical Association, all medical
professionals must exhibit unflinching trustworthiness in every aspect of professional
interactions with patients.35 The American College of Emergency Physicians, in its
“Code of Ethics for Emergency Physicians,” demands the same standard of absolute
truthfulness.36 The same standards are asserted, without stated or implied exception, by
the American Nurses Association, the American College of Physicians, and the National
Medical Association. On the other hand, when considering the When the concrete details
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and circumstances of a particular scenario are introduced, however, numerous medical
providers begin to disagree over what limits exist in their duty to be completely truthful.
The distinction between dealing with the patient’s medical status and treatment plan and
the personal relationship as human beings is a boundary that has become blurred, partly
by trends toward good medical practice, in the modern physician-patient relationship.37
Nonetheless, the rightful complexity of this relationship complicates the development of
medical error disclosure protocols, in as much as these the relationships can vary
significantly in character.38 Beyond these considerations, inherent limitations exist in
communicating technical minutia and professionally significant nuances in information
concerning the medical error that are not describable in language the patient can grasp, if
only because he or she lacks the medical training to interpret the ideas.39 Even after these
distinctions are delineated, many issues of interpretation and evaluation of specific, ‘real,’
cases remain to be resolved. Consequently, establishing an implementable disclosure
protocol in practice requires careful attention to illuminating and considering the
specifics of each individual case as part of arriving at decisions of how to proceed.
A possible solution to the challenge of achieving more detail in carrying out
disclosure protocols is to incorporate the legal definition of informed consent, which
dictates the presentation of all information whether positive or negative, including the
occurrence of a medical error by physicians so that the patient or his or her representative
can make reasoned and informed decisions about treatment options that might fix or
counter the effects of the error. Another possibility for ensuring more frequent and
complete disclosure in practice would be for the protocol to explicitly stipulate scenarios
necessitating detailed disclosure in terms concrete enough not to be open to
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interpretation. For instance, disclosure to patients to be part of this mandate could include
any accidental error that has a high likelihood of compromising the patient’s safety in the
future, which would require full, detailed disclosure. Similarly, any error that necessitates
adjustment to the patient’s original treatment plan would qualify for required disclosure
on the grounds of preserving informed consent. By contrast certain types of errors the
disclosure of which might remain optional could include those latent or potential errors
that were discovered and prevented before they had caused any harm, as well as errors
that have a more than a 50% chance of occurring and are thus the subject of assiduous
monitoring. More rare and debatable in the interpretation of when to use its rationale
would the choice not to disclose errors to an excessively excitable or worrying patient if
the stress related damage from knowledge of the error would significantly exceed any
damage that the error itself has caused. Other concrete grounds might be set for delaying
disclosure, such as when a patient is being prepared for imminent surgery, or the health
care organization is under legal investigation, or the institution is ordered to refrain from
doing so during the process of litigation, or the cause of the error is not yet known and
investigation is underway.40
Chapter 5.C. Medical Error Disclosure Protocols Based on Type of Information
This section of Chapter 5 is divided into three subsections, which
will discuss respectively: 1) Better Communication, 2) Communicative
Competency, and 3) Barriers to Communication
Patient outcome, as opposed to accuracy in conveying all the complexities of the
situation, must be the principal focus when formulating procedures or protocols and
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overseeing their implementation in communicating with affected parties in the wake of a
medical error.41 Disclosure of the error and its consequences needs to be guided by three
major considerations: 1) the patient and any other involved layperson must be able to
fully understand grammar and vocabulary of the language used by medical professionals
at all points in the communications process; 2) the focus of the explanation should
consistently be on the impact of the medical error, in particular any negative effects,
damage, or risks incurred as opposed to an ‘cut-and-dry’ iteration of the antecedents,
events leading up to, and characteristics of the error; and 3) the patient must receive a
clear and thorough explanation of steps being taken to mitigate any negative impact, real
or potential, options for correcting any damages that have ensued or may develop in the
future, together with their prognosis for success.42
Chapter 5.C.1. Better Communication
There is research which demonstrates that an ongoing supportive attitude
promoting patient autonomy in the ICU to the maximum extent possible in conjunction
with concerted efforts toward facilitating communication between physicians and
medical staff on one side and patients, surrogates, and family members on the other can
and has fostered a collaboration in shared decision-making.43 This model envisions the
doctor, the patient, and involved relatives or surrogates discussing and identifying the
values, goals and priorities of the patient and family. Subsequent to this meeting as a
consensus is achieved as to these general guiding consideration, the physician will
explain the patient’s prognosis and will present options and recommendations how to
move forward with treatment based on the evidence at hand concerning the patient’s
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condition.44 Studies have further revealed that this collaborative decision-making model
can be especially effective and advantageous in case no advanced directive exists, there is
no proxy for healthcare, or medical certainty or clarity as to the clinical status of the
patient is limited.45
In meetings such as these between medical professionals and family or surrogates,
at which the patient is unable to independently and constructively participate as is
common in the hospital ICU setting, the patient’s prognosis becomes critical information.
After it has been presented, it becomes important in the course of the conversation that
time is allocated for dispelling any confusion or uncertainty, as well as for potential
psychological, logistical, or emotional reactions, and any form of bereavement that can
be anticipated.46 Depending on the ramifications of the medical error, consideration of
any number of life-support therapies (LSTs), issues, or decisions, such as palliative,
hospice, or end-of-life care, possibly focusing on a priority to manage pain or undesirable
symptoms. Concurrently, withdrawal options such as do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders
need to be addresses, along with the natural feelings many surrogates are prone to
expressing concerning their doubt or reluctance to accept the accuracy of doctor’s
prognosis; under these circumstances, the time to reconcile with the inevitable and the
option of being able to decide for oneself will ultimately be appreciated.47 Studies have
also shown a correlation between communication improvements between physicians and
surrogates and improvement in clinical outcomes which include. According to a variety
of research, the results of the enhanced communication envisioned with this model
include: 1) ICU stays of shorter duration, 2) increased in referrals for hospice care and
support, 3) earlier and less agonizing decisions concerning DNR orders and withdrawal
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of other LSTs, and ultimately 4) a lowering of the frequency and incidence of medical
errors.48
Chapter 5.C.2. Communicative Competency
Possibly one of the most indispensable facilitators of improved patient outcomes
is increasing the level of doctors’ communicative competency in the following three
areas: 1) expressing empathy, 2) sharing the patient’s prognosis with all involved parties,
and 3) aligning the shared decision-making model with the habitual and preferred
communicative norms and preferences, especially in terms of the pacing of interaction
and communication.49 An established correlation exists in the research literature between
empathy as expressed by the medical professional and the comfort level of both patients
and family members. In particular, the physician’s acknowledging the family’s stress,
difficulties in arriving at momentous decisions, and fears over the impending death of a
loved one.50 This diverges significantly from historical precedent, according to which
doctors actively restrained themselves from even appearing to become involved in the
patterns of elevated emotion and levels of stress, which patients and relatives were
experiencing.51 In the past, only in unusual circumstances did doctors into the family’s
readiness much less willingness to discuss candidly the patient’s prognosis, let alone
decisions concerning the employing versus withholding or withdrawing of life-support
options in the ICU.52 Even today, many physicians are dubious about frank discussions of
the uncertainties of prognosis, fearing that a realistic understanding of the lack of
certainty will contribute to excessive stress and crush any hope the patient’s family has. 53
Research has demonstrated that contrary to these misgivings, relatives of patients report
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more positive attitudes, i.e, are more optimistic when they feel they are receiving accurate
information and candid appraisals even though that candor reveals how much is unknown
or unknowable.54 A reason for this admittedly counterintuitive situation may lie in the
time that a realistic assessment of the uncertainty gives psychologically preparing for the
inevitability of the patient’s demise. Whatever the mechanism, family members, relatives,
and surrogates reject the notion of concealing either the negativity or the uncertainty of
the prognosis as ultimately causing greater stress and possibly unwarranted or false
hopes, which will prove to be such in the end. Moreover, the individuals responding to
the research investigation were clear that they did not expect omniscience or infallibility
from physicians in charge of the case.55
With the frequency of cases in which the patient as an individual is not capable of
personal exercising autonomy, the focus of decision making in the hospital ICU has in
recent years migrated toward the model of shared or collaborative decision-making
between physicians and the principal stakeholders, such as next of kin or surrogates.56
Research findings would indicate that disclosure protocols should be grounded in the
goals of determining optimal outcomes for the patient and corrective measures to achieve
these outcomes, rather than dwelling on the antecedents of the error and causes of the
current negative impact or the details of ameliorating procedures and implementation.57
As enumerated above, the three principles of communication that need to guide
disclosure are: 1) layperson-friendly terminology, 2) a focus of consequences in terms of
risks or negative impacts, rather than simply a description of the error and its antecedents,
and 3) a clear elaboration of options for correcting, mitigating, and preventing further
negative consequences.58 Though far easier to describe than to implement, these
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principles form a foundation for physicians and patients, along with other interested
parties to agree upon an efficacious course of action for dealing with the ramifications of
the error without getting bogged down in the complexities of detail.
One of the inherent obstacles to this approach is the diversity of background
which the different interested parties bring to the process in terms of motivations and
interests, education and understanding of the medical aspects of the situation, perceptions
and concerns, as well as stress levels and emotional states. Furthermore, any lack of
preparation for such eventualities, such as advanced directives or powers of attorney will
complicate the task of decision-making. In order for such communication processes to be
effective, parties on all sides need to utilize the following interpersonal, problem solving
skills: 1) openness and flexibility in exploring a variety of options, 2) willingness to
maintain a sense of compatibility and cohesion while discussing and deliberating over
options, 3) the basic willingness to actively listen to other points of view, 4) the ability to
withhold premature judgment. Aside from the lack of these skills among the participants,
potentially working against these requirements for effective deliberation are: 1) the need
for taking immediate action and consequently rapid decision making decisions rapidly if
not instantaneously, 2) the elevated levels of tension and anxiety, exacerbated by the high
levels of uncertainty, and 3) the high levels of drama and urgency emanating from the
ICU environment itself. Moreover, some aspects of the discussion are inherently complex
and difficult to communicate, such as how a prognosis was formulated, has been
quantified and qualified, has evolved for significantly and radically altered over time, as
well as how and why uncertainties have arisen or evaporated. Given that making
decisions, setting goals, and clarifying expectations are inextricably intertwined, the

277

assumptions by all parties underlying the communications process can be the source of
obstacles and areas of potential conflict between the medical staff and the patient’s
family members in particular.59
Chapter 5.C.3. Barriers to Communication
A considerable variety of obstacles at a number of different levels together form a
series of barriers, each individually functioning to inhibit effective communication. For
instance, the population of those residing in the U. S. continues to include a significant
portion of potential patients who do not have the functional fluency to understand spoken,
and something even written English, especially its idioms, making language a major
barrier in all facets of negotiating the healthcare system.60 Even for the native speaker of
English, communication can be opaque as medical practitioners, like all specialized
professionals speak a “language of the field” all of their own, with frequently used
terminology and jargon that is poorly understood if at all by the educated layperson, let
alone those whose education is not as advanced. Numerous terms consistently used
within the ICU can cloud physician-layperson communication, thus impairing the
decision making and treatment process, including abbreviations and terms such as DNR,
AD, CPR, and intubation.61 Moreover, superficially comprehensible phrases such as poor
prognosis, unlikely to work, withdrawal of care or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment
can be imprecise, context dependent, or misleading, easily confusing or even causing
unwarranted anxiety for the layperson.62 Some euphemisms such as letting nature take its
course or do everything may so context dependent or used differently by different
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professionals that even the medical practitioners themselves are vulnerable to
misinterpreting the precise intent being conveyed.63
Beyond language and vocabulary in the strictest sense, cultural and religious
differences may also play a role with concepts such as patient autonomy that is not
practiced in many countries that depend on relatives to make decisions of the patient or
the patriarchal dictates of medical practitioners.64 Values will differ, impeding
communication, with such seeming innocuous phrases as truth telling, in which the
candor valued in U.S. majority culture may come across as cruel and offensive to those
raised in societies with sharply differing attitudes toward what is polite. Ideas matter; for
example, there is the globally somewhat widespread superstition that even discussing
death elevates the likelihood that it will indeed occur.65
Among the greatest challenges in cross-cultural medical communication is clearly
explain of corrective treatment options, given that some outcomes and courses of
treatment such those which are futile or inappropriate from the standpoint of Western
medical practice, may even be fully expected by others related to the patient, who grew
up with contrary beliefs or cultural traditions.66 Despite the best efforts to surmount other
barriers to communication, these impasses involving futile or inappropriate treatment
tend to be unresolvable. Such impasses usually involve the physician refusing to take
futile measures that family or relatives insist upon, which because the measures have
been deemed useless, are unfundable through medical insurance, Medicare, or Medicaid;
or even prohibited by institutions, professional medical associations, HMOs, or
government agencies who deem these measures unethical to pursue. Furthermore, these
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futile treatment are many practitioners to be unethical because of their cost, certainty of
no beneficial outcome, and their diverting of resources from efforts with more positive
prognoses.67 Simple though emotionally harsh as this type of situation sounds, it is vastly
more complex because of the difficulty of qualitatively or quantitatively characterizing
the specific situation and reliably identifying which case are indeed futile.68 Even when
the complexities of a patient’s condition can be spelled out, there may be little chance of
resolving a debate as to whether some treatments or all of the treatments under
consideration will prove futile. Demonstrating this phenomenon, a recent study of
hospital in Europe revealed that almost 75% of their ICUs had given admission to
patients without no chance of survival even in the short term.69 As document in other
research, in the U.S, almost 5% of Medicare patients received ICU care in terms of
grossly expensive yet foreseeably futile treatment measures immediately before dying. 70
Chapter 5.D. Protocols for Medical Error Disclosure Based on the Anticipated Risk
Management Strategy in the Hospital ICU
This section of Chapter 5 is divided into three subsections, which will discuss the
following aspects in relation to the disclosure of medical errors, respectively: 1) the
Global Trigger Tool (GTT) of the Institute for Healthcare Improvement; 2) the
Conditions for Informed Consent; 3) the Role of Surrogates.
Chapter 5.D.1. The Global Trigger Tool (GTT)
Although possibly intuitively self-evident, a body of research has emerged
illuminating the intrinsically hazardous nature of being treated in a hospital’s intensive
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care unit (ICU). Among these studies, one from 2011 focused on 3 hospitals in the United
States, examining 795 patient records and identified 393 adverse events; such analysis
suggests that these adverse events may prove to be more frequent by a measure of tenfold in hospitals than had been previously assessed on the basis of an earlier review of
medical records using the Global Trigger Tool (GTT) of the Massachusetts based
Institute for Healthcare Improvement. Backing up the 2011 research, the National
Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and its Prevention Index for
Categorizing Errors revealed a nearly identical frequency and patterning in the
distribution of severity of errors it studied. These findings represent events at least a
decade subsequent to those of the Institute of Medicine’s 1999 report suggesting that
medical errors or adverse events are still as much as if not more than a problem for
patients in hospitals today.71
Further revealing, the 2011 study’s findings placed medication errors, adverse
events connected to surgery and other procedures, along with hospital-related infections
at the top of their medical error frequency rankings – a situation similar that shown in
earlier previously described research. Related to this study, using the same GTT
methodology that identifies more patient injuries that are a result of adverse events,
Internationally and even more currently, in 2012 researchers studying average sized
Swedish hospitals and their ICUs that various forms of adverse events were surprising
common given that they had never previously been reported or documented as occurring
in the ICU. Of greatest concern, over a two years interval, 128 patients fatalities were
recorded as having been the results of some 41 different adverse events such as
healthcare-related infections, hypoglycemia, pressure sores and procedural complications.
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Distressingly, a full 54% of these medical errors, termed ‘adverse events’ were judged to
have been avoidable.72
Starting in 1991 with the Patient Self Determination Act, disclosure protocols
began to be established in U. S. law, as part of the larger goal of promulgating policies
and procedures to spur the use of advanced directives among medical institutions.73
Subsequently, informed consent has come to include the notion of permission given by
the patient to the medical practitioner to carrying out a regimen of medical treatment for a
specific condition, on the foundation of knowledgeable decision made ultimately by the
patient to subscribe to that treatment. The circumstances surrounding surgery as
treatment provide a clear-cut illustration of the specifics of informed consent. In this
context, it refers to the physician-patient process of communication, possibly involving
educational dialogue, definitely including an elaboration and mutual evaluation of 1)
benefits and risks, 2) feasible alternative courses of action, and 3) characterization of and
rationales for the various procedure options. In this context, the span of event during
which informed consent is operative runs from the initial consideration of surgery as an
option, all the way through subsequent recovery and includes any postoperative
complications.74 By the same token and closely related, informed consent has also been
characterized as the collaborative decision-making process shared and mutually
reinforced by the doctor and the patient or the latter’s surrogate.
Chapter 5.D.2. Conditions for Informed Consent
The conditions required of providing consent are four-fold. The first condition is
that patients must be capable of making a decision about their healthcare. According to
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bioethics in healthcare, four conditions are prerequisite to the patient’s giving true
informed consent: 1) that he or she clearly sees his or her condition as being in need of
medical treatment, whether because of injury or illness; 2) that he or she is aware of and
understands each of the therapeutic options which the physician has offered as feasible or
at least possible courses of treatment, and moreover comprehends the advantages and
potential drawbacks or negative consequences of each option; 3) that he or she can
assimilate the information provided concerning the various options in order to resolve
conflicting points of view and arrive at a decision consistent with his or her beliefs and
goals, and finally 4) that he or she can clearly articulate the choice once made.75
In order for the patient to demonstrate the second required condition in order to
exhibit informed consent, he or she must have ready access to enough information about
all options in order to deliberate and arrived at an informed choice. Although creating a
precise measure of what constitutes sufficient information is elusive, a widely accepted
criterion is that which a reasonable individual would need to have at hand in order to
make a rational choice. In practice, such a standard necessitates the patient having a
working comprehension of both the potential advantages and the risks of all options the
doctor presents for consideration, a standard given legal precedent in the appeal of
Canterbury v. Spence 1972.76 An alternative disclosure standard has been stated in terms
of the patient receiving sufficient information so that a patient could not objectively claim
surprised by any foreseeable outcome that might follow treatment.77
Implicit in the third conditional requirement of consent is the notion that the
patient gives it free of any coercion or undue influence provides consent without coercion
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from any source, whether the physician, relatives, or others. Obviously, this requirement
does not exclude recommendations and reasons offered in support thereof. Rather,
coercion is something that a reasonable person would have to struggle to resist; broadly
defined, it can include decisions based deceptive misinformation or exaggeration. In
order to prevent any accusations of coercion having been involved in a treatment
decision, the physician needs to notes into the patient’s file summarizing any verbal
conversations along with decisions made by patients and physicians as opposed to merely
relying on standard consent forms.78
The informed consent principle in biomedical ethics is especially applicable to
care in the hospital ICU given the foreseeable, heightened risks of medical errors leading
to serious additional injury or even fatality. Protocols need to incorporate both written
permission and verbal (i.e, spoken communication) discussion of the risks, as well as the
potential benefits; this dual approach helps to guarantee that the patient or surrogate
completely understands the course of treatment being prescribed.79 Informed consent
documents always need to comply with the principles of communication previously
discussed in this dissertation; furthermore, they need to be compatible with subsequent
communication which would be generated by the occurrence of a medical error. To
facilitate this second goal, the informed consent document may even include anticipated
remedial procedures for dealing with both foreseeable and unexpected occurrences, such
as but not limited to medical errors.80
There is no standardization of hospitals consent forms, just as facility operating
procedures can vary as greatly as do medical and surgical procedures. Some forms
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contain information about risks involved; others include space document patients’
reasons for declining a recommended procedure. With this degree of variation, any
assumption that most or all patients understand what they are consenting to would be a
gross error as at least one body of research has demonstrated.81 Particularly with surgery,
consent for unanticipated eventualities becomes a complicated medical issue; therefore,
as much prior discussion with the patient as possible is warranted and should cover
realistic hypothetical scenarios such as the need for extended mechanical ventilation
arising in mid-operation.82 Other procedures that can be anticipated as highly likely might
also be considered ahead of time as well such as Postoperative procedures in the ICU are
one of various foreseeable needs to be discussed in advance and ideally to have a
surrogate designated for, should the patient not be able to give informed consent for the
unexpected.83
Chapter 5.D.3. The Surrogate
Across the country, numerous state agencies advocate bringing a surrogate into
any extended consent discussion between the doctor and the patient, along with having
involved discussions between the patient and the designated surrogate. State level
authorized surrogates acting on behalf of incapacitated patients fall under various
nomenclature, such as healthcare agents, healthcare proxies, and designees having
durable powers of attorney for healthcare. Given the serious complications which the
absence of a surrogate can present, various states have further set out procedures through
which a surrogate may be designated if needed and not already done. Other states that
default provisions for spouses or nearest of kin. Regardless of the arrangements in the
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jurisdiction, the doctor needs to engage in prior consent discussions with the surrogate
whenever possible.84
The concept that, with medical advice, a surrogate can effectively provide
guidance for an incapacitated patient needing surgery has considerable ethical and legal
precedent. Whenever possible, having and following the patient’s written desires and
instructions as nearly as the circumstances dictate is the best practice in this regard. When
this ideal is not achievable given the unpredictability of foreseeing most eventualities, the
surrogate needs to rely on a standard of substitute judgment, taking the patient’s known
priorities and values into account. Thus, as extensive previous contact between patient
and proposed surrogate as is possible is to be sought. In the absence of the knowledge
and understanding that comes from interaction, the surrogate must rely on the standard of
what is in the best interest of the patient, often necessary when the patient is a minor or
has had long term mental incapacity. If surrogate and physician disagree, more likely in
these latter circumstances, a professional ethicist may be consulted. The physician’s
reason for disagreeing should has ethical merit, such as an honest conviction that the
surrogate; 1) insufficiently understands the choices from a medical or ethical perspective,
2) has a conflict of interest, 3) is making a decision which the physician has evidence that
the patient would have rejected, or 4) has not followed the available and appropriate
standards in arriving at the decision.85
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Chapter 5.E. Medical Error Disclosure Protocols Based on the Timing of Disclosure
This section of Chapter 5 is separated into two subsections, the first discussing the
advanced directive; (AD) and the second examining issues connected with verbal
instructions.
Faced with the possibility of either danger or harm, human beings as a species are
apparently innately prone to finding discomfort in and avoiding uncertainty, which is
course, inherent in medicine’s treatment of illness or injury.86 Consequently, any protocol
disclosing ahead of time what can or should be anticipated throughout the course of a
treatment regimen will relieve concern, stress, and worry, circumstances that will help
reduce the chance of medical errors while providing a framework for contextualized
understanding of any errors that might occur.87 While not always feasible in various ICU
settings and circumstances, pretreatment disclosure brings the patient into the care and
treatment decision-making process, laying the groundwork understanding the potential
for medical error before one arises.88
Chapter 5.E.1. Advanced Directives
Advanced directives (ADs) allow patients to give a written account of their
decisions concerning care and treatment, along with their choice of surrogate, all prior to
any situation in which the need for decision making arises.89 Various research studies
support the contention that individuals who have created ADs are more able to exercise
individual autonomy, significantly increasing the likelihood their wishes will be
followed. Further to their benefit, those with ADs can receive decision-making assistance
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from the surrogates they have chosen, and are ultimately less likely to die in a hospital
setting, where medical professionals might attempt “heroic’ measures that the future
patient would not want and which would cost family members unnecessary trauma and
expense at the end of the patient’s life.90 Despite the obvious benefits of advanced
directives, along with the closely related living wills and powers of attorney, and in some
case legal requirement that hospitals obtain ADs before admitting a patient, the majority
of people have failed to create an AD. Furthermore, some recent studies have suggested
that advanced directives are failing to achieve many if any of the goals for which they
were developed, such as guiding the care provided by medical practitioners in settings
like the hospital ICU and ultimately reducing the uncertainty, pain, and expenses of
critical and end-of-life hospital.91
The typical timing of the disclosure of a patient’s condition and prognosis in the
ICU illustrates one failing in the use of advanced directives. Physicians make the decision
of when to communicate a patient’s condition and prognosis to the appropriate persons,
and tend to hold off on doing so when the prognosis is not good, ultimately shortening
the time families or surrogates have to prepare themselves psychologically and to make
decisions.92 The research on the phenomenon suggests that doctors are primarily
motivated to delay informing those involved out of a desire reach greater certainty with
less reliance on judgment or intuition. However, this attitude places a higher value on
scientific accuracy than on the emotional and logistical needs of those close to the patient
to prepare for what is inevitable.93 The stress in this situation is compounded if the
physician gives the negative prognosis and immediately asks the surrogate and family to
begin making end-of-life decisions. In this situation, loved ones will tend to feel
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emotionally and cognitively pressured by the lack of time to resolve outstanding issues
and to say farewell to the dying patient, all of which can lead to a subconscious sense of
resentment should a medical error be discovered to have been involved. The body of
relevant research clearly indicates that patients and family members want the earliest
practical disclosure of prognosis, as soon as feasible after initial diagnosis and if possible
before the patient is admitted to the ICU, all of which is decidedly before the doctor has a
strong degree of certainty.94 Among the negative impacts of delaying disclosure is that in
its absence, physicians and even other hospital staff are distracted by persistent queries
from family members about the patient’s prognosis in terms of ascertaining some idea of
his or her chance of survival.95 Furthermore, reducing the interval between a negative
prognosis and the actual end-of-life reduces or possible eliminates the options of hospice
or palliative treatment, which would have assisted the patient in managing pain while
affording the family and the patient more time and a more comfortable environment than
the ICU to prepare themselves emotionally and to deal with any unresolved issues or
practical matters prior to the patient’s death.96 While there have been few studies
attempting to delineate precise time preferences for disclosure, at least one has found that
an average of 36 hours passed between initial communication and prognosis or a
combination of prognosis with a negative conclusions of physicians in the ICU; in 19%
of the cases sampled, no prognosis had even been communicated.97
Chapter 5.E.2. Verbal Instructions
Enhancing the process of disclosing a patient’s prognosis is not merely an issue of
the attending physician intuitively prognosticating based on empirical evidence from vital
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signs and communicating such prognosis to those involved with the patient’s treatment.
From the perspective of the medical professional, envisioning ways to improve prognosis
disclosure in relation to advanced directives once the patient is admitted to the ICU is
difficult in large part because of the behavioral reluctance of most patients to specify in
written or often even in spoken detail their wishes for advanced directive, living wills,
powers of attorney; this is true even in the context of direct communication between,
physicians, patients, and relatives or surrogates. The absence of advanced directives, or
their lack of specificity when present, compound the uncertainties with which the
physician must contend. One revealing body of research, conducted at a major teaching
hospital in Illinois over a number of years and involving over 2,000 patients to the
neurological and intensive care units, involved the collection of empirical evidence in
both written and oral form of patient advanced directives.98
Those patients or their surrogates and family members who stated that they had
created an advanced directive, either previous or at the hospital amounted to only a third
of those polled; even significantly fewer reported having it documented on the patient’s
medical chart where it would be readily accessible if the situation arose for consulting it.
While the study under consideration represents data from a single hospital, it give some
impression as to the frequency and types of ADs which may exist. What is clearly the
norm is a patient arriving at the hospital ICU unable to articulate personal wishes with
family or a surrogate, if present, only able to reconstruct from memory any discussions
relating to ADs, and no written documentation to be had. Incomplete proxy statements
are common, as are those deemed legally invalid for lack of being properly signed and
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witnessed. Patient directives which actually were documented in hospital charts were also
lacking in the specificity of their instructions.99
Lastly, the research study provided some record of the types of instructions and
directives which arise out of the long-term spoken interactions and communication
between doctors, patients, and relatives over the course of lifetimes of treatment. Being
self-reporting of data as remembered, they may well represent inaccurate, distorted, or
selective remembrance, and may prove incomplete, no longer current, or even complete
fiction. Nevertheless, this body of data reveals that patients frequently want medical
intervention to be limited and dependent on a reasonable prospect for recovery or
maintaining a certain quality of life. Patients with such perspectives were much more
numerous than those who wanted every measure of care or treatment at all costs. The data
reveals an interesting mix of detail or lack thereof, juxtaposed against a clear, general
absence of specific temporal directives.100
Chapter 5.F. Medical Error Disclosure Protocols Based on the Stakeholders of Interest
This section of Chapter 5 is divided into three subsections, which will cover: 1)
communication failures; 2) the disclosure of information concerning the medical error;
and 3) the transfer of patients, also known as handoffs.
Chapter 5.F.1. Communication Failures
Treatment of a patient in the ICU always involves stakeholders beyond the
physician, the patient and close relatives; rather it involves the hospital, everyone serving
on the care and treatment team, the patient’s insurance provider, manufacturers of the
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ICU equipment used in care and treatment, pharmaceutical companies whose medication
is part of treatment, and any relevant government regulators (as representatives of the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services). Proactive disclosure to stakeholders of any
foreseeable medical errors, possibly as part of informed consent documentation, could
facilitate disclosure protocols should an error indeed occur. Such disclosure becomes a
natural outgrowth of enumerating and describing the risks involved with anticipated
interventions, outcomes, and contingencies to undo or mitigate the damage from a major
medical error.101
According to several research studies, a full 85% of patients deemed part of
sentinel populations, and therefore at elevated risk of experiencing harm from a medical
error had a communication failure linked to their particular case; among these ICU
surgical patients experienced the greatest risk from such breakdown in communication.102
While the patients themselves have the most significant stake in ensuring accurate
conveyance and understanding of information, it is most often between the medical staff
and family member that the breakdowns occur. As described earlier in this chapter,
difficulties with and barriers to communication are complex, multifaceted, and
bidirectional. In the ICU and for the patient, barriers to communication can further
include: 1) ventilators, 2) intubation, 3) a tenuous grip on consciousness owing to
sedation, 4) coma, and 5) physical and psychological distractions such as fatigue, distress,
alienation, disorientation, pain, depression, or frustration. For medical staff of the ICU,
despite their substantial knowledge, skills, and experience, they face barriers including:
1) the inability to read lips or to communicate with sign language, formal or impromptu;
2) the inability to decipher what patients try to say during brief moments when the latter
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are conscious or thinking rationally, or 3) a lack of understanding of the patient’s
particular that would be necessary for decipherment of abbreviated messages. The
complexity of these barriers predicts that neither technological breakthroughs nor
specialized training would be likely to overcome these obstacles in any simple or highly
effective manner.103
Chapter 5.F.2. Disclosure of Medical Error Information
In the process of disclosure for a medical error, certain individuals and groups
need to be considered in detail, given their roles as stakeholders. This subsection is
further broken down into discussions of three of these: 1) the family of the patient, 2) the
medical staff of the ICU, and 3) those involved in transfers or ‘handoffs’ of the patient.
Chapter 5.F.2.a. The Family
Aside from the patient and the required documentation, him or herself, the group
of stakeholders with the next strongest interest in disclosure of medical error information
is the patient’s family. Multiple studies have concluded that patients’ family members
are frequently dissatisfied with and disapproving of the timeliness and the manner in
which they receive medical information from ICU staff and the hospital in general. Close
relatives cite the inadequacy of communication, as well as its unpredictability and
inconsistency. Many inherent characteristics of the circumstances create barriers to clear
and adequate communication, such as the dynamics or lack of internal organization or
cohesion in the family itself, severe time constraints and the lack of doctors and nurses to
attend to the immediate demands of the ICU. In the past, ICU staff have not observed a
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tradition of engaging families in critical decision-making processes whether or not an AD
has been created, and despite the shift in the field of medicine to collaborative family
centered decision making, this trend has been slow to take hold.104 The result is the
family’s heightened psychological worries and stress concerning invasive treatments
without patient or family consent and the awkwardness of interactions among the ICU
staff as a multidisciplinary team.105 Various research surveys have revealed the deeply
felt need and desire on the part of families of patients to be an active, informed part of the
process of ICU care and treatment of their loved one, particularly in relation to end-oflife care and decision making.106
Chapter 5.F.2.b. The Medical Staff of the ICU
The medical staff of the ICU in which the error occurred constitute only part of
larger group of professional involved in dealing with the error. Insofar as the patient’s
family members have been actively involved in decision making for the patient with
regard to treatment of the original condition, they might conceptually be considered
members of the staff. In fact, the medical staff itself may also regard the patient and
family as part of their group, particularly in light of the current emphasis on patient
autonomy and collaborative decision-making. However, this merging of categories
further complicates disclosure protocols. Thus, the medical staff should be thought of as
the professional team within the hospital ICU and thus faced with the challenge of
providing expert medical care in this high-pressure setting.107 The degree to which the
ICU staff works efficiently and smoothly as a team of highly skilled and specialized
experts has the utmost bearing on the degree to which quality care is provided, in turn
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determining the safety and probability of survival and recovery for the ICU patients.108
Various studies have shown positive correlation between the quality of this teamwork in
practice and a wide range of efficient operations in the department, while conversely a
negative correlation with errors rates, medical difficulties, and fatalities. Coupled with the
32 to 37% portion of documented medical errors related to verbal miscommunications
between doctors and nurses, the need for the type of teamwork that incorporates efficient
reliable communication becomes obvious, made all the more significant given these
verbal miscommunications arise from a mere 2% of the doctors’ and nurses’ work
activities.109 However, research studies also offer the promise of benefits from teamwork
that includes effective communication; productive interaction between ICU caregivers
has been found to lead to shorter ICU stays by fostering effective leadership, conflict
resolution, and colleague sensitive cooperation.110
Chapter 5.F.3. Those Involved in Transfers or Handoffs of the Patient
Transferring patients, also referred to as a handoff, whether in either direction
between the ICU and another part of the hospital or alternatively between two hospitals
or even simply between the care of different physicians, constitutes among the most
complex, challenging, and high risk activities for the medical staff.111 During such
transitions, the patient in in a position of increased vulnerability, and it is at this point that
all sorts of medical errors are prone to occur and more likely than other times to go
unnoticed. The risks include the heightened opportunity for lapses in essential
communication and confusion about responsibilities related to patient data involving the
patient’s medication, diagnosis, tests results, ongoing treatment, special needs and
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circumstances, as well as the overall goals of the patient’s care.112 There is substantial
research findings to correlate the occurrence of medical errors and adverse outcomes
directly with such transfers, in addition to which, patients tends to report more
dissatisfaction with the quality of their care during these periods.113 As many as an
estimated 18% of the reported adverse events affecting ICU patients are connected with
their discharge from that hospital unit.114
The benefits of accurate and timely handing off of critical patient information
include: 1) reducing risks or eliminating sources of errors, 2) avoiding unnecessary
duplication of diagnostics and laboratory testing, 3) minimizing the likelihood of needed
re-hospitalization, and 4) overall, boosting the patient’s quality of life. Optimal patient
outcomes are highly correlated with communication that is exhibits not just quantity and
frequency, but also clarity in its content.115 In contrast, studies on the subject have found
that inter-site communication and coordination of care and treatment has been noticeably
absent; this phenomenon has been particularly evident between acute care providers in
the ICU and the patients’ primary care providers (PCPs) to the distress of the patients
themselves.116 In 2011, it was estimated that somewhere between $25 and $45 billion
U.S. dollars could have been saved through better communications during patient
transfers.117
There is no indication at present that any country has established a uniform
hospital discharge protocol, in spite of research indicating the advantage of such
standardization.118 The complexity and considerable degree of variation in practice
among discharge processes creates added risk of the occurrence of medical errors.119 For
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example, a transfer to the ICU from the operating room (OR) involves inherent risk in
that the patient is in a particularly fragile state physically, yet must be moved between
environments; meanwhile the patient’s data, which can change rapidly and dramatically
during this time must be passed between various medical professionals of differing
specialties in different locations. In such a scenario, obviously the patient will not be in a
condition to help monitor the process; all of these factors create an elevated potential for
medical error.120
Chapter 5.G. Medical Error Disclosure Protocols Based on the Formal and Informal
Acknowledgement of Medical Errors and Apologies
This section of Chapter 5 is separated into two subsections, namely Informal and
Formal Apologies; 2) Apology Laws.
Chapter 5.G.1. Informal and Formal Apologies
While minor medical errors, i.e, those whose consequences do not materially or
adversely affect the patient’s original prognosis or cause separate damage can ethically be
handled through informal apology protocols involving only those closely, formal
procedures and policies for apologies must be adopted in advance of occurrence of any
error with major consequences.121 This latter, admittedly broad, category will involve
various parties or stakeholders who are secondarily connected to the event and have
differing, possibly conflicting interests. Since this type of situation always includes the
potential for communication problems to compound issues, having a well drafted formal
apology at least in outline form is a wise precaution, although various researchers have
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concluded that such pre-formulated apology statement can have mixed results in terms of
successful resolution.122
Given that informal apologies generally occur within the person-to-person context
of the physician-patient relationship, the four cornerstone characteristics of successful
informal apologies for medical errors are that: 1) the doctor acknowledges that an error
has occurred, revealing who or whatever is responsible and the specifics of what has
happened; 2) the doctor accepts responsibility and describes the effect it is having or will
have on the victim; 3) the doctor expresses regret by admitting culpability, personally or
on behalf of the institution and those responsible, along with showing humiliation,
sincere contrition, and compassion; and 4) the doctor offers mitigation and compensation
for the damage caused by the error.123 Informal apologies such as this constitute typical
moral behavior in reconciliation between individuals in their interpersonal relationships.
Absent from this scenario, in contrast to formal apologies in the wake of medical errors,
are any involvement of any government agencies and regulators, legal institutions, or
enforcement officers and mechanisms. Moreover, an informal apology can be more or
less spontaneous and immediate, without need for forethought concerning its ramification
in situations for which the stakes are small because the error was minor.124
By contrast, formal apology for a medical error as is much more common in the
ICU, is normally an affairs bringing in at minimum a number of doctors, other medical
staff, and hospital administrators institutions, in addition to those experiencing the effects
of the error. Furthermore, apology protocols may very well involve secondary
stakeholders such as medical insurance providers and legal counsel, as well as the
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eventualities of malpractice litigation, major consequences in terms of damage, serious
injury, death, and extensive financial burdens. Because of all the legal considerations
involved, the formal apology process is inextricably linked to the legal processes of
adjudication, objective determination of culpability, and compensation, as opposed to any
face to face expression of responsibility.125 Thus, in the majority of cases in which formal
apology protocols are needed, spontaneous admissions of responsibility or even regret are
strenuously discouraged and avoided.
Intrinsic differences in circumstances can logically account for differences
between informal and formal apology protocols. On the interpersonal level, medical
apologies can involve merely the simple, immediately implementable actions described
earlier in accord with the religiously based, cultural expectations for apologies. By
contrast, formal apologies involve institutions, bureaucracies with complicated
procedures, multiple actors, all of which can delay the protocol weeks or months,
possibly years if litigation ensues. Moreover, formal apologies correlate with medical
errors occurring at large facilities, where determining causation as due to a single act of
omission or commission, as opposed to a complex systemic failure, or anything in
between, is an involved time consuming endeavor. Thus, in cases such as those in the
ICU, the medical staff may face various constraints in communicating to patients details
about the incident, details which the patient and family members are anxious to learn.
Unfortunately, given society’s tendency to overestimate the certainty of medicine and the
omnipotence of physicians, patients can be prone to confusing tragic outcomes of
medical procedures that are high-risk or have a small chance of succeeding with those of
a medical error involving culpability.126
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Chapter 5.G.2. Apology Laws
In an effort to promote timely apologies for medical errors partly as a means of
enhancing patient safety, several countries including the United States, New Zealand,
Finland, Denmark, and Sweden, have adopted apology laws intended in part to remove
the fear of legal action from suppressing explanations of errors, expressions of regret, and
apologies.127 Prompting this change in perspective, the Institute of Medicine report of
1999,128 had documented the following disturbing trends: 1) a rapid increase in the rates
of medical errors, 2) commensurate rises in the costs of medical care and malpractice
litigation, 3) rapid technological change as contributing factor, and 4) significant decline
in the public reputation of physicians stemming from conflicts over medical error and the
lack of patient involvement in the process of making decisions about care and treatment.
It is important to note that the Although the 1999 report did not address the issue of
changes to how apologies are treated in legal contexts, it did advocate for adjusting the
imbalance of power dynamics in the doctor-patient relationship, in which patients lacked
both knowledge of medical healthcare and technology and a lack of decision-making
power that was a long established tradition in medicine.129
The apology laws which resulted from this shift in thinking did make the use of
some aspects apologies by doctors inadmissible in court, but were weak at best, lead to
half-hearted expressions of sympathy rather than apology that failed to assuage patients’
concerns and fears, and in the end did little or nothing to improve the physician-patient
relationship.130 While over two-thirds of the states in the U.S. passed into law some form
of these statutes, Colorado’s apology law was the only that unequivocally barred all
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statements of apology by doctors from being admitted in court proceedings. One of the
problems was that From the point of view of many victims of error-related adverse
outcomes, the type of apologies without admission of fault, which these new laws
engendered lacked and sense of self-examination on the part of the physician and thus
lacked honesty and sincerity.131 Research finding are clear in that patients want
explanations aside from any compensation, and if they sense insensitivity and a lack of
honest remorse they will resort to legal action, in part to prevent others from suffering a
similar fate.132
The intent of apology laws was to remove the barrier that the threat of legal action
had on candor and apology in the wake of a medical error so that other benefits would
accrue; whether these laws did anything to foster better doctor-patient communication,
facilitate more patient control in treatment decisions, or even reduce the rate of medical
errors, improving patient safety in the process is still undecided by the research
community.133 As a case in point, Minnesota and Florida have similar apology statutes.
While the former has no cap on medical malpractice awards, physician-patient apologies
and medical error disclosures are quite frequent, and along with those circumstances, the
rates of medical errors, malpractice litigation, and concomitant insurance rates are near
the bottom ranked among the 50 states. More to its credit, Minnesota’s payouts for
awards are only marginally above the nationwide average despite the absence of any cap
on judgments. On the other hand, Florida’s ranking in the same categories are among the
highest in the nation, in some cases 19 times as high as those of Minnesota.134 All these
statistics call into question whether state apology laws aimed at fostering disclosure
protocols have had any inhibitory effect on either malpractice litigation or medical costs.

301

In the final analysis, the incidence of medicals errors is high and on the rise, apologies for
errors remain strikingly infrequent, physicians still are typically vulnerable to having an
apology used against them in court, and medical costs continue to rise far faster than
inflation.135
Minnesota’s overall approach to dealing with errors in healthcare is notable in
several ways; the state has had since 1999, its Adverse Health Care Events Law, which
mandates the reporting of adverse events, categorized into one or more of 28 groupings,
documented to the Minnesota Medical Practice Board, including an determination of root
causes and a plan for corrective action.136 Some of the categories match those of the
National Quality Forum, such as surgical, product or device, patient protection, care
management, environmental, and criminal events.137 Fundamentally, this policy is an
outgrowth the state’s prioritizing public safety in medical practice over punishment
through the legal system. Five years after implementation, 90% of all hospitals in the
state had adopted policies of disclosing adverse events to all patients and family member
victims.138 Even earlier, the Children’s Hospitals and Clinics of Minnesota (CHCM) had
created and instituted its own patient safety program, which included disclosure to all
families whenever an adverse event had occurred or might foreseeably occur in the
future, along with the steps being done to remedy the effects of the adverse event and
prevent any reoccurrence. The Board explicitly declared when adopted these policies
that they believed it was the right thing to do, even in the face of liability to medical
malpractice litigation.139 Ironically, Minnesota’s patient apology law actually resembles
the U.S. Supreme Court’s famous Miranda ruling in its statement everything said by the
apologizers can potentially be used against them in a court of law. In the final analysis,
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Minnesota’s success have resulted primarily from its creation of a ‘culture of safety’
founded on the principle of doing what is ethically right.140
Chapter 5.H. Medical Error Disclosure Protocols Based on Compensation
This section of Chapter 5 is divided into two subsections, the first of which is
entitled Medical Error Disclosure Protocols and Compensation, with an implied focus
only financial reimbursement for damages, harm, or loss. As its name implies, the
second subsection, entitled Non-Monetary Compensation, covers other forms of
restitution.
Both the principles of biomedical ethics and legal statutes concur in requiring just
and sufficient compensation for any harm done, moreover, the legal systems presupposes
at least the potential for adjudication between adversarial parties and the need for
enforcement. By contrast, if agreement concerning fair compensation is possible without
formal legal action, all parties involved may reap the benefits the cost saving in the form
of time and resources expended, in the avoidance of distraction from other priorities and
responsibilities such as doctors focusing on other patients and patients concentrating on
recovery, and finally in the substantial reduction of emotional duress. Specific disclosure
protocols as related to detailed procedures and criteria for arriving at equitable
compensation promise to significantly increase the likelihood of an amicable settlement
with all the advantages that it would entail.141
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Chapter 5.H.1. Medical Error Disclosure Protocols and Compensation
From the patient’s point of view as well as that of those who support him or her,
any disclosure of a medical error will inevitably lead to a discussion of compensation,
and thus any procedure or protocol developed for the purpose of disclosure must take this
factor into account. However, the minute, disclosure and compensation are broadened in
scope this way, the issue is no longer simply an ICU matter, but becomes system wide
matter for the institution as a whole, engaging new stakeholders with concern and
policies related to apologies in relation to the potential for lawsuits, insurance coverage
for medical errors, opportunities for mediation, and binding arbitration versus nonbinding arbitration.142 From this broader perspective compensation includes not only
financial remuneration for loss and damages, but also: 1) apologies, 2) sincere
expressions of regret and contrition, 3) admissions of guilt by those culpable, 4) an
explanation of the series of events leading up to the error, 5) expressions of compassion
and empathy, and 6) outlining of procedures being or to be taken to prevent any repeat of
the same or similar errors in the future.143 The broad view towards disclosure and
compensation would enable medical error disclosure to be conceptualized as a process
encompassing the error, and its reverberations, aftermath, and ultimate outcome. The
1999 publication of the report entitled To Err is Human by the Institute of Medicine laid
a conceptual foundation for this broader notion of compensation. Following in the same
vein, a 2009 Canadian research team gathered data concerning of 64 malpractice cases
and found that 59% of medical error victims instigating lawsuits over medical errors were
primarily motivated by the desire to force the medical practitioners involved to
acknowledge their culpability in the matter, as well as to force these professionals and
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facilities to take measure that would ensure there would no be repeating of the error.144
Despite the differences between the Canadian and U.S. healthcare and legal systems, the
findings of this study are generalizable given that they concern patient attitudes,
expectations, and dissatisfaction with behaviors among physicians which are not specific
to either country.145According to the Canadian study, 53% of respondents claimed their
main goal was to obtain explanations for what had happened to them. While 41% did
admit to wanting to enable some form of punishment, a nearly equal number, 40%, were
focused on forcing an apology as their primary goal. By contrast, a mere 18% stated that
obtaining monetary compensation was their first priority as a goal. Another 35% of
respondents relegated obtaining money to the status of secondary goal, and scarcely 6%
declared that financial compensation was their sole goal. Most tellingly, a full 41% of the
participants in the Canadian study did not cite money as their purpose at all, let alone as
either as their primary or secondary goal. Revealing of the disparity in perspectives
between the medical establishment and of patients and family members affected by
medical errors, the same Canadian study found that surveyed members of the
professional medical and legal communities were strikingly out of touch with the feelings
of their legal opponents. Perhaps less surprisingly, over 90 % of the defense attorneys
representing the doctors involved contended that the sole purpose of patient-victims
lawsuits over medical errors was to get money; compounding this misperception, 65%
percent of the hospital administrators who were themselves or had their facilities named
in the suits, along with the attorneys for the latter group of defendants, thought that
monetary compensation had been the victims’ primary goal although this latter group
admitted the possibility of other secondary goals such as receiving an explanation,
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justice, the acceptance of responsibility, or insuring corrective measures to forestall
recurrences.146
Chapter 5.H.2. Non-Monetary Compensation
The findings of the research presented above imply that desired non-monetary
forms of compensation, as mitigation for medical errors could may be viewed by patients
in a substantially divergent manner than do medical professionals and their legal counsel.
While the results of this study suggest that attorneys, insurers and many hospitals, view
lawsuits as appropriate disclosure protocol in cases of significant medical errors, the
response of plaintiffs in these cases, the injured patients and their representatives, indicate
that much of the need for litigation could be avoided to the advantage of all parties, with
the possible exception of legal counsel. Further supporting this notion, researchers for
the Pew Charitable Trust conducted a series of studies in New York state and
Pennsylvania, which compared the mediation efforts made by medical practitioners and
institutions to resolve issues in the wake of errors with subsequent litigation when it
developed. Their findings indicate that the more doctors and hospitals showed sincere
remorse and made specific, good faith efforts to improve in the aftermath of a medical
error, the more willing the patients became to resolving the case through mediation rather
than pursuing a lawsuit.147
However, in line the attitudes suggested by the Canadian study, physicians and
hospital administrators supported with advice from their defense lawyers attempt to
forestall legal proceedings by engaging in legal delay maneuvers, fighting to maintain
secrecy, dispute any suggestion or responsibility for the error. The result is invariably
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long protracted court battles with increasing animosity, when the patient or family
member initiated the malpractice suits out of confusion, anger, and frustrated at doctors’
and hospitals’ unwillingness to candidly reveal what had occurred, admit to their
mistakes, and apologize for them.148 Putting all this into perspective and casting further
doubt on the wisdom of the medical practitioners’ and institutions’ strategies, studies has
shown that the clear majority of patients who are victims of medical error do not pursue
litigation.149 One practical reason for this hesitancy on the part of those injured through
medical errors is the long delays which are likely and the fact that such a large portion,
54% of the compensation eventually paid out according to one well regarded study, was
consumed in prosecuting costs and legal fees.150
Even though there is clear evidence that forms of non-monetary compensation are
the primary concern and motivating force behind patients’ initiating legal action,
monetary compensation does play a role in their decision to pursue litigation. Isolating
the monetary aspects of the legal cases, one major research endeavor focused on 1452
closed malpractice litigation claims and brought to light insights concerning the nature of
the claims being made, as well as and the final settlement or judgment figures.151
A sizeable body of research, focusing on the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, Southwest,
and West of the U.S, investigate the workings of 5 malpractice insurance providers
companies operating in the target areas. This data pool amounted to 33,000 physicians
work in 61 acute care hospitals, of which 35 were academic and 26 were non-academic;
added to this pool were 428 outpatient facilities. Significant subgroups of plaintiffs
included 60% females with a median age of 38; 19% newborns and infants, and 12%
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seniors, age 65 and above. Given that the study concentrated on four clinical categories,
namely obstetrics, surgery, missed or delayed diagnosis, and medication errors which
comprised that 80% of claims investigated, predictably the classes of medical
professionals most frequently the defendants in lawsuits were obstetrician-gynecologists
(OBGYNs) at 19% and general surgeons at 17%, followed closely by primary care
physicians at 16%. Adverse impacts motivated a substantial amount of the lawsuits; 39%
were cases of those whose injury resulted in significant disability, 15% were those whose
resulting disability was classified as major, and 26% were on behalf of those who died as
a result of the error. Less frequently at 4% were those who had experienced emotional or
psychological trauma, 1% who claimed their informed consent has been violated, and 3%
who pursued cases despite there being on adverse outcome.152
In terms of time and money, the average period from initiation to settlement was
five years, for an average monetary award of approximately $485,000 in 1995–2004
dollars, this latter average representing 56% of the applicable cases. While just 15% of
the lawsuits went as far as a trial verdict, the chances of winning were much lower with
plaintiffs winning only 21% of their cases, as opposed to 61% of litigants who won
settlements out of court. However, of those who did win at trial the average award was
approximately $799,000 in contrast to settlements averaging about $462,000. The mean
administrative costs for claims decided by trial was On the other hand, at an average of
around $113,000, administrative costs for cases that went to trial was nearly triple that of
out of court settlements, at about $42,000. In the final analysis, the investigators in this
study found these costs to be exorbitant and unwarranted.153
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Among the large number of cases included in the study, medical error was the
sole or significant partial cause in 63%; of these, in 73% of the cases, the plaintiffs
received compensation. In contrast, of all the lawsuits in which errors did not play a role,
72% of the plaintiffs failed to receive damages; among the claims in this group, 84%
failed to receive compensation if no injury was sustained. Based on the corpus of cases
studied, the investigators in study concluded that: 1) from a legal perspective, the
concepts of medical error and negligence are not easily disentangled, 2) contrary to the
charges of a vocal body of critics, many lawsuits are not frivolous and inherently without
merit, and 3) the proportion of legal actions which are initiated by victims of medical
errors is, as other researchers have puzzled over, surprisingly small given the frequency
at which errors are documented or believed to have occurred.154
Recently, in addition to researchers, academic hospitals, medical professionals,
and some state agencies and entities have been discussing initiatives and making efforts
to and implement disclosure and compensation protocols that would replace the
traditional litigation, arbitration, and mediation model for resolving cases of medical
error. With some limited success, protocols for offering formal apologies, fully disclosing
medical errors, and offering immediate compensation have been implemented, such as 1)
the “disclosure-and-offer approach” in operation specifically at the Veterans Affairs
Hospital in Lexington, Kentucky; 2) the “reimbursement model” in which the institution
automatically offers compensation to the patient for any losses in time, wages, and
expenses incurred due to the medical error; 3) the “early settlement model” as
implemented by the University of Michigan Health System, which sets no cap on
compensation, which is dispersed when the facility has confirmed that a medical error has
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occurred; and 4) the “avoidability standard” model, in which an panel of experts
determines whether the same error would have still occurred if the patient were being
care for and treated at the a top quality healthcare system or by the leading specialist in
the field. Under this last model, upon the panel’s ruling that the medical error would not
have occurred under these ideal conditions, the patient or his or her representative
receives remuneration for both economic and noneconomic losses corresponding to the
seriousness of the harm or damages.155 Despite substantial savings in terms of time and
money some of these initiatives have achieved in terms of enhancing disclosure and
involving patients in the process, these models still have flaws and inefficiencies, which a
small number of researchers are quick to point out.156
Chapter 5.J. Conclusion
In the final analysis, a critical step in improving ethical behavior involves
establishing and implementing protocols for disclosing medical errors when they occur in
the ICU. Protocols need to be commensurate with the scope and scale of errors and
proactively address the acceptance of responsibility, considerations involving risk to
patient outcomes and loss, management of the risk to the medical institution, anticipation
of consequences, identification and involvement of stakeholders, and disclosure timing,
apologies, and compensation.
This chapter has analyzed in detail eight aspects of disclosure protocols for
dealing with medical errors in the hospital ICU whenever it may occur, specifically, the
scope and scale of the error, the ethical criteria supporting the acceptance of
responsibility, measures to correct the impact of the error and establish the prognosis of
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the patient, strategies for managing anticipated risks, the timing of disclosure, the various
stakeholders in the apology process and their interests in the case, informal and formal
acknowledgement of the error and apologies for it, and the compensation, in both its
monetary and non-monetary forms. Specific facets of the issue of medical errors have
been explored, leading to the following insights, among others, into where protocols will
have special needs in their development and implementation: 1) biomedical ethics, along
with most professional medical associations, takes a clear stand advocating full and
detailed disclosure, 2) transfers and handoffs of patients in and out of the ICU are
particularly prone to the occurrence of medical errors, 3) barriers to communication in all
their forms need to be addressed proactively, 4)great differences exist between acceptable
protocols for informal versus formal apologies, and 5) apology laws while well
intentioned have had mixed results.
Among the themes that cut across the various sections of this chapter are that: 1)
medical professionals acknowledge ethical obligations for disclosure in concept, but live
up to these duties in practice, 2) patients and those close to them expect answers,
explanations, and apologies stemming from sincerely felt contrition, 3) physicians
severely misunderstand the perspectives and motivations of patients as victims.
Patients and family member harmed by a medical error are neither solely nor
primarily interested in gaining money as compensation, as the 2009 Canadian study
indicates. Further supporting this, the Pew research study of mediation and litigation
described above is one of numerous studies suggesting the tendency of victims of
medical errors to avoid resorting to going to court if they receive what they most want,
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namely a sincere admission of fault, apologies, and efforts to prevent errors in the future.
Despite this tendency, physicians throughout the medical establishment, including the
ICU, remain distinctly reluctant to admit their culpability in cases of medical errors based
on their concerns about potential negative impacts on their reputations, careers, and even
livelihoods. From a myriad of research, it is clear that medical professionals, facilities,
and institutions are very far out of touch with the feeling and priorities of victims or
medical errors, real or potential.
One possible solution has been exemplified by the experiences of the medical
establishment in Minnesota, where they have achieved lower rates of errors, litigation,
and malpractice insurance rates, not so much by shielding physicians from legal
consequences of admitting fault or apologizing for errors, but rather by proactively
committing to take the ethical course of action, i.e, by ‘doing the right thing,’ despite
possible ramifications.
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Chapter 6. Systemic Endeavors to Diminish Medical Errors in the Hospital ICU
Introduction
The previous chapter focused on protocols relating to the disclosure of medical
errors once they have occurred; this chapter of the dissertation, its sections, and
subsections together with the protocols and recommendations they describe concentrate
on efforts and procedures to prevent medical errors before they happen to the extent
humanly possible, or when not, to lessen the severity of and mitigate the harm caused by
medical errors. These protocols include prevention planning, communication,
administering medication, as well as preventing and managing equipment failure and
system failure. Subsequently, the chapter’s analysis will consider the history of tort
reform in the U.S., describing the direction that such reforms need to take in order to
ensure justice for all parties and to discourage medical errors. Further recommendations
concern the educational system for training future physicians and other healthcare
professionals, which along with legal reforms, are aimed at getting the medical
professional, as well as the administration of medical facilities and institutions to handle
medical errors with the high standards of biomedical ethics which they claim in theory to
espouse.
Chapter 6 is divided into six sections, which will cover respectively; 1)
Prevention planning protocols, 2) Communication protocols, 3) Medication
protocols, 4) Equipment failure protocols, 5) System failure protocols, and 6) Tort
and medical education reform.
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The first section discusses organized effort to minimize if not preempt the
occurrence of adverse events, considering the role and potential of information
technology. Since, they have long been a practical cornerstone in forestalling
adverse events, cleaning and decontamination techniques are analyzed here in
detail. The potential of teamwork to reduce errors is described in parts of this
chapter; in conjunction with this emphasis, the second section analyzes how
effective communication, both internally and external to the medical institution
should function. The section concerning medication protocols highlights three
innovations that promise to significantly reduce, or in some cases eliminate specific
causes or sources of this very common classes of medical errors. In terms of
technology, computerized physician order entry in particular does away with a
number of causes of medication error that have plagued the traditional prescription
and treatment process. While the benefits of eliminating the overworking of
physicians and other involved personnel are understood, if difficult to get facilities
to commit to, an innovative approach, feasible at least for the ICU is to include
pharmacists in patient rounds. After these sections, the two subsequent one will
focus on the need for and obstacles to creating effective protocols for the prevention
of equipment failure and system failure, respectively. In both areas, complexity as
well as other features common to the two make preparing to identify risks for and
the occurrence of, to avoid or minimize them, and to deal with them once they have
been discovered, uniquely difficult among the various root causes of errors and
adverse events.
While recommendations for improving the prevention or minimization of
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medical errors, the hospital ICU and elsewhere are incorporated wherever
appropriate, the final section of this chapter is devoted to badly needed changes in
both the legal foundations for handling claims of negligence and malpractice and
the system of educating future medical professionals.
Chapter 6.A. Prevention Planning Protocols in the Hospital ICU
The prevention, or at least to the extent possible, the minimization of medical
errors in the hospital ICU or elsewhere in medicine is the primary aim behind planning;
furthermore the achievement of this goal necessitates anticipating foreseeable risks and
tendencies toward error, which in turn requires that planners know the circumstances that
foster the occurrence of errors comprehend the characteristics of these events and be able
to realistically assess the likelihood of their happening.1
This section on planning protocols is divided into two major parts, with the latter
containing a further four subdivisions. As presented, they include 1) Prophylaxis and
Monitoring Procedures and 2) Steps to Avoid Adverse Events. This second part is
segmented into subsections dealing with: a) The Role of Information Technology, b)
Cleaning, Disinfection, and Sterilization Procedures, c) Investigative and Evaluative
Procedures, and d) Reorganization of Medical Team Operations in the ICU.
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Chapter 6.A.1. Prophylaxis and Monitoring Procedures
Chapter 6.A.1.i. Prophylaxis Procedures
The term prophylaxis procedures refers to tangible actions taken in the course of
the diagnosis and treatment of a patient that are aimed at error prevention, implying that
such must be a priority for hospitals in general and ICU departments specifically.
Accurately assessing the probability of medical errors in advance enables the medical
staff to take two preemptive measures- first, increasing vigilance in high risk places and
procedures, and second, developing strategies and protocols ahead of time to forestall the
anticipated type of error. The ultimate benefit of such efforts is more effective and
accurate patient care. The majority of these prophylactic activities and strategies have
been incorporated into established and widely available procedural checklists for all sorts
of medical professionals from attending physicians and specialists such as cardiologists,
anesthesiologists, and laboratory technicians to nurses and other care staff to follow in
carrying out their respective duties.2 The principle goal of this standardized approach is to
guarantee that all procedures are not forgotten but are conducted, yet not repeated in so
much as unnecessary duplication is not only a waste of resources, but could constitute a
medical error causing harm in and of itself. The natural next step beyond the use of such
checklists is the development of contingency plans to correct any omissions or
consequences of repetitions. On a broader scale, such detailed understanding of the dayto-day functioning of the ICU enable more efficient general administration of the unit
through sufficient staffing and supervision.3
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The body of research literature available specifically focusing on medical errors
points to the effectiveness of dividing errors for the sake of prevention into two types: 1)
those which can be forestalled through improved medical management, typically relating
to planning and implementation; and 2) those which typically can be prevented through
appropriate interventions in course of diagnosis, treatment, or specifically the
administration of medication. A significant portion of the potential advantages of these
checklist lies in their timely and continuous documentation of any and all occurrences, in
turn reducing liability in the form of alleged negligence while assisting in prevention of
future errors by enabling the regular improvement of prophylactic protocols.4
Chapter 6.A.1.ii. Monitoring Procedures
As typically employed, the general term monitoring procedures is not restricted in
scope to overseeing the treatment plan of the patient and its progress, but rather includes
the overview of standard procedures for administration of all routine activities of
departments such as the ICU and for specific categories of treatment such as surgical
interventions. As an integrated component of general monitoring, procedural checklists
have been proven to contribute to noticeable decreases the rate of medical errors, as well
as reducing the level of harm caused by those errors that did occur.5 The hospital ICU in
particular is a unit in which the routine use of checklist program is not a foreign concept
and is most essential, given the complexity of activities in the unit. At minimum, this list
needs to be employed daily and must include: 1) the patient’s status, in terms of code; 2)
the patient’s degree of sedation; 3) the patient’s GI and DVT Prophylaxis, 4) the patient’s
levels of fluids, electrolytes, and nutrition; and 5) an assessment of the patient’s
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disposition. Beyond this minimal level of monitoring and data collection, it is important
to frequently and regularly assess and record: 1) the I/O for each patient, recorded with
daily cumulative totals; 2) each patient’s IV access, with ready access to the dates and
times at which the central lines were installed; and 3) for each patient, the occurrence and
length of any administration of steroids for shock purposes. There are additional checklist
items for any and all patient receiving mechanical ventilation, namely: 1) the date of
initial intubation; 2) the gage of the tube; 3) the settings for the vent, specifically the
mode, the rate, the volume, the pressure, the PEEP, and the FiO2); and 4) the
peak/plateau pressure.6
A mnemonic device which serves as an additional monitoring reminder in
numerous ICUs is termed FAST HUG, which stands for: 1) feeding, 2) analgesia, 3)
sedation, 4) thromboembolic prophylaxis, 5) head of bed elevation, 6) stress ulcer
prevention, and 7) glucose control. According to Vincent, “The concept of the Fast Hug,
a simple, short mnemonic to highlight some key aspects in the general care of all
critically ill patients, which should be considered at least once a day during rounds and,
ideally, every time the patient is seen by any member of the care team. This approach
helps involve all members of the critical care team, including nurses, physiotherapists,
and respiratory therapists.”7 The goal of all these checklist style monitoring measures is
the comprehensive and systematic overseeing of the status of the patient’s condition, his
or her response to the prescribed course of treatments, adding up to an accurate prognosis
for recovery or improvement.
A study conducted by Carless et al., investigated two procedures aimed at
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enhancing quality of care in the ICU, namely facilitated incident monitoring (FIM) and
medical chart review (MCR), looking at both comparatively as implemented by ICU
staffs. In order to observe the FIM in practice, the researchers trained the participating
ICU staff in the course of the latter group’s ICU orientation. Subsequently, staff members
were asked to recall incidents of medical errors they had been witness to or a part of; they
were then asked to document each occurrence an incident report form. Meanwhile, as a
component of more established quality control procedures, the investigators had MCR
used as a part of peer review. In the final analysis, Carless et al. concluded that in an ICU
setting, FIM was more effective at potential and real problem identification and alert than
was MCR. Explaining their analysis, these researchers noted that FIM was superior to
MCR in 1) yielding more contextualized data, revealing both more problems overall and
specifically more, as well as a higher percentage of those deemed preventable, and 2)
being easier to integrate with existing ICU clinical routines.8
Chapter 6.A.2. Steps to Avoid Adverse Events
The first step toward systematically planning and implementing medical errors
prevention is to create a classification scheme for medical errors in order to properly
identify them and investigate their causes. One widely used categorization scheme labels
them as: 1) adverse events, 2) near misses, 3) slips, 4) lapses, 5) mistakes, 6) errors of
omission, and 7) errors of commission although these last two categories may be argued
to overlap with some of the others. To clarify, in order to be labelled an adverse event,
the harm or damage must be the result of a flaw in the medical management rather a
negative development in the patient’s condition through a progression of the injury or
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illness in spite of appropriate treatment. Even excluding these unfortunate setbacks in the
face of efficacious, diligent treatment, Brennan et al. assert that, “There is a substantial
amount of injury to patients from medical management, and many injuries are the result
of substandard care.”9 As any system designed to aid in preventing medical errors must
include those events that did not cause harm in the case in question, but could well have
done so in other circumstances, in other words, near misses. For example, any error in the
creation of a treatment plan is a mistake if it could have led to harm, even though it
actually didn’t. Medical errors categorized as mistakes are most clearly defined by
precipitating circumstance occur when anyone involved in care or treatment of a patient
must perform a non-routine action, often a novel undertaking for the caregiver; the task
will necessitate concentration and possibly judgment or problem-solving skills.10 Any
deviation from a set of standard procedures for treatment and care can increase the danger
and probability of errors or adverse events although even the deviations themselves may
be hard to document. One difficulty with assessing and analyzing medical errors on a
scale beyond that of the individual institution is that various facilities have their own
schema for identifying and classifying errors, as well as determining the likelihood of
their occurrence which nevertheless may be very useful to doctors and other medical staff
in adhering to standards and formulating corrective measures when errors arise.11
Chapter 6.A.2.i. The Role of Information Technology
Two obvious methods of medical error detection typical come to mind first,
namely spontaneous reporting by those involved and manual review by disconnected
observers; however, both are impractical for accurately revealing the broader picture of
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the situation in that the former methods elucidates only a small fraction of occurrences
and a glimpse of the situation that enables them while the latter is prohibitively labor
intensive to be cost effective, except as targeted sampling in the context of a broadly
based research investigation.12 Originally brought into hospitals and similar facilities for
billing and payment processing, as well as for other high-volume, time-sensitive needs
such as lab tests, computer and electronically facilitated technologies are increasingly
being employed to monitor, evaluate, and enhance the quality of patient care which
hospitals and outpatient facilities deliver.13
The use of information technology can eliminate the drawbacks mentioned above
that make strictly human monitoring unfeasible, yet has its limitations in that coded data
only will not reveal all forms of medical error. Thus data from a variety of sources, both
quantitative and qualitative, such as clinical narratives, must be synthesized in order to
identify a truly broad range of adverse events that have or could occur.
Given the promise of gaining a more complete picture of error generation,
investigation needs to move toward understanding the process by which it occurs. To
date, the focus of research has been reactive, identifying the occurrence and analyzing the
causes of errors, and not on developing adverse event detection systems or effective
procedures for prevention. Advances in the thoroughness of medical error detection
should enable the study of the effectiveness of various approaches to enhancing patient
safety through adverse event prevention. This progress will be of significant benefit in
that the unpredictability of most medical errors coupled with the high costs of
interventions makes definitively determining their effectiveness very difficult.14
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Chapter 6.A.2.ii. Cleaning, Disinfecting, and Sterilization Procedures
Chapter 6.A.2.ii.a. Cleaning Procedures
The term decontamination is refers to a variety of activities, the goal of which
alone or in combination, is to eradicate or at least render innocuous any pathogen or other
dilatory substance enabling the reuse of anything coming in contact with multiple
patients. Decontamination can take the form of: 1) cleaning, the physical removal of
infectious agents and the organic matter that supports them, typically without destroy
them; 2) disinfection, the killing or rendering harmless of most but not all
microorganisms; and 3) sterilization, the complete eradication of anything living or
potentially so, such as bacterial spores, whether or not deemed harmful.15
Sharbaugh asserts that cleaning is the first and most critical step in preventing
adverse events caused by contamination, in addition to being a prerequisite to
disinfection and sterilization. Significantly advances in preventing infection within
hospital settings, including rigid cleaning and reprocessing standards along with the rise
of one-time use equipment, have made infectious complications during hospitalization
attention getting exception, as opposed to the norm of centuries past. Cleaning may need
to be either a manual or automated task, depending on the features of the equipment or
implement to be cleaned; alternatively, it may require a combination of both methods, the
operative factors being preserving the proper performance of the device while insuring
the safety of the one doing the cleaning. Depending on the task, acceptable cleaning
methods, as provided by the manufacturer of the article to be cleaned, include: 1) simply
applying soap and water, 2) applying another specified chemical agent, 3) manual
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scrubbing, i.e, by human hands, 4) ultrasonic cleaning, and either 5) washer disinfecting
or washer sterilizing, i.e, by placement in a machine.16
For cleaning to be effective, it must involve the complete removal of foreign
material; otherwise, any subsequent disinfection or sterilization will be more time and
energy intensive and possibly ineffective in the end. It consists of washing an item with a
detergent or a disinfectant detergent and water, rinsing the item, and thoroughly drying
the item. Multiple research endeavors concerning endoscopes, surgical instruments, and
other equipment have document exponential and logarithmic scale reductions in
microorganisms from cleaning alone. As alluded to above, a direct correlation exists
between the level of biological material present at the inception of disinfection or
sterilization and the time delay needed to effectively accomplish those processes.
Reducing what is referred to as bioburden reduces time and costs while increasing
effectiveness and safety, including that of employees who undertake subsequent
equipment handling. Sufficient, effective cleaning further prevents of release of
potentially harmful endotoxins, removes barriers that would otherwise shield
microorganisms from contact with liquid disinfectants or sterilizing agents, while
preventing any deactivation of the latter two groups of agents.17
Chapter 6.A.2.ii.b. Disinfecting Procedures
Crucial to preventing adverse events proximally caused by harmful
microorganisms coming into contact with the patient under treatment is disinfection,
which by definition kills or renders innocuous pathogenic organisms other than bacterial
spores.18 Immersing medical equipment in liquid chemicals for sufficient periods of time
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and processing them through wet pasteurization are the two most common ways of
handling the non-living objects and surfaces with which the patient comes into contact.19
Obviously, disinfectants cannot be used directly on the patient or with items such as
eating utensils by means of which the disinfectant could be ingested.20
Sharbaugh classifies disinfectants into three categories, namely; 1) the high-level
ones, which eradicate all microorganisms other than some types of bacterial spores; 2) the
intermediate-level ones, which kill off vegetative bacteria, the majority of viruses and
fungi, along with (of special importance) the organism Mycobacterium tuberculosis, but
not bacterial spores; and finally 3) the low-level ones, which kill most bacteria, as well as
a number of virus and fungi types, yet are ineffective against M. tuberculosis or bacterial
spores. Outside Sharbaugh’s scheme is sterilization, defined as the killing of absolutely
all microorganisms without exception.21
Reporting on research by Rutala, and Weber highlighted the former’s conclusion
concerning the efficacy of classifying the sterilization of equipment for patient care as
being either critical, semicritical, or noncritical, with the criterion for categorization being
the level of the danger of infection. Two policy guidelines, namely the "Guidelines for
Environmental Infection Control in HealthCare Facilities" and the "Guideline for
Disinfection and Sterilization in Healthcare Facilities" both published by the U.S. Centers
for Disease Control, the (CDC), incorporate this three-fold system of classification.
Those instruments considered critical items include anything subjected to potential
microorganism or bacterial spore contamination and a correspondingly high risk level.
Semicritical items, including everything from diaphragm-fitting rings to respiratory
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therapy and anesthesia equipment, may come into contact with a patient’s mucous
membranes or nonintact skin. By contrast, equipment and instruments that come in
contact only with intact skin and no moist tissue, such as mucous membranes, are
designated as non-critical, inasmuch as the large majority of microorganisms cannot
penetrate the unbreached epidermis. Such noncritical equipment would include, the ICU
surroundings consisting of furniture, curtains, bed rails, linens, and floors, as well as
those items the come into bodily contact in the way that crutches, blood-pressure cuffs,
and bedpan do.22
Chapter 6.A.2.ii.c. Sterilization Procedures
Sufficient heat, frequently by means of steam, is the most efficient method of
sterilization for healthcare institutions, given the heat tolerance and stability of most
equipment in need of the process. On the other hand, cost saving and other trends over
the last six or seven decades have led to a growing segment of the medical device and
instrument arsenal that cannot tolerate high-temperature sterilization and therefore
necessitates a low-temperature equivalent. One such alternative is ethylene oxide gas,
effective for medical devices sensitive to both heat and moisture. More recently, the
following processes: 1) hydrogen peroxide gas plasma, 2) peracetic acid immersion, and
3) ozone have been engineered and proven effective in the sterilization of medical
devices. The following portion of this sub-section analyzes various procedures for
sterilization as currently used in the fields of medicine and healthcare with the goal of
identifying their optimum usage in the effort to forestall the contamination of medical
devices leading to medical errors.23

339

The purpose of sterilization is to eradicate all living organisms from the treated
implement or surface, among the most dangerous of which are staph infections.24
Sterilization destroys all microorganisms on the surface of an article or in a fluid with the
goal of eliminating any risk of disease transmission through the use of the sterilized item
in treating a patient. Although common sense dictates that inadequate sterilization creates
a decisive risk of pathogenic infection, the documentation of such occurrences is
extremely sparse. While a wide variety sterilization methods are in use, the present
discussion focuses on the two most common, namely steam sterilization and ethylene
oxide or "gas" sterilization (ETO).25
As a form of moist heat, saturated pressurized has a multiplicity of advantages,
leading to its frequency and recommendation as the first choice for sterilization wherever
feasible; these advantages include: 1) dependability, 2) low cost, 3) nontoxicity, 4) rapid
and thorough killing of microorganisms and spores, and 5) rapid heating and penetration
of fabric. These properties make sterilization by steam advisable for treating anything
that tolerates high temperatures and moisture, such as respiratory therapy and anesthesia
equipment, even when doing so would not be strictly necessary for preventing pathogen
transmission. This process, over a longer time frame, can even be used in the
decontamination of microbiological waste. Four parameters are required for steam
sterilization to be effective, namely sufficient steam, pressure, temperature, and time of
exposure.26
The other widely utilized sterilization technique is ethylene oxide "gas"
sterilization (ETO). Inasmuch as this gas is a colorless gas, as well as both flammable
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and explosive, its use by hospitals and other healthcare institutions is generally confined
to sterilizing moisture or heat sensitive equipment and implements the complete
decontamination of which is semi-critical or critical.27
One of the innovations within the medical field in recent decades has been the
inception of single-use medical implements, which substitute the costs, problems, and
risks of waste disposal for those of disinfection or sterilization and reuse; these should,
however, be utilized whenever appropriate. Infections fall within the scope of medical
errors as unintended and largely preventable harmful consequences, constituting a
foreseeable adverse event of elevated consequences in the hospital ICU and a legal
responsibility to prevent to the extent possible. Just as any medical device or piece of
equipment may become recontaminated as easily as it became contaminated before
sterilization, infection control and prevention must be a coordinated endeavor by the
entire medical facility, rather than merely the task of the sterilization processing unit or
staff. Comprehensive guidance for cleaning, disinfecting, and sterilizing of medical
devices and equipment is contained in the MAC Manual of the Medicines and Healthcare
Products Regulatory Agency.28
Chapter 6.A.2.iii. Investigative and Evaluative Procedures
Chapter 6.A.2.iii.a. The Basic Concept of Checklists
Like airline pilots, doctors must work with sophisticated equipment under
circumstances that can evolve rapidly in terms of the source of the threat and the degree
of the hazard. While safety in both professions is an absolute, cost containment is always
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a potentially conflicting priority.29 In recent years, a number of medical institutions have
been able to reduce error rates noticeably by imitating the adopting investigative and
evaluative procedures comparable with those used by the Federal Aviation
Administration’s policies and procedures for monitoring prior to and investigating in the
wake of adverse incidents. A powerful tool for error reduction or elimination, developed
in the fields of aviation, aeronautics, and product manufacturing, now becoming
increasingly utilized in the field of medicine is the checklist. Its spread as a tool is
predictable in that just as in the other fields safety and precision are uncompromising
standards in the delivery of services, and given that lives are at stake, errors are
unacceptable even when unavoidable.30 Conceptually, checklists may assume the format
of a list of: 1) factors, properties, or aspects to consider; 2) components or dimensions of
tasks; or 3) criteria or decision trees for decision-making.31 Checklists are distinct from
cognitive aids in that they lack the informality and ambiguity of a posted note or the
proverbial string around one’s finger; they differ from the protocol in that they normally
do not mandate the completion of specified tasks leading to predetermined outcomes.
Thus, checklists give guidance, organizing sub-tasks and routines, providing verification
of completion, but not specifying the end result. According to Hales and Pronovost,
“Checklists can have several objectives, including memory recall, standardization and
regulation of processes or methodologies, providing a framework for evaluations or as a
diagnostic tool.”32 Checklists are designed with the goal of preventing potential errors
which would otherwise occur due to oversight or omission of necessary procedure or
action by preventing or else catching the omission and rectifying it prior to any damage
or injury.33 The routine use of checklists facilitates and preserves the qualities of
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precision, focus, clarity, and memory recall in the performance of tasks whether routine
or otherwise and by those on all levels of medical staff; their use has proved particularly
effective in preventing errors under conditions of elevated stress.34
Chapter 6.A.2.iii.b. The Effects of Checklists in the ICU
Yet another area in which healthcare institutions are adopting successful practices
in aviation is in the organization and deployment of crews or, in the case of medical
facilities such as ICUs, teams. Promising as this apparently analogous situation seems,
the theories and approaches of checklist implementation and error management have to
date been incompletely adapted or implemented at best, and not without reason. Unlike
flight processes which deal with the operation of machines, inherent factors in healthcare
and medicine, such as the unpredictability of the human body in the course of illness,
injury, and recuperation, make the rigid standardization in the use of checklist
unfeasible.35 Nonetheless, there has been some slow movement toward the adoption of
checklists in the critical care branch of medicine, albeit adapted to fit the complexities
and uniqueness of this environment, with moreover, some indication of beneficial
outcomes. One investigation involving the medical-surgical ICU tertiary care units at two
teaching hospitals report that some 80% of the nurses felt that the adoption of checklist
procedures had enhanced the quality of patient end-of-life care, including when it
involved the withdrawal of life support. More objectively, the study found that a
significantly smaller number of patients were subjected to inappropriate resuscitation or
comfort medications during the final 12-hour period of their lives.36
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Chapter 6.A.2.iv. Reorganizing the Medical Team in the Hospital ICU
By fundamentally rethinking their medical staffing and task allocation
approaches, various hospital ICU departments have implemented creative and effective
models of staffing, with the result being an increase in teamwork and a corresponding
decrease in the dependence on isolated individual specialist to independently select and
implement steps in the treatment process.37
Chapter 6.A.2.iv.a. The Effects of Teamwork in the Hospital ICU
Manser defines teams as consisting of “Two or more individuals who work
together to achieve specified and shared goals, have task-specific competencies and
specialized work roles, use shared resources, and communicate to coordinate and to adapt
to change. Compared with teams in other industries, medical teams especially in the
dynamic domains of healthcare such as operating rooms, intensive care, emergency
medicine, or trauma and resuscitation teams.”38 These changes in conceptualization have
increased the responsibilities of professional medical staff members at all levels, have
reduced the clarity of boundaries between professionals, and have increased the
interdependence and correspondingly the collaboration among the medical professionals,
as well as that of others in support and managerial position. On the other hand, all of
these theoretically positive outcomes are inherently linked to an increased risk of
interdisciplinary communication failure, often leading to consequences potentially more
disastrous than with the previous paradigm. While surgeons had been at the forefront of
this teamwork approach and touted it as quite effective, their teams were invariably
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strictly hierarchical with themselves as the individual authoritative leaders, such would
and could not be the structure of the multidisciplinary team.39
Wheelan et al. assert that physicians, nurses, and even support personnel do not
receive anything close to adequate training in team building and teamwork skills although
doing so would be extremely beneficial to healthcare facilities and to patients alike, even
if accomplished in the form of in-service training. Furthermore, access to assistance from
professional consultants would be very useful when problems arise, yet only a small
fraction of facilities have this resource available. Improved patient outcomes and higher
quality work environments for healthcare staff are inherently connected, explicit goals of
the healthcare industry, and achievable through the development and fostering of
supportive, productive healthcare teams.40 Among the benefits claimed for teamwork
from an administration perspective better teamwork: 1) reduces costs, 2) reduced staff
turnover and absenteeism, 3) diminishes interstaff conflict, 4) increases the level of
quality care, 5) bolsters staff motivation, and 6) improves patient outcomes. All these
benefits stem from improving the psychological health and well being of the healthcare
staff. Concomitantly, stress decreases while greater effectiveness and innovation bloom
wherever a team of healthcare professionals are working harmoniously.41
The first step in evaluating the quality and effectiveness of teamwork i n specific
situations is to identify, in general, behaviors and characteristics which form the
foundation of efficacious teamwork, interrelate to constitute successful clinical
performance, and finally manifest themselves in positives outcomes for the patient.
Measuring tools or instruments for the assessment of teamwork competencies and
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processes are neither new nor unique to the field of medicine, and has been promulgated
throughout the research literature. As in other fields, in this process of measuring and
assessing teamwork in the care and treatment of patients, attention must be devoted to
ascertaining the degree to which these skills and processes must be adapted or
individually prioritized in defining what is effective teamwork in individual
circumstances, such as a hospital ICU.42 Asserting that potential performance indicators
in the ICU include level of available technology, case mix, nurse staffing and patient
ratios, and caregiver interaction, Rafferty et al. proceeded to test the hypothesis that each
was related directly to quality of care. In order to do so, the author further defines
caregiver interaction as being an amalgamation of five different aspects, namely: 1)
culture, in its manifestations as the shared norms, beliefs and expectations of a particular
group; 2) leadership, as displayed by the medical practitioners involved with the case; 3)
coordination, not only ICU internal, but also with other acute care units of the hospital; 4)
communication between all of the aforementioned parties; and 5) management of the
conflicts that inevitably arise. Given the complexities of the ICU setting, Rafferty singled
out communication for special in-depth analysis.43
Chapter 6.A.2.iv.b. Teamwork and Patient Outcomes in the Hospital ICU
The value of proper teamwork in promoting productivity has been established in
many in the work environment is universally recognized throughout the public and
private sectors, whether for profit or nonprofit. Despite this conclusion, to date the
relationship between teamwork among healthcare professionals and patient outcomes
remains unclear. Wheelan et al. report the existence of apparently contradictory finding
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from various studies as to whether patient outcomes were impacted positively or not at all
by how well the staff members attending the patients worked as a team.44 One recently
published study does conclude that the lack of or poorly coordinated management of staff
likely contributes to a dominant percentage of adverse events experienced by patients. 45
In many hospital ICUs, effective communication and teamwork between doctors and
other healthcare staff members is advocated as a means of enhancing the care that
patients receive. Ideally, such coordination and teamwork lead to more complete
information which becomes the foundation of better decision-making. The collaboration
needed to achieve this was defined as physicians and nurses sharing the task of problem
solving in making decisions in selecting the optimal plan for patient treatment and care,
as well as implementing that plan.46
Chapter 6.B. Communication Protocols in the Hospital ICU
Just as communication which is clear, accurate, and timely is a necessity in
preempting the occurrence of a medical error, it is equally essential in dealing with and
minimizing the harmful consequences of an error.47 Although physicians must prepare
themselves to be medical experts through rigorous education, extensive both in scope and
depth, all this training includes scant attention to the development of communications
skills.48 In spite of this omission, the physician in clinical practice is faced with the near
constant demand to utilize these skills at an extremely high level of proficiency in dealing
with not just colleagues, other medical professionals, and staff members, but also with
patients and family members, not to mention facility administrators, insurance
representatives, and government agency bureaucrats. All of these interactions take on
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heightened requirements for communicative proficiency when a medical error is
involved.49 The consequences of mistakes in communicating, not only yet particularly in
the ICU, but also throughout the medical institution and its dealing with outside entities,
can be catastrophic to the point of irreparably harming or end careers or exponentially
increasing the costs of dealing with a medical error.50 To their credit, the large majority
of physicians comprehend the dangers of ineffective or inappropriate communication, yet
with equal frequency, they lack the time or the motivation to take action to improve their
communication skills.51 At its most simplistic description, effective communication
means assuring that the substance of the message being sent equals that of one being
received; nonetheless, many factors can impede this ideal.52 Bypassing a theoretical
analysis of these impediments and bringing the discussion to a practical level, hospital
administrations must focus their efforts on fundamentally revising both external and
internal communications protocols, well beyond measures such as extending the use of
informed consent paperwork or building more extensive networks of internal
communication between the medical professionals, administrators, and support
personnel.53 The following section will divide the topic of communication into two parts,
namely internal communications and external communications.
Chapter 6.B.1. Internal Communication
Adverse events, whether on not properly classified as medical errors, are often
discovered to have had faulty communication among those medical professionals
involved in critical care as a contributing factor. Research is now being directed toward
the goal of isolating those features of effective communication, which will assist in
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protecting against and preventing medical errors.54 Poor communication is a
multidimensional problem, one of the most fundamental aspects of which is the
divergence of the way doctors and nurses communicate according to their respective
medical training regimens.55 Baggs et al. reports on several studies as conducted by
Knaus et al, on one hand and Shortell et al on the other compared 13 ICUs and
established differences in the ratio of actual to predicted mortality, after controlling for
severity of illness. The former group of researchers developed an instrument they named
the Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation (APACHE) and used it to measure
differences in the ICUs of 13 hospitals between the proportions of predicted fatalities and
those which actually occurred. Kraus et al found that the interaction and coordination
among staff members, basically measuring the same phenomenon the other investigators
have labelled collaboration, proved to be the crucial determinant in the cases studies.
Subsequently, the latter group of researchers, Shortell et al, expanded the study to include
data from some 42 hospital ICUs analyzing the influences of a collection of variables
related to communication and coordination, which these investigators conflated in a
collective group which they labelled, "caregiver interaction.” While this group of
researchers could not make definitive conclusions concerning their chosen variable and
long term or overall risk-adjusted survival, they did uncover a positive correlation
between caregiver interaction and the shorter risk-adjusted duration of a patient’s stay in
the ICU. Moreover, Shortell et al. determined based on this study that positive
organizational characteristics, such as communication and collaborative problem solving,
lead to better ICU care.56
The characteristics and components of team communications which facilitate or
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inhibit effective teamwork have been the subject of significant research, not only for the
purpose of analysis, but also for the development of training in the appropriate skills.
Specifically focusing on the ICU, a number of studies have identified neglect or
misunderstandings in inter-team communication as a frequent causal contributor to
medical errors; nonetheless, this relationship has been far less explored, analyzed, or
understood in comparison to the work that has been accomplished in other equally highrisk field of endeavor where stress levels can be intense, the pace fast and the course of
activity rapidly and unpredictably changing, the stakes high, and safety paramount.57
Ironically, while the need for effective, error-free communication and teamwork would
be universally acknowledged, systematic efforts to provide formal training and to
evaluate their quality in practice have been severely lacking.58 In one of the most
extensive human factors investigations of error in the ICU, According to Donchin et al. in
possibly the most thorough studies to date of human factors which precipitate medical
errors, the communications between doctors and nurses in the ICU constituted merely 2%
of the activities which each were engaged in during the course of their work in the unit;
on the other hand, this 2% was involved in approximately 33% of medical errors
detected. Undoubtedly, communication skills in the ICU are an integral part of ensuring
safety and quality patient care. Other research has demonstrated a correlation between
greater degrees of collaboration between doctors and nurses and decreases in both patient
mortality and average length of stay in the ICU.59
A clear prerequisite to creating training and assessment mechanisms for
enhancing teamwork in the ICU is an in-depth understanding of the process and an
identification of the precise communication skills critical to preserving patient safety.60
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Crew resource management (CRM) is an example of one such communications tool,
which since its adoption in the aviation industry in 1979 has experienced success in
reducing the frequency of accidents caused at least in part by human factors, especially in
time-sensitive critical situations similar to those involving interdisciplinary teams in the
ICU. The CRM approach concentrates on upgrading the safety of systems, eschewing
individual culpability while employing standardized communication tools to ensure
safety. Despite the similar challenges faced in the fields of aviation and medicine, CRM
has yet to prove its effectiveness in terms of patient safety and outcomes. Although some
earlier thorough surveys of the published literature had failed to demonstrate any
significant relationship, some more recent research into the use of CRM and improved
patient outcomes is beginning to suggest a positive correlation.61
Chapter 6.B.2. External Communication
While modern medicine, with its technological advances and multidisciplinary
focus, has improved patients’ health and extended their lives, it has typically done so at a
cost to their psychological well-being. In contrast the traditional doctor-patient
relationship, many a patient today senses that medical professionals see him or her as
merely as set of data based on test results, rather that taking an interest in him or her as a
human being.62 In this environment, the National Patient Safety Foundation exhorts
medical professionals on all levels to be forthright, candid, and compassionate disclosing
and explaining medical errors to patients and family members.63 Each doctor-patient
relationship is unique; time and effort are needed to build it, in part because of physical
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and psychological influence its character will have when injury or illness impacts the
patient’s life.64
While circumstances requiring the conveyance of unpleasant or negative
information occurs throughout the field of medicine, sensitivity or lack thereof in sharing
such news can all the difference in how it is handled by receiving patients and family
members. Increased psychological trauma, inhibited coping mechanisms, denial, anger,
and the elevated tendency to pursue legal redress are all predictable responses.
Contributing to the problem, the situation is typically stressful for many physicians
themselves, as they lack effective training in how to handle such situations, and may
thereby do or say something that aggravates the situation.65 Even from the point of
preliminary diagnosis, the patient must deal with the stress of uncertainty.66 In recent
years, an acknowledgement of the significance and gravity of such communication has
grown, and with it an understanding of the need to incorporate appropriate skills into
undergraduate and postgraduate medical education curriculum. Bad news poorly
communicated stimulates confusion, extended stress, and ultimately resentment; in
contrast to the understanding, acceptance, and adjustment fostered by handling the same
information with sensitivity. To be effective, communications training for medical
professionals must adhere to sound educational approaches and be evidence-based, as
well as supported by adequate monitoring, coaching, and practice.67 In conveying
unpleasant information, the physician must be aware of current aspects of the cultural
climate, such as the predominance of and comfort level with electronic communication,
which among other things constantly surrounds people with one report after another of
suffering and death.68
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Chapter 6.C. Medication Protocols in the Hospital ICU
One of the most significant categories of medical error, in the ICU as in other
hospital departments, is that of medication errors.69 In the ICU environment, medication
errors are most common at the stage of finally administering the substance prescribed,
outnumbering all other types of errors and adverse events.70 Implied by investigations of
their root causes is the conclusion that systemic flaws in the training, communications,
monitoring, and implementation of protocols by staff members are core contributing
factors.71 Further complicating the process of analyzing and combating these systemic
errors is their possible source in the sequential accumulation of various individual errors,
each with a distinct ultimate cause.72 In order to have any prospect for prevention or
minimization, the analysis and evaluation must sort out and as far as possible isolate all
these causes which may trace back to the initial diagnosis of the original illness or injury,
likely involving environments outside the ICU.73 The subsequent section endeavors to
explain strategies recently promulgated in an effort to prevent medication errors in the
ICU; these include 1) the implementation of computerized physician order entry; 2) the
elimination of extended work by individual physicians; and 3) the participation of
pharmacists in hospital rounds.
Chapter 6.C.1. Computerized Physician Order Entry
Estimates by the Institute of Medicine suggest a rate of medication errors in
hospital setting as high as one error per patient per day, based on their 1999 report, which
documented 7,000 fatalities connected to medication errors. Since then, electronic
prescription, such as Computerized Physician Order Entry (CPOE) systems, have come
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into wide use and are endorsed by the British Department of Health as having proven to
reduce the likelihood of medication errors.74 The CPOE functions as the cornerstone for
clinical information systems; by permitting doctors to input their prescriptions
electronically, the system saves the professional’s time, reduces the potential for
misreading handwriting, and allows the computerized system to provide real-time
recommendations to the physician concerning dosage, potential multiple drug
interactions, and any duplication of medication, all in time to catch medication errors
before administration of the drug.75
While these systems have frequently been successfully incorporated into the
routine of healthcare institutions, just as many have failed or caused enormous problems,
including: 1) significant implementation delays, 2) chaotic transitions, 3) cost overruns,
and 4) threatened work actions by staff members or groups hostile to the systems. This
last problem of human opposition can be explained in part by: 1) changes in work
routines necessitated by implementation of the system, 2) shifts in roles among of the
members of the care team, 3) the need for retraining, and 4) conflicts with institutional
policies.76 Despite the negative experiences many institutions have had, benefits from
successful implementation of CPOE are unassailable, and include the virtual elimination
of lost, delayed, overdue, and ambiguous orders, all by directly inputting the initial
prescription order into a computer database. The automation inherent in a CPOE system
ensure automatic: 1) orders for routine procedures, such as heparin-flush orders for
intermittent injection sites; 2) stop orders, such as for prophylactic antibiotic treatments;
3) monitoring to prevent order duplication; and 4) reduction in time lapses in filling drug
orders.77
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Camire et al. report on a study done by Shulman, et al. which analyzed, “The rate
of medication errors before and after institution of computerized physician order entry
without decision support in their 22-bed multisystem ICU. A pharmacist prospectively
identified medication errors during prescription review over 26 days of data collection.
Following the introduction of computerized physician order entry, the proportion of
prescriptions with errors decreased from 6.7% to 4.8%.”78
Chapter 6.C.2. Elimination of Extended Physician Work
As with all other human beings, physicians, nurses, and all other care staff feel the
effects of excessive workloads and long working shifts, resulting in fatigue and sleep
deprivation and leading to vulnerability to making mistakes. Though often thought of as
unavoidable in healthcare, such administrative staffing is not a necessity but rather a
short-sighted mistake with negative consequences for the safety of medical professionals
and patients alike.79 Medical professionals in this country, regardless of level of training
and expertise, are typically required to work longer both by hours per week and by length
of shift than considered safe or allowed by law in equally hazardous environments such
as transportation or nuclear power. Similarly mandated limits in the fields medicine and
healthcare would reduce the dangerously high risk to patients, given that institution and
facilities are highly motivated to contain soaring medical costs by scheduling long shifts
and much overtime.80
Among the sparse efforts to date to curb the practice of overworking staff at
medical facilities, New York is the sole state to mandate a limit on working hours during
residency, along with increased residency supervision. Among its 27 committees
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overseeing residency program review, the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical
Education (ACGME) has a mixed record in terms of setting standards for work hours, oncall rotations, and time off; moreover, from one specialization to another, the variation in
these standards is great vary widely among specialties. For instance, while strict limits of
60 hours per week hold for emergency medicine, no such limits or even
recommendations exist for pediatrics, or for obstetrics and gynecology, the former of
which can be as unpredictable, critical, and stress inducing as can emergency medicine.81
Landrignn et al. found a positive correlation between hospital interns regularly
working shifts equal to or in excess of 24 hours and a substantially higher rate of
behaviors leading to serious medical errors, as opposed to period of time when these
interns were responsible for significantly shorter shifts. Clearly, the authors conclude,
abolishing these shifts of extended duration, along with reducing the total number of
hours that any given intern works in a week has the potential to precipitate a noticeable
decrease in serious medical errors occurring in the hospital ICU.82 Moreover, Camire, et
al. report on a recent study comparing the clinical work schedules of interns with their
propensity for making medication errors. The research compared two groups of interns,
one of which averaged 77–81 hours a week, a traditional clinical schedule, while the
other averaged a lesser 60–63 hours a week, which furthermore, capped the number of
hours that could be worked at a stretch to 16. The results for the group of interns whose
hours were limited was a 17.3% lower rate of serious medication errors, specifically a
rate of 82.5 errors per 1000 patient-days, rather than the 99.7 errors reported by those
working a more traditional schedule. Nor was this reduction limited to interns in the ICU,
but was similarly seen across hospital units.83
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Chapter 6.C.3. Participation of Pharmacists in ICU Rounds
One of the root causes of medication errors is the absence of critical information,
both about the drug and about the patient, at the point of selecting a particular medication
as treatment. Given that the pharmacist is the professional whose expertise includes
knowing what information is needed to accurately evaluate a proposed regimen of
medicine, having that individual on hand as a part of the team conducting patient rounds
can forestall many adverse drug events (ADEs).84 Research data documents cases of
pharmacists preventing medication errors which would otherwise have occurred in the
hospital ICU, as well as giving advice that lead to lowering medication costs.
Traditionally, due to the accepted communications paradigm, pharmacists merely
responded to prescriptions made by physicians without interaction and without critical
knowledge of the patient and in the ICU, unlike in outpatient circumstances, without the
opportunity to at least meet the patient and ask crucial questions. Ideally, the
pharmacist’s expertise would prove most efficient and error preventing if it were
available at the point of decision-making.85
Supporting the value of immediate input from pharmacists, one of the studies
mentioned above, demonstrated a 66% reduction in the occurrence of adverse drug events
when a pharmacist participated directly in ICU medical rounds.86 Camire, et al. also
report on another study, which investigated the effects of having pharmacists participate
in ICU hospital rounds. In this study, the author gathered data on the incidence of adverse
drug events in an ICU prior and subsequent to having pharmacists involved, using a
coronary care unit of the hospital in which no pharmacists were involved as a control for
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the comparison. While the control unit reported the rate of adverse drug events
statistically unchanged, the group into which pharmacists were incorporated saw a 66%
decrease in the rate, dropping from 10.4 to 3.5 events per 1000 patient-days. Supporting
the contention that such collaboration between medical professionals is feasible, the
researchers documented a 99% acceptance rate of pharmacists’ advice by attending
physicians over the course of the nine month study. Such participation is not a unique
innovation of this study; both the Society of Critical Care Medicine and the American
College of Clinical Pharmacy have been advocated just such pharmacist participation in
hospital rounds as part of multidisciplinary teams for some years.87
Chapter 6.D. Equipment Failure Protocols in the Hospital ICU
As medical technology and its capabilities have increased exponentially in recent
decades, the hospital ICU has become ever more reliant on complex and sophisticated
systems and equipment for the monitoring of patients, alerting of medical staff, and even
the automatic delivery of treatment. Exacerbating the potential for medical errors due to
equipment failure is the disconnect between the understanding and perspectives of onsite
ICU staff and higher levels of institutional administration, along with an across-the-board
lack of understanding of the vulnerabilities of these system and their associated risks.
Inherently, the ICU is a transcendently complex environment to start with, and the
advances in medical technology only make it more so, necessitating the absolutely
highest standards of continual vigilance.88 As a significant portion of this technology and
associated equipment is devoted to supporting the patient’s life functions so as to permit
recuperation, flawless functioning of these systems is crucial.89
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The next section includes two subsections, both focusing on errors in relation to
medical equipment and technology, namely: 1) Equipment Failure in the ICU, and 2)
Medical Equipment Maintenance in the ICU.
Chapter 6.D.1. Equipment Failure in the ICU
Inasmuch as all these sophisticated equipment and systems require expertise to
understand, maintain, and repair, equipment failure is intrinsically elusive both to
diagnose as the source of a medical error and to repair so as to prevent recurrence. It
would be stating the obvious, but needs to be emphasized, that the entire spectrum of
medical staff, supervisors, and administrators alike are far from being competent to
diagnose the causes of mechanical or electronic malfunctions beyond identifying what
errors have been produced. The resulting conundrum is that while manufacturers and
technicians have initial responsibility for control of systems so as to prevent errors before
the equipment and systems are actually in use, once they are in operation and errors can
actually occur, the technologically untrained healthcare provider has become proximately
responsible for preventing any errors from the poorly understood technology. 90 Shirley
and Bion note that, “From a total of 7525 incident reports collected over the course of
approximately 6 years, they identified 176 reports of 191 incidents relating to intrahospital transportation from 37 ICUs. Clinical management errors accounted for 61% of
the problems, and equipment failure for the remainder.”91 The speed at which medical
technology and equipment is becoming ever more complex and sophisticated only
exacerbates this trend. Paradoxically, even as medical facilities and staff grow more and
more reliant on the proper functioning of the technology, they become less and less able
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to monitor its performance or identify and fix its malfunctioning.92 Two potentially
effective measures for dealing with this problem of equipment failure and the errors it
creates, albeit at a significant additional cost, would include either having available a
sufficient quantity of backup equipment or integrating representative of the equipment
manufacturers into all stages of planning for and using the equipment.93 The growing
capability and sophistication of technology in modern healthcare, along with its ever
increasing role, necessitate that maintenance and management issues be given ever higher
priority.94
Chapter 6.D.2. Medical Equipment Maintenance in the ICU
Obviously, any use of equipment in the ICU requires prior testing out on site.95
Subsequently, proper maintenance is essential to continued delivery of quality, error free
patient care, given that poor maintenance, planning, and management are the most likely
root causes of adverse events involving equipment. One remedy consists of employing
computerized maintenance management systems (CMMS), which can provide an
abundance of relevant data for both maintenance, analysis, and long term planning.
Utilizing CMMS can be crucial for managers and engineers, who must both respond
quickly to issues and plan in order to forestall future problems.96
According to Taghipour et al., “The ever-increasing number and complexity of
medical devices demands that hospitals establish and regulate a Medical Equipment
Management Program (MEMP) to ensure that critical devices are safe and reliable and
that they operate at the required level of performance. As fundamental aspects of this
program inspection, preventive maintenance, and testing of medical equipment should be
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reviewed continuously to keep up with today’s technological improvements and the
increasing expectations of healthcare organizations.”97 The authors further describe the
World Health Organization’s (WHO) four-category classification system for essential
medical equipment, based on delivery of specific types of health services, namely: 1)
diagnostic imaging equipment, 2) laboratory equipment, 3) general electro-medical
equipment, and 4) other support equipment.98 Recently, the clinical engineering
departments of hospital as far apart as the entire United States, Australia, and Canada
have come to view simply adhering to the recommendations of medical equipment
manufacturers as insufficient and have pursued a variety of maintenance strategies aimed
not only at reducing errors, but also at being simultaneously more efficient and costeffective.99 According to Taghipour “Ridgway provide concise guidelines for
maintenance management of medical equipment and address methods which have been
used for a long time in other industry segments, such as Reliability Centered Maintenance
(RCM). RCM is a structured methodology for determining the maintenance requirement
of a physical asset in its operating context through a thorough and rigorous decision
process.”100
Chapter 6.E. System Failure Protocols in the Hospital ICU
Indisputably, areas of overlap between or among various systems whether human,
technological, or both are juncture at which the propensity for errors is elevated, and yet
is more difficult to identify and prevent or fix, given that with their complexity comes a
degree of uniqueness, frustrating attempts to create standard protocols.101 Among hospital
departments, the ICU represents perhaps the greatest confluence of interacting systems,
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possibly accounting in part for the prevalence of this type of medical error in this part of
the institution.102 System failures can either be the immediate cause of a medical error or
just as frequently the root cause; moreover, they can be due to problems as simple as
neglected maintenance of equipment or as complex as issues of ergonomics or
institutional culture of an institution.103 The following subsection will discuss: 1)
improvements in the quality of healthcare in the ICU; and 2) analysis of the causes of
errors in this department of the hospital.
Chapter 6.E.1. Improvement in Healthcare Quality in the ICU
Although quality improvement is universally acknowledged as one of the highest
priorities for healthcare institutions and facilities and has been studies regularly for over
twenty years, ascertaining which approaches are likely to prove effective is still a mystery
to be solved.104 Some trends even suggest that it is becoming more elusive. AlDoghaither contends that the shared responsibility among different doctors for individual
patient care and treatment inherently creates a propensity for disagreements based on
sincerely held professional beliefs and judgments.105 Batalden and Davidoff define
quality improvement as “the combined and unceasing efforts of everyone—healthcare
professionals, patients and their families, researchers, payers, planners and educators —
to make the changes that will lead to better patient outcomes (health), better system
performance (care) and better professional development.”106 Al-Ahmadi and Roland
assert that both internal and external forces are capable of stimulating enhancements in
the quality of care, the internal ones on the basis of systematic efforts within the system
while the external ones on the basis of public pressure.107 Groene, et al., take this
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specification further, labeling these forces in terms of healthcare industry-wide actions
aimed at improving quality and safety, including: 1) aligning organizational processes
with external pressure, 2) elevating the quality of service delivery to highest priority, 3)
developing and implementing quality support mechanisms across the organization, 4)
building teamwork throughout the institution with clear responsibilities and general
expertise in team building, 5) creating and utilizing experientially based ‘care pathways’
that focus on safety and quality of patient care, 6) restructuring information systems
according to a pathway focus, and 7) integrating feedback focused evaluation and
recommendation into routine operations.108
Given the complex interaction of the wide range of diverse and hard to quantify
variables that make up healthcare delivery, evaluating its quality in any given setting is
inherently extremely difficult. Patient satisfaction may be the best parameter for
evaluating specific aspects of healthcare. From the perspective of commerce, the degree
of patient satisfaction predicts the use of services and market share, but this assumes the
patient’s continuing need and ability to choose between providers.109 Nevertheless, levels
of patient’s satisfaction with their treatment and care have proven measurable to an extent
such that the extent to which care is patient-centered can demonstrably be identified as a
crucial component in how satisfied the patient ultimately feels. Moreover, two distinct
assessable circumstances that undermine patient satisfaction are, first, insufficient
instruction prior to hospital admission, and second, communication difficulties with the
care-giving staff. Conversely, other research has identified two factors for doctors which
lead to the greatest satisfaction, namely incorporating the patient’s opinions and wishes
into treatment and care decisions, and maintaining the highest possible levels of privacy
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for the patient. Ironically, satisfaction ratings were at their lowest when doctors explicitly
asked patients for feedback on the quality of their care and treatment, as well as about
what difficulties they were having.110 Focusing more generally on their satisfaction, AlDoghaither found that those hospital patients who receive regular checkins and updates
from their attending physicians rated their level of satisfaction twice as high on average
compared to those who did not and thus lacked a clear idea of how their treatment was
progressing.111
A related component of this sense of satisfaction is the timeliness of responses by
medical professionals and support staff to questions and concerns expressed by the
patient. The Al-Doghaither investigation reinforces this conclusion, finding a significant
correlation between how promptly requests were dealt with by doctors and whether the
patient gave a significantly higher satisfaction rating.112
In one of the more specifically focused studies, Mokhtar et al., recommend better
education of diabetic patients as part of improving the quality of their care.113 A research
investigation involving that same specific medical condition but focusing more
tangentially on satisfaction as a measure of quality in inpatient diabetic care in relation to
early hospital readmission documented the predictable correlation, namely higher quality
care and lower chances of early readmission. Although groups with strong reputations,
such as the American Diabetes Association, have promulgated guidelines for measures
known to reduce the likelihood of readmission, medical practitioners and the facilities in
which they work have been reluctant to embrace the guidelines in practice, undercutting
the effectiveness of diabetes care. As an antidote to this Hussein recommends prioritizing
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and emphasizing team building among physicians and healthcare professionals of various
specialties.114
Other indications of barriers to improving quality in patient care residing within
the perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs, and practices of medical professionals and hospital
staff have been documented in a number of research studies, Among these investigations
the use of clinical practice guidelines (CPG) ran up against resistance in the form of
survey responses among healthcare professionals indicating that only a minority agreed
with the idea that scientific evidence ought be utilized as the priority consideration
selecting a patient’s course treatment, which reveals a definite reluctance to trust and
adopt the practices of evidence-based medicine. Along the same lines of thought, a
separate study reported that both doctors and nurses, by their own admission were
dubious or skeptical of the value and importance of patient-centered care as a determinant
of the quality of medical care and treatment; in fact, fewer than 60% of respondents
thought of the concept as important to any degree. It has been hypothesized that a failure
of administrative and institutional leadership is the root cause of these attitudes. Were the
leadership in understanding of and promoting the patient-centered approach, it should
translate into commitment and support from the policy making and planning stage
onward. In contrast to these negative or discouraging attitudes, within the same surveyed
population, 97% of respondents acknowledged that CPGs are a valuable educational tool;
moreover, in excess of 90% claimed that the CPGs have value in the quest to coordinate,
standardize, and improve the quality of healthcare for patients.115
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According to Hussein, the perception of doctors and nurses differ substantially in
terms of patient safety in a given environment, with physicians giving higher ratings of
62.9 compared to that of the nurses at 56.6, which Hussein interprets as possibly a sign of
poor leadership in facilitating a culture of safety in the hospital.116 Speculating on
Hussein’s finding, Hughes notes the heavier burden of workload nurses are faced with
involving extended contact delivering patient care, frequently round the clock, and
involving more routine tasks, all of which leads to greater fatigue, and thereby the
difference in perceptions.117 According to El-Jardali et al. based on their work, and
inverse correlation exists between disclosure and communication in the wake of a
medical error, and how routine the normal activity related to the error is or how
frequently it is performed. In such cases, the authors hypothesize, the fear of
repercussions from committing an error in the context of a routine activity add to the
reluctance to report it.118 Van Geest and Cummins contend that healthcare professionals
fail in their ethics-grounded obligation to report medical errors and adverse incidents
because they experience fear, shame, or guilt, anticipating punitive measures and a
readiness on the part of administration to label someone, anyone as culpable. On a more
hopeful note, the most recent reaccreditation process for hospitals documented some
significant improvement in the way in which medical professionals communicated with
their patients with regard to safety concerns.119
Chapter 6.E.2. Root Causes Analysis
With the increasing prioritization of patient safety, analysts in the healthcare
industry have been searching for tools which will aid in uncovering system vulnerabilities
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so that they may be strengthened and monitored.120 Root cause analysis (RCA), first
promulgated in the field of psychology, and systems engineering are among those being
applied to the field of medicine and healthcare in the attempt to uncover fundamental
causal factors which account for variations in the quality of performance with regard to
healthcare delivery. Such tools have already proved successful in fields as disparate as
aviation and nuclear power by enabling systematic post hoc analysis of errors, identifying
latent potential for errors in the process.121 So far, these tools are already in use by the
healthcare services of the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).122 Root cause
analysis is rapidly becoming a well understood approach in many hospitals and
healthcare facilities and anecdotally has had success identifying various problems and in
point to potential solutions.123 In the process of addressing a medical error, the RCA team
meets on three times, first to identify known versus unknown facets of the case, second to
document established facts and to prepare to investigate those that are unknown, a flow
chart of events is developed, and third to determine the ultimate or root causes and to
make recommendations for response and future prevention, focusing on addressing
systemic weaknesses rather than individual blame.124 The three goals of the RCA are
embodied in the following fundamental questions: 1) What happened? 2) Why did it
happen? and 3) What can be done to prevent it from happening again? Root cause
analysis is quite adaptable in healthcare, useful in environments as diverse as inpatient,
outpatient, long term, acute, and even home care.125
Root cause analysis has been embraced by both the Veterans’ Administration and
the Joint Commission; the latter currently mandates an analysis of every adverse event
while the former facilities the submission of RCA reports on significant adverse events to
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the National Center for Patient Safety. As for other governmental bodies, 25 of the states
mandate that adverse events, which are intended to include medical errors, be
documented with the information forwarded to the health department of the state in
question. Both among and within organizations, the required or implemented parts of a
root cause analysis and its report may vary; for instance the VA mandates that each RCA
include recommendations as to corrective measures and a plan to monitor and ascertain
that the action taken produces its intended results. However, the follow-up to these
corrective action plans is entirely in the hands of the individual facilities. Alternatively,
the Joint Commission’s handling of the RCA involves commissioning healthcare
institutions to develop their independent criteria for what constitutes a sentinel event and
to voluntarily report any such events they uncover to the commission. Here, too, an
action plan with measurement strategy is required; moreover, in some instances, the Joint
Commission has been known to follow up on how the plan has worked out. Although,
one fifth of the states in the U.S. require root cause analysis including the development of
a plan for remedial action, the follow-up on compliance with these regulation is spotty at
best on these plans, given that the regulations vary significantly to begin with.126
Chapter 6.F. Needed Reforms and the Disclosure of Medical Error in the Hospital ICU
Under current conditions, inherent institutional barriers to the disclosure of
medical errors exist in the areas medical educational, administration, and legislation;
therefore reforms in all three of these areas are necessary to combat the rising incidence,
harms, and costs of errors. The next two subsections will discuss areas in which reforms
are needed as part of the larger quest to reduce and effectively deal with the
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consequences of medical errors in the hospital ICU. They are: 1) tort reform, in
conjunction with legislation reform, and 2) medical education reform.
Tort law refers to the body of legislation and the process it establishes for injured
patients or those acting on their behalf to pursue whatever restitution for their injury is
not already forthcoming whether in the form of “repairing” damages, to the extent
possible, or compensating for physical, emotional, and other damages or loss. Within this
legally based approach, medical errors are seen as a matter of negligence for civil
jurisprudence to handle with the goal being correcting an injustice to the victims of the
medical error. However, the increasing preponderance of opinion in the field is that the
current system fails far more than succeeds at either adequately redressing injustice or
preventing future occurrences of harm to patients.127
Chapter 6.F.1. Tort Reform
While historically, the individual doctor or attending physician was the
predominant focus of care for the patient and thereby uniquely accountable any harm
done through negligence, today health care has become an affair involving whole systems
of medical professionals and support staff, with accountability becoming an institutional
responsibility. Emblematic of this shift are the increasing numbers of physicians working
as professionals yet as employees of medical facilities, established systems of
institutional quality control, In particular, more physicians are employed, quality and
outcomes are routinely measured, and reimbursement increasing being handled according
to the consumer model of a value-based purchase.128 Tort reform has become an
expensive aggressively fought battle over the last twenty years, focusing increasingly on
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the issues of physician liability and the costs of an already exorbitantly expensive health
care system.129 To its discredit, the current system; 1) elevates administrative costs, 2)
actually discourages legitimately injured patients from using civil action to seek
compensation, 3) sets up an adversarial process with unreasonable delays and a low
probability of winning, and 4) rewards attorneys and others with no directly hand in the
initial adverse event with a more than fair share of whatever compensation is
forthcoming.130
In order to understand calls for reform, one must first understand the legal
foundations invoked when a medical error leads to litigation. Medical malpractice is
classified under tort law, civil wrongs which do not involve explicit legal contracts, and
negligence, an alleged wrongful act of commission or omission leading to injury of
another person or damage to his or her property, which the accused presumably should
have been able to avoid. In recent years, the chances of any given doctor, regardless of
specialty or practice, having an open malpractice claim against him or her was recently
reported to be 7.4%, of which 1.6% had claims resulting to a payment to the plaintiff.
Over the course of a career, by the traditional retirement age of 65, 75% of physicians in
low-risk specialties and 99% of physicians in high-risk specialties can anticipate having
faced a malpractice claim, irrespective of resolution.131 Conceptually, malpractice
liability exists in the legal system to ensure that quality healthcare and especially
treatment is equally and mutually in the interests of both health care providers and
patients by creating penalties and disincentives for poor performance leading to harm.
Thus any effort to limit liability or excessive judgments for compensation can be opposed
as reducing incentives to provide proper care and ultimately harming patients
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outcomes.132 Nonetheless, both of the two most recent U.S. presidents, Bush in 2004 and
Obama in 2009, have recommended placing limits medical malpractice liability with the
ostensible goal of keeping healthcare costs in check, thus making health insurance more
affordable and thereby raising coverage rates.133
There has been a disconnect between to stated aims of reform in terms of curbing
negligence and the ulterior motives of reducing malpractice liability premiums as
opposed to increasing patient safety.134 Unfortunately, rather than promoting ethical
behavior in reporting, disclosing, and dealing with the consequences of medical errors,
the cumulative effect of repeated rounds of tort reform has been to create and enhance a
‘conspiracy of silence’ throughout the institutional hierarchy, including the ICU.135
By contrast, the thrust of currently proposed reform measures must foster a nonpunitive atmosphere, which in turn will facilitate complete and timely reporting of and
learning from medical errors without sacrificing organizational accountability or fair
redress for those who have been harmed.136 The currently advocated tort reforms if
achieved would constitute a fourth round, subsequent to major reforms in each of the last
three decades of the 20th century.137 Legitimate tort reform has the potential to lower
excessive monetary awards, as well as curb the practice of defensive medicine. In theory,
any change that, on balance, lowers healthcare costs should raise the rates of health
insurance coverage rates, further reducing healthcare costs in general. Even before the
Affordable care act, from 1981 and 2007 reforms capping damage awards, along with
redefining collateral sources and joint-and-several liability were documented to increase
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health insurance coverage by those most sensitive to the rising cost of insurance from a
half to a whole percentage point for each such group.138
The goal and focus of legislative reform needs to be ensuring patient safety rather
than suppressing medical liability. Measures now in place which: 1) limit non-economic
damages, 2) set statutes of limitations, and 3) redefine the concept of joint and several
liability are all are due for reevaluation from the perspective of prioritizing patient safety.
In addition, upgrading the standards for qualification as an expert witness in litigation and
ongoing oversight of trends in health insurance industry should help to preserve justice
and ethical treatment for side involved in litigation in the wake of a medical error.139
Other supportive steps of reform to be recommended include: 1) further revision of payfor-performance incentives, which will ultimately support litigation reform, 2) revising
the Medicare system for greater efficiency and effectiveness, which will help avoid
medical errors while rapidly, comprehensively, and compassionately responding
whenever preventable errors have occurred.140
Avraham and Schanzenbach report on a 2002 conclusion by the Department of
Health and Human Services, which argues for curbing unreasonably high monetary
judgments for non-economic damages in civil suits, claiming that doing so would create a
savings of between 5%–9% of nationwide healthcare costs, thereby enabling somewhere
between 2.4 and 4.3 million Americans who could not at the time afford to do so to
obtain health insurance. A number of interest groups, such as the national association of
health insurance providers, working under the name, America's Health Insurance Plans
(AHIP), have been advocating for tort reform, on a platform asserting that defensive

372

medicine and litigation costs add approximately 9% to the growing costs of health
insurance premiums. Furthermore, despite the obvious increase in availability and
affordability subsequently brought about through the Affordable Care Act of 2010, the
potential savings and benefits of tort reform remain unchanged.141
Other studies on the consequences of tort reforms have concentrated on how
reforms have influences award payments. This body of literature supports the conclusion
that capping the award levels for noneconomic damages has led to a reduction in the
amounts of payments to plaintiffs in cases for which juries had exceeded such limits in
determining the value of non-economic damages. Although predictable, these findings
confirm that caps can be effectively established and adhered to in trial law.142
Furthermore, Gilmour reports that tort reform has typically included, in addition
to capping damage awards: 1) offsetting payments from collateral sources, 2) placing
limits on legal fees for plaintiff representation, 3) setting periodic payments of damages
either on a discretionary or mandatory basis, 4) restricting the manner in which damages
are labelled in relation to joint and several liability, and 5) raising the criteria for
qualification as an expert witness.143 Looking back historically, Stamm et al. classify
reforms into two generations, namely first-generation measures, which aim by direct
means to decrease the number of malpractice claims and to reduce the levels of
settlements, and second-generation malpractice reforms which are currently being
experimented with in pilot programs at individual health care facilities and systems and
whose measures are more varied and less direct. The former group have resorted to: 1)
monetary caps on malpractice awards, 2) shortening of the statutes of limitation, 3)
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pretrial screening, and 4) eliminating rules concerning joint and several liability. Such
reforms have been in effect long enough for significant research literature to document
their impact, albeit inconclusively. For example, according to Stamm et al., “There is also
good evidence that noneconomic caps reduce malpractice claim volume and payment
amounts by 20%-30%. 11 Much less literature is available describing the impact of these
early measures on patient-centered outcomes, such as access to care and patient
safety.”144 The latter group, Stamm et al’s second generation of malpractice reforms,
tends to employ concepts such as schedules of noneconomic damages, health courts,
along with mandated or voluntary communication procedures and resolution programs,
among other ideas.
All such attempts tort reform share two common characteristics; first, their
primary aim is reduce the costs of malpractice litigation and in particular the amounts of
monetary awards, and second, they have unfortunately created a significant impediments
to the ability of injured patients, along with their families, to establish which parties were
negligent and thus liable, making rightful compensation harder to obtain.145
Chapter 6.F.2. Education Reform
The first step in educational reform is to integrate explicit training in preventing,
minimizing the effects of, and handling medical errors into the curricula of medicine and
nursing schools, a primary educational objective of which must be instilling a
commitment to behaving in accordance with the principles of biomedical ethics in
dealing with all types of errors.146
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The call for adding to the curriculum of professional medical training is not at all
a new phenomenon. At various points in its history, medical education in the United
States has expanded from a pre-World War I undergraduate medical education,
specifically at a medical school leading to the MD degree to a post-war realization that
the rapid increase of knowledge, techniques, and practices necessitated further clinical
training in the form of the internship and later the residency before commencing general
practice. Further expansion of medical education was called for at that time to prepare
individuals who wished to pursue a clinical specialty or take up medical research.147
Thus, the call for various extensions of medical education made in this analysis, are not
without precedent.
Subsequent to the 1999 report by the Institute of Medicine (IOM), the body of
professional literature concerning medical errors and patient safety in general has
expanded exponentially; however, while frequently advocated in these publications,
reports on efforts to educate future medical professionals in this regard are not to be
found.148 Among the IOM recommendations for improving patient safety were the
following: 1) voluntary error reporting, 2) re-evaluating the design of safety systems, 3)
revising and implementing these enhanced designs, and 4) setting out clear standards for
healthcare professionals with regard to safety, many aspects of which specifically focus
on both preparatory and continuing education of medical and health care professionals.
The report implies that these avenues of improvement have a profound ability to
beneficially alter the flaws in current practice and advocates the creation of broadly focus
programs promoting patient safety in order to accomplish this. Overall, the IOM report
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advocated coordinated efforts to raise both standards and expectations in terms of
prioritizing, monitoring, and ensuring patient safety.149
According to Halbach, while legislators and agencies at various levels of
government, along with NGOs, such as the National Patient Safety Goals of the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations and the Leapfrog Group
relating to the field of healthcare have exerted considerable effort toward reforms aimed
at curbing unsafe practices at healthcare institutions and the medical errors they lead to,
the research literature appears to indicate a distinct lack of attention being paid to
educating medical students and other healthcare professionals in best practices for
prioritizing and maintaining the safety of patients. Reports on any efforts to incorporate
this aspect of medical care into the curriculum were conspicuously absent.150 According
to Dr. Dennis O’Leary, who at the time in 2003 served as President of the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, in testimony held by the U.S.
Senate Subcommittee on Government Affairs, “I would finally suggest that consideration
be given to a government commissioned study of the content of professional education as
it relates to patient safety. Such a report could create pressure for sufficient reforms of
medical and nursing education to permit appropriate allocations of time to systems
learning, education about the contribution of human factors to patient safety, and
interprofessional team training.”151
What reform has been achieved in medical education has been restricted nearly
exclusively to the preclinical phase of training.152 The type of reform that will positively
and significantly affect patient safety requires that provide future physicians be provided
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with the opportunity and time for meaningful interaction with patients in clinical settings,
including the in-depth study of and critical reflection on their cases.153 The results of any
effective reforms in the training of healthcare professionals must be doctors who are
prepared more that solely as experts in the theory and practice of biomedical science, but
are moreover adept at the skills of human interaction as taught in the social science
disciplines, especially when dealing with difficult situations such as medical errors.154
Halbach contends that explicit instruction in the principles and practices of patient
safety is to be mandated for many reasons, with medical error prevention quality of care
enhancement topping the list. Beyond these two reasons for integrating patient safety into
the medical school and residency curriculum, another five include: 1) the enormous
effects of medical errors on society, 2) the lagging attention of academic medicine to
patient safety issues in comparison to others in the field and in government, 3) the need
of medical schools to instill in future physicians attitudes toward disclosing and handling
errors, which align with the expectations of patients and the public, 4) the assessment of
many physicians themselves that such training in dealing with medical errors is sorely
needed, in particular with how the medical professional can cope and recover from the
psychological impact of being responsible for an error, and 5) the need to reduce the
emotional and cultural barriers in medicine to handling medical errors. Creating barriers
against these reasons for change are various attitudes and motivations, including: 1) fear
of encouraging malpractice litigation, 2) perceived threats to professional autonomy, 3)
discomfort with and reluctance to engage in practical applications of systems theory, 4) a
lack of faculty with the expertise to train in these matters, and 5) the crowded field of
worthwhile topics and needs all in competition for the attention of medical practitioners
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and educators.155 Sales asserts that three integrally related aspects of effective reform
include: 1) Medical school admissions policies, 2) academic and intellectual preparation,
and 3) professional and clinical training. Reform in the first aspect involves shifting
admissions criteria away from it over-reliance on the ability memorize facts in the natural
science as assessed in the likes of standardized test. The second aspect refers to the need
to more fully and extensively incorporate the social science framework and skills needed
for best practices in medicine into the existing preclinical medical school curricula. The
third and final aspect deals with the need, in the course of professional and clinical
training, for rising medical professionals to learn to integrate administrative, policy,
management, and research, components of clinical practice with direct patient treatment
and care. The aim here is to integrate these parts of the job in order to serve goal of
quality improvement in healthcare delivery, and not to view those activities that are not a
direct part of the physician-patient relationship as unwelcome, but unavoidable intrusions
on the care and treatment of patients.156
Overall, the U.S. system of medical education has been quite successful, adapting
to a rapidly advancing field throughout the last century. Still, the system has always
lagged behind its own ideals in terms of adequately preparing students for the rising
standards of the profession. Inasmuch as the field of modern medicine has become
incredibly complex, rapidly changing, and unprecedentedly demanding on current and
future practitioners, the need to reform medical education has taken on a corresponding
urgency.157
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Chapter 6.H. Conclusion
The topic of protocols covers a much wider scope that simply the response to
adverse events or medical errors, as dealt with in the previous chapter under the heading
of disclosure and apology. In contrast, the primary goal behind the process of establishing
protocols, from their conception, creation, and development to their implementation and
monitoring, is to eliminate wherever possible errors and adverse events. Moreover, as
complete prevention in the broader sense is not feasible, the implementation protocols is
essentially proactive seeking to decrease the frequency with which medical errors occur,
to mitigate their severity, and to undo or at least ameliorate any harm or damage they
may have caused.
The process of establishing and using protocols for the prevention of medical
errors, in the hospital intensive care unit or elsewhere, commences with prevention
planning starting with prophylaxis, which focuses on anticipating vulnerabilities to error
so as to strengthen against them and monitoring, which inherently can never be absolute
but which is becoming feasible to a much greater extent through the aid of information
technology. The avoidance of medical errors and potential adverse events necessitates the
teamwork by and increasingly larger group of medical professionals who must work
efficiently together, needing enhanced communications skill, not just in terms of the
traditional doctor-patient relationship, which requires special effort at personalization,
given the trends toward impersonalization in modern medicine. For the medical
professional, the imperative of better communication does not stop with the patient;
accurate mutual understood communication must occur with the patient’s family and
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relatives, as well as internally with other staff member, facility administrators, insurers,
and government regulators. As one of the major routine components of the care and
treatment of most patient, particularly in the hospital ICU, the process of providing
medication from prescription through administration, is uniquely vulnerable to the
occurrence of adverse events and medical errors. In general, improvements in the
administration of medication in terms of better training for and communications among
staff members, more effective monitoring, and protocols will help to significantly reduce
this vulnerability. Two promising innovations described here to combat medication errors
are computerized physician order entry (CPOE) and, specifically in the ICU, the practice
of having a pharmacist participate in patient rounds. Yet another means of preventing or
minimizing the occurrence of medical errors the root cause of which is equipment failure;
the obvious, solution is ensuring access to backup equipment although in many cases it is
not financially feasible and requires that the malfunction be detected prior to its leading
to and adverse event. A more practical solution would be to keep a representative of the
equipment’s manufacturer in touch for advice and monitoring.
Finally, this chapter has discussed at length and made recommendations
concerning three areas in which it would be possible with the correct approach to
substantially reduce the occurrence of adverse events and medical errors. These three
include 1) adopting measures to prevent system failures; 2) instituting the type of tort
reform in the judicial system through legislation that would promote adherence to the
principles of ethics and provide justice, rather than create protracted adversarial
proceedings; and 3) restructuring the system of medical education, so as to prepare future
physicians and other medical professional to be more effective communicators and to
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handle medical errors, whenever they happen, according to the highest standards and
principles of biomedical ethics. Reforms in these areas, while they cannot be
accomplished through protocols per se, will significantly assist in lowering the rate of
medical errors across the board in the field of medicine, not just in the ICU, all of which
ultimately is the purpose behind this chapter.
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Chapter 7. Conclusion
The very facts that humans are fallible and that they are integrally involved in the
delivery of healthcare and medical treatment guarantee that medical errors will occur
despite the best of training, skills and vigilance, precautions, or preventive procedures.
The analysis presented in this dissertation makes this conclusion clear and that,
furthermore, the fast paced development of innovative medical techniques and
procedures, along with evermore sophisticated technology only intensifies the risks and
multiplies the opportunities for adverse medical events.
While medical errors occur across the spectrum of care and treatment, the
propensity for their occurrence and the severity of the damage they are likely to inflict are
undeniably greatest in the hospital intensive care unit (ICU). Through the chapters of this
dissertation, the research and analysis has provided the following: 1) a detailed account,
to the extent that it has been documented, of the high frequency of errors occurring in the
U.S. in general and specifically in hospital intensive care units, as well as the range and
extent of the harm done to patients and family members, both physically and financially;
2) a classification and analysis of the proximate, intermediate and ultimate causes of and
contributing factors to medical errors, which in addition to identifying causation has
formed the basis for this dissertation’s recommendations aimed at developing procedures
and protocols to effectively reduce errors to the greatest degree possible while
minimizing their harmful impact; 3) an in-depth analysis of expectations, grounded in
biomedical ethics, for dealing with the consequences of medical errors including
disclosure and communication, the expectations of patients and family members, the
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attitudes and concerns of medical professionals, the disconnect between these two
groups, and recommendations for procedures and protocols to ensure prompt, complete,
and just handling of all consequences of the error; 4) an in-depth framework, based on
Western religious and cultural foundations, for both those responsible for and those
injured by medical errors to interact in handling the consequences of the error, as well as
all of the communication which it engenders; and 5) proposals for numerous procedures
and protocols, both for lessening the vulnerability of hospital ICU patients to suffering
the effects of an error and for addressing and counteracting the variety of systemic
problems which create or heighten the propensity for the occurrence of medical errors.
It is the contention of this dissertation that biomedical ethics, no matter what
philosophical foundation serves as its basis, demands that nothing less than continual
vigilance to anticipate and forestall the occurrence of even the most minor or errors, be
justifiable. This stand insists on every effort being made to plan for prevention, including
training, monitoring, procedures and protocols, along with the incorporation of
technology directed at prevention and the prior establishment of protocols for dealing
with errors once they are discovered. Furthermore, in the event of a medical error, the
only acceptable course of action is complete and honest disclosure to the patient and all
other relevant stakeholders of the error and its consequences, both real and potential. In
keeping with the principles of biomedical ethics, the key necessities for such disclosure
include: 1) explaining the circumstances leading to the error in layperson’s terms, 2)
describing both the real and potential consequences of the error, 3) accepting
responsibility for the error, either personally or on behalf of the institution and
individuals responsible, as appropriate 4) presenting a proposed course of action and
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alternatives if appropriate to ameliorate, and to the extent possible, to reverse the negative
effects of the error; and 5) proposing equitable arrangements to compensate the patient
for any and all negative consequences of the error.
As part of the overall conclusions and recommendations provided by this
dissertation, the greatly elevated tendency of medical errors occurring in the ICU. Such is
to be anticipated, given the weakened and thus vulnerable physical condition of ICU
patients, the large number of medical professionals and staff members who must
coordinate their care, the complexity of both the patients’ treatment plans and the
communication involved in implementing them successfully, and the ever increasing
reliance on sophisticated equipment and other technological support. Therefore, every
hospital ICU must engage in the development, implementation, and periodic review of
system wide, as well as individual staff member and action specific, protocols designed
to prevent medical errors to the absolute minimum that is possible. All of these efforts
must be developed on a foundation consistent with the highest standards of biomedical
ethics, acknowledging that medical errors will inevitably occur and that when they do,
principles of ethics must take precedence over other considerations, whether financial,
reputational, or other. The last two chapter of this dissertation address the need for,
barriers to, and specifics of creating and implementing protocols and proposals both to
prevent and to deal equitably with medical errors in the hospital ICU, with applicability
to the rest of the field of healthcare.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation presented an overview of the extensive scope of
medical errors, in terms of their severity from ‘near misses’ that lead to no negative
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consequences all the way on the scale up to errors that cause fatalities. The analysis in
this chapter has further classified typical medical errors and adverse events in the hospital
ICU as either errors of commission or omission; errors of commission are those events
that should not have happened potentially causing damage because they did, while errors
of omission are planned and intended actions in the treatment process that failed to occur
at all or within the necessary timeframe potentially causing harm by their absence. The
unifying characteristic of both types of error, and indeed of anything that all discussions
of medical errors agree on, is that to be classified an error the event must not have been
caused by the disease, injury, or ailment for which the patient is already being treated,
except in those cases in which the error precipitated a negative progression in the original
affliction which would not otherwise have occurred as swiftly or severely.
Among the forms that errors of commission may take are: 1) improper execution
of treatment or of treatment not called for, 2) incorrect diagnosis or selection of and
planning for treatment, 3) any delay in correct administration of treatment including
medication, 4) the failure of sophisticated technology or equipment, and 5)
miscommunication between any of the various medical practitioners involved with the
patient’s care. Errors of omission usually fall under specific descriptors, such as the
failure to administer some preventative treatment, such as neglecting decontamination or
sterilization procedures, a lapse in monitoring, and the omission or poor implementation
of a scheduled step in the patient’s treatment regimen, implementation of medical
management.
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This chapter has further documented the specifics of medical errors within the
context of the hospital intensive care unit (ICU). While the ICU constitutes an
environment with an inherently and extremely elevated risk of medical error, which
moreover will involve patients for whom any error can be of greater severity than in other
areas of the facility, the ramifications of a medical error in the ICU can range as widely
as its cause, from virtually no effect at one end of the continuum to irreparable damage or
even fatality at the other. Despite this variety, one clear trend among the types of errors
occurring frequently in the ICU is the preponderance of errors involving medication. All
the above factors point to the hospital ICU as likely to be one of the most, if not the most,
medical error prone environments in the field of medicine. Furthermore, the harm caused
by an error is likely to be more severe than in most other environments, considering the
following circumstances: 1) patients in this unit already are dealing with life threatening
illness or injuries, 2) they are in a weakened physical state as a result, often with
compromised or suppressed natural immune systems, 3) they are frequently sedated, 4)
they require constant monitoring and are under the care of many different medical and
healthcare personnel, and 5) they are being cared for according to complicated treatment
plans, typically involving multiple medications.
The statistics on preventable medical errors in the hospital ICU are grim, with
preventable fatalities estimated to range between 44,000 and 98,000, in addition to
economic costs of 17 to 29 billion dollars. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the
ICU is the setting for more than an estimated one third of all the medical errors in any
particular medical facility; this estimate hold for both the number and frequency of
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incidents, as well as the percentage of the hospital’s annual budget devoted to ICU in an
effort to prevent even greater error costs and consequences.
In this dissertation, Chapter 3 focused on the principles of biomedical ethics,
which have been espoused and publicized by the American College of Physicians, the
American Medical Association, and other professional medicals groups based in the
United States, which have indicated that these standards are mandated foundations and
guiding principles for both preventing and dealing with medical errors occurring in the
ICU or elsewhere within professional practice. Central to these principles is the complete
and candid disclosure of every medical error or adverse event, including all relevant
details and the informing of all stakeholders. Aside from legal duties, which have been
addressed in later chapters of this dissertation, by virtue of professional oaths and codes
of conduct, every medical practitioner, institution, facility, and organization is bound to
these standards.
The discussion in this chapter addressed the foundations of these ethical
principles in consequentialism, teleological theory, and utilitarianism. The first two of
these are focused on promoting and ensuring optimal outcomes in medical treatment and
healthcare; the last focuses on providing the greatest degree of positive benefit to the
largest segment of the population. The discussion has further considered the premises and
claims of deontology and principlism, which are in many ways in distinct opposition to
the aforementioned ethical schools of thought. Nevertheless, despite fundamental
differences, all the theories of bioethics agree that the principles of autonomy, justice,
beneficence and non-maleficence are necessary cornerstones in dealing with medical
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errors.
Regardless of the philosophical foundations of these approaches to bioethics, they
are unanimous in insisting that medical errors be fully disclosed to all involved parties;
they come into disagreement over questions such as how to deal with patients who lack
the capacity to provide informed consent or are in futile circumstances, as are those
receiving end-of-life care, both situations more common in a hospital ICU. Ethical
dilemmas, such as the conflict between family members agitating for every attempt to
prolong the life of a loved one against the medical professional’s judgment of futility and
the violation of professional ethical standards that continued or extreme measures would
entail, are situations which complicate the determination of and handling of medical
errors, real or perceived.
Among the inherent characteristics of medical services in the ICU, which bring
many ethical issues and dilemmas to the forefront, are the limitations on its resources
compounded with the unpredictability, intensity, immediacy of the services required at
any given point in time. To begin with, a high proportion of the Unit’s patients are
experiencing terminal illness, which means that they need extensive resources that even
though expended may do little to extend let alone improve the quality of life. Thus, acting
in each patient’s best interest simultaneously becomes an impossible ideal. These realities
require painful, ethically charged decision making frequently with foreseeably fatal
outcomes. Having discussed and assessed various ethical foundation principles for
allocating treatment resources, this dissertation has concluded that no single strategy,
such as: 1) treating each patient thoroughly in order of he or she presents, 2) favoring
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those patients whose conditions are more life threatening, 3) seeking to treat the greatest
number of patients to the greatest extent possible in other words, utilitarianism, or 4)
prioritizing those patients deemed to have the most social usefulness, can be considered
completely satisfactory or even fully ethical in the practical circumstances of the ICU.
Integrating multiple ethical principles can better achieve equity and adherence to
standards, but at a cost of increased complexity and thus, difficulty with implementation.
The chapter has concluded by examining the issues surrounding the withholding and
withdrawing of life-saving treatment and the ethical or legal distinction which may exist
between the two treatment decisions, particularly within the ICU. Medical errors and
adverse events occur in the hospital ICU in the climate of all these already complex
ethical circumstances and must be dealt with accordingly.
Chapter 4 began with an overview of those precepts with which most Western and
other cultures and religions across the globe concur in relation to the responsibilities of
those involved in the aftermath of a medical error, regardless of how minor or
devastating. These moral traditions require that any person, group, or organization that is
responsible for causing harm or damage to another individual or group, explicitly
acknowledge that responsibility to all those affected by its consequences and offer some
appropriate form of restitution or compensation to the extent possible. From the point of
view of the hospital ICU, what is demanded by ethics is full disclosure of the error,
including: 1) all relevant contributing conditions and circumstances; 2) all already
manifested impacts- typically negative; 3) all those consequences which can be
anticipated; 4) a sincere confession and apology; 5) proposed courses of action to
alleviate any suffering caused by the error, to rectify or undo any damage caused; 6)
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proposed steps to prevent further occurrence of the same or similar; and 7) proposals for
rectifying the error and compensating the victim.
The ultimate conclusion of all these ethical considerations is that it is the
undeniable responsibility of those in the ICU to completely communicate the
circumstances leading up or contributing to all errors, together with explicit
acknowledgements of responsibility and apologies from those responsible. Society as a
whole expects all these elements; moreover, they are the priorities desired by those
experiencing the effects of the error. This group of affected individuals indicate, both in
hypothetical scenarios and as experiencers of the situation in reality, that receiving the
details of how the error occurred, what its consequences are or can be anticipated to arise,
how these consequences of the error will be managed and corrected, and what will be
changed to forestall future occurrences.
Despite the combined force of cultural norms, moral dictates, principles of
biomedical ethics, codes of conduct from professional medical associations, policies of
the more enlightened medical facilities and institutions, and even legal mandates, the
norm among medical professionals is either to conceal part or all of the circumstances
surrounding a medical error or to distort the situation in an attempt to hide fallibility or
culpability. The pressure to follow the route of concealment is formidable. The list of
fears counteracting the sense of professional obligation in the minds of medical
practitioners includes: 1) feeling of guilt and shame, 2) lasting impairment to professional
reputations, 3) fear of loss of employment and permanent damage to one’s career, and 4)
civil litigation for malpractice with the accompanying publicity. From the perspective of
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biomedical ethics, motivations to deny or otherwise avoid responsibility are ultimately
irrelevant in that such actions expose patient, in the ICU or elsewhere, to additional
trauma both psychologically and physically.
As the analysis in this chapter concludes, contrary to the intended results of
concealing fault and culpability, such behaviors or measures readily produce the very
results medical professional had wished to avoid, namely patient dissatisfaction, harm to
professional reputations, and litigation.
The chapter goes on to describe the procedures necessary in dealing with a
medical error. The first step in the disclosure process involves collecting and reviewing
all pertinent data; documenting it; identifying all those whose actions contributed directly
to the error; creating a presentation of all that is known and surmised in the case, as well
as preparing the apology, the plan for dealing with the effects of the error, and taking
measures to ensure that there will be no recurrence. The second step is planning for the
disclosure meeting itself constitutes the second step in the disclosure process and includes
many details concerning time, place, attendees, and who is speak, when, and how during
the meeting; all aspects of which must be considered in order to optimize clarity of
communication and understanding and at the same time minimize the concern and stress
felt by the patient and others. Research has shown that the lack of careful implementation
of this process is the likely cause of approximately 70% of patients and others involved
reporting unmet expectations in the wake of the disclosure process. This chapter of the
dissertation concludes that a reevaluation of the institutional disclosure process is called
for, the goal of which needs to be no less than a fundamental restructuring of the process.
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The initial step in achieving this goal needs to accomplish significant improvements in
notification and documentation in the wake of any medical error.
Chapter 5 of this dissertation rests on the premise that the high standards of
biomedical ethics inherently cannot be upheld, complied with, or achieved in the absence
of the prior development and implementation of a comprehensive systems of protocols
for the disclosure and handling of every medical error in the ICU, from the most minor to
the most severe. Given that medical errors vary widely in the scope and scale of their
causes and consequences, protocols must be equally flexible, not only to ensure
adherence to ethical standards, but also to be consistently commensurate with the
intensity and severity of the error in question. These protocols must also be designed
flexibly enough to: 1) handle issues of accepting responsibility before errors occur, 2)
proactively manage risks to patients from errors, 3) deal with risk to the medical facility,
4) anticipate the consequences of an error, 5) identify and deal with all the stakeholders in
the event according to their individual relationship to it, and 6) coordinate the timing and
execution of disclosure, apologies, and compensation.
This chapter has described eight essentials of designing disclosure protocols
including: 1) uncovering the scope of the error, 2) adhering to the ethical principles in
acknowledging responsibility, 3) accurately assessing patient prognosis and planning to
correct the consequences of the error, 4) managing foreseeable risks arising from the
error, 5) coordinating the timing of disclosure to various stakeholders, 6) incorporating
these stakeholders into the process of disclosure and apology, 7) informal and formal
acknowledging the error and providing apologies, formally and informally as appropriate,
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and 8) handling compensation, in all the forms it will take. Moreover, this chapter’s
analysis has clearly established a number of basic factors which must be taken into
account when creating protocols and other efforts to combat medical errors in the hospital
ICU: 1) both the principles of ethics and those of professional medical associations insist
on full disclosure, 2) transfers and handoffs of patients are an especially vulnerable
activity, 3) a pressing need exists to work proactively to overcome barriers to
communication, 4) the differences in what is appropriate protocol in formal as opposed to
informal apology is considerable, and 5) current apology laws in many jurisdictions do
not achieve the positive results that were intended.
The various sections of Chapter 5 converge in establishing four distinct and
contrasting attitudes among those involved in adverse medical events and medical errors
in particular. First, medical professionals unanimously, or nearly so, concur in principle
when confronted with the issue hypothetically, that standards of biomedical ethics oblige
them to provide full disclosure and apologies. Second, these same physicians and
administrators consistently behave in directly the opposite fashion when confronted with
a medical error and its ramifications, involving them personally. Third, the clear priorities
of patients, as well as their relatives and friends are to receive answers, explanations, and
apologies from the medical professionals responsible, all of which should be motivated
by sincere regret and contrition. Fourth and possibly forming the greatest obstacle to
satisfactorily resolving the consequences and problems created by a medical error,
medical professionals fundamentally misjudge the attitudes and motivations of these
patients who have been exposed to a medical error, as well as the desires and feelings of
those concerned for these victims.
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Contrary to the presupposition of many medical professional, and even more so
their legal counsels, the primary aims of those patients who have been victims of medical
errors or their relatives and who subsequently pursue legal redress is not the pursuit of
financial compensation, as documented by a Canadian study from 2009. Findings of the
Pew research group, looking into research on mediation and litigation in the wake of
adverse medical events document the results of various studies concurring on the point
that victims of medical errors first and foremost desire a candid acknowledgement of
culpability, a sincere apology, and a demonstrable commitment prevent similar mistake
in the future. As this dissertation as discussed at length, all these findings starkly
contradict the presumptions of the majority of doctors and administrators in all segments
of the medical establishment, including the ICU, who see all legal recourse as motivated
by greed or the desire to inflict financial punishment, and thus, out of fear for their
reputations, careers, and finances remain distinctly reluctant to admit anything hinting of
negligence or responsibility. One major conclusion that the analysis of this dissertation
establishes is the extreme degree to which professionals in the medical community
misunderstand and misinterpret the feeling and priorities of patients who experience and
suffer the consequences of medical errors and their family members.
The experience of the medical institutions in the state of Minnesota provides an
example of the positive outcomes or proactive measures to combat medical errors, in
terms of significantly reducing the frequency and severity of errors, which has been
accompanied by declines in the frequency of lawsuits and concomitantly a significant
drop in the rates of malpractice insurance premiums. These impressive goals have been
achieved by doing the opposite of what has been the instinctive inclination of the medical
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community, in particular physicians, along with the thrust of the legal reforms of recent
decade. Those predominant attitudes, which Minnesota has eschewed, have been realized
in efforts to either hide medical errors, to make circumstances extremely difficult for
patients to successfully pursue redress in the courts, or to protect doctors from legal
ramifications they may engender by acknowledging medical errors and apologizing for
them. To the contrary, the professional medical community in Minnesota dedicated itself
to adhering proactively to the standards of biomedical ethics, in other words to ‘do the
right thing,’ without regard for possible consequences.
The final chapter of this dissertation, Chapter 6, concentrates on the development
of protocols and procedures, both to prevent and to dealing with medical errors occurring
particularly in the hospital ICU, but also in the broader scope of the fields of medicine
and healthcare. Protocols, as discussed in the previous chapter which were related
directly to disclosure and apology, are a vital yet narrowly focused portion of the full
scope of developing and implementing a comprehensive approach to the prevention,
minimization, and ethical handling of medical errors and adverse events. While, the
primary aim of protocols for disclosure and apology is the minimization of harm to and
the ensuring of justice for the injured patient and others aggrieved as a result of the error,
the broader focus in this chapter has been the prevention and elimination of the
occurrence of these errors and adverse events in the first place, along with the blunting of
their severity when they do occur, as stipulated at the outset of the investigation of this
dissertation. This comprehensive approach to recommending protocols encompasses their
conception, creation, and development, implementation and monitoring on an ongoing
basis, as well as their invocation once a medical error or its effects have been detected.
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Moreover, as complete prevention in the broader sense is not feasible, the implementation
Thus, as highlighted in this chapter, protocols are inherently proactive in their goal of
reducing both the rate at which medical errors occur and the levels of damage they inflict,
just as much as they aim to undo or minimize the ill effects on the patient, to the extent
possible.
The beginning of instituting, implementing, and administering the protocols
described in this chapter, whether for the hospital ICU in particular or the facility in
general is a comprehensive assessment of the institution’s specific and distinct
vulnerability to medical error as a precursor to the anticipation of definable weaknesses
that need to be proactively addressed and targeted with specific measures aimed at
correcting conditions that would foster errors, forestalling errors in inherently highly
vulnerable and unavoidable activities, and systematic monitoring of all areas and
activities prone to the occurrence of medical errors. On a promising note, this final goal
of monitoring is being increasingly facilitated by advances in information technology.
Just as modern medicine typically brings larger groups of medical professional working
together as teams dedicated to the care and treatment of various individual patients, so
too must the effort to prevent and counteract the effects of medical errors and adverse
medical events. Achieving these goals requires: 1) the efficient cooperation of various
professionals with individual specialties, 2) prompt, clear, and accurate, communications
between professionals explicitly trained and proficient in such skill, and 3) a concerted
effort to retain the personal dimension of the traditional doctor-patient relationship in the
face of the impersonalization in which is the natural tendency of the aforementioned
trends in modern medicine. The need for more effective communication extents beyond
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exchanges between physician and patient to encompass interactions with family and
relatives, other medical staff member, institution supervisors and administrators,
insurance providers, legal counsel, and government agency representatives. This need is
especially true for the error-prone activities surrounding the delivery and administration
of medication in the ICU, where training in communication skills, enhanced monitoring,
and appropriate protocols promise to significantly reduce errors. As part of these
recommendation, computerized physician order entry (CPOE), including pharmacists in
patient rounds, and providing access either to backup medical equipment or to expert
equipment technicians will each contribute to forestalling many adverse medical events.
Beyond the recommendations for protocols to forestall, minimize the effects of,
and deal with the consequences of medical errors, this dissertation calls for three major
initiatives in the broader context of the field of healthcare, which will aid in significantly
diminishing the frequency and harm caused by adverse events and medical errors while
improving the profession in other ways. First, measures need to be devised and
implemented to eliminate failures to deliver quality care and treatment resulting from
system-wide flaws or inadequacies. Second, tort reform needs to be undertaken
throughout the legal system with the expressed aim and which results in fostering
adherence to the highest ethical standards and the delivery of timely justice, as opposed
to protracted adversarial legal processes. Third, the process of educating future
physicians and other medical professionals needs fundamental revision, so as emphasize
and thereby prepare medical and healthcare students in effective communications in
general and specifically for dealing with medical errors. Since it is not possible to achieve
the goals behind these proposals through protocols along, these recommendations will
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contribute significantly to reducing the incidence of medical errors throughout the field of
medicine, beyond the scope of the hospital ICU.
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